A PRIMER OF GREEK THOUGHT

FOSTER PARTRIDGE BOSWELL

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A PRIMER
OF
GREEK THOUGHT

BY
FOSTER PARTRIDGE BOSWELL
Professor of Philosophy at
Hobart College

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TO

C.P.B. AND H.O.B.

IN MEMORIAM

PREFACE

This book is intended not only for college students beginning the History of Philosophy, but also for those of the general public who may desire to obtain, at this critical time, an understanding of the intellectual framework of our world. I have, therefore, endeavored to present in a manner more vivid and direct than that of the usual text book, the main doctrines and principles of Classical Philosophy.

Important as an understanding and appreciation of Greek Philosophy was before the Great War began, it is still more important now. For Greek thought is fundamental to half our civilization. The principles which Greek philosophers discovered, joined with the truths of Christianity, constitute the guiding principles of progress of the Western World. The present current of great events has brought knowledge of such principles from the realm of inspiration and remembrance to the domain of immediate practical application.

My indebtedness is gratefully acknowledged to the work of many writers, especially to that of George Santayana, to Windelband's "History of Philosophy," and to Jowett's translations of Plato's Dialogues from which passages were quoted; and also to my friends of the Faculty and Students of Hobart and Wm. Smith Colleges for inspiration and assistance.

FOSTER P. BOSWELL.

Hobart College, Geneva, N. Y.
August 15, 1923

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A PRIMER OF GREEK THOUGHT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

The Development of Human Thought

Philosophy originates as the result of a universal human instinct. There is hardly a race of savages so low as not to feel wonder and awe in the presence of the great phenomena of Nature, nor so lacking in ingenuity as to be unable to devise some explanation of them. Neither has any race appeared so far advanced in science and wisdom as to be sufficiently informed in regard to the foundations of the world, but rather with each increase in man's intellectual progress comes an increasing consciousness of his ignorance, and ever more intensely fascinating becomes the mystery of the universe.

What is true of the race is also true of the individual. There is scarcely any normal human being so dull as never to have asked himself such questions as, "What is it all?" "What does it all mean?" "Whence come I?" "What am I?" "Whither do I go?"

The world with its unanswered problems, with its appalling evils, its miracles of life and beauty, its weird and brooding mystery is always with us, ready to fascinate our interest the instant we forget the sham familiarity of the commonplace and turn our thoughts to things of wider sweep and greater moment than those of daily need and habit. Great philosophical problems stare us in the face, compelling our attention whenever sorrow or trouble breaks through the crust of custom. We are all philosophers by nature and heredity, and one and all we are compelled to give some answer in thought, or word, or deed, to the great problems of the universe. To render such answers articulate, to express them in such a way as to appeal to all men's reason, by clothing them in universal terms of thought, and to secure a true answer, is the task of philosophic speculation.

In addition to the inherent interest which the problems of the universe possess, there is also the interest which attaches to the origin and history of those ideas which govern men's minds and determine their attitude toward life, and are thus potent in moulding civilization and in guiding human progress. For philosophy is partly the

expression of the spirit of an age, partly a source of its inspiration. Moreover, in the conflicts of history and in the progress of civilization among peoples, philosophical principles and ideas are tried and tested, and in the evolution of the race toward better ways of living, false doctrines tend to be eliminated and the true to be established.

The two chief influences in the civilization of the West are Greek thought and the Christian religion. Included within the Christian religion are, of course, the Hebraic doctrines which it inherited and was instrumental in disseminating and a complex of ideas, teachings and institutions, which it has derived from many sources and assimilated to itself. Among these are many ideas derived from the Greeks, which it is now impossible to separate from Christian teachings, and which can be clearly understood only by a study of Greek thought. With the history and influence of Christianity every intelligent person may be assumed to be reasonably familiar. The same can, however, by no means be said in regard to our acquaintance with Greek thought. Nevertheless, to its influence is due our science, our philosophy, our systematic theology, and all our reasoned, ordered, systematic ways of regarding life and many of its aspects. Our literature, sculpture, painting, music, architecture, and many of our liberal arts trace their origin, or at least their original sources of inspiration, to the Greeks. In politics we owe to the Greeks the first conception and establishment of free civic government, the idea of the free citizen of a free state, and the principles of the limited constitutional monarchy, of the republican, and of the democratic forms of government. Furthermore, the three great rebirths of learning in the West,—the first at the time of Charlemagne; the second, the Renaissance of the Middle Ages, which was marked by a revival of literature and art and by the establishment of the universities; and third, the great Renaissance of the fifteenth century, through whose influence has resulted modern civilization,—were due to the inspiration and quickening of men's minds by contact with Greek thought.

The Greek mind was very comprehensive, and its works appeal to all the distinctively human sides of man's nature at its best, inspiring within him a love of beauty, a love of truth, and a love of goodness. Greek thought is sane and reasonable, never one-sided, never intolerant, never bigoted, never fanatical. It was scientific, but not blind to everything on heaven and earth but the present abstraction; it was practical, though not meanly practical, but practical always

with the aid of knowledge and skill and inspiration; it was philosophical, but not out of touch with human nature and human limitations. Finally, it is universal, appealing to the reason of all men. Not only is this true of Greek accomplishments in the realms of physics, mathematics, and the more exact sciences, but also in the fields of those sciences by nature capable of less exact treatment. The doctrines of politics, ethics and morality, which the Greeks were the first to clearly formulate, "are wont to outlast the sciences themselves." The philosophy of Aristotle dominated the minds of men for two thousand years, and even today it is difficult to find an extended work on scientific or philosophical subjects in which his ideas are not considered and his name quoted with respect and admiration. Greek art is so universal in its appeal that it has stood for centuries as an example of the purest and best, while its beauty has inspired all the peoples of the world. Greek literature continues to form part of the instruction of all those who are properly admitted to the ranks of educated men, and Greek plays are attended by more spectators today than in the age of Pericles.

The clarity and articulateness of the products of Greek genius is another source of their great influence. No attempts are made to cover up with sentimentality and enthusiasm ideas clumsily felt or half thought out. Each sentiment is delicately articulate; each emotion is criticised, purified and evaluated most carefully before it is considered fit to serve as food for the soul of man. "The half is greater than the whole," could not have been accepted as a maxim by any race not supremely critical, supremely definite in its thought, and, consequently, supremely articulate in its expression. It was this characteristic of the Greeks which enabled them to advance in things of the mind beyond other nations. Truths which others saw as through a glass darkly they saw face to face, and by their clarity of expression enabled more benighted peoples to discern them also.

In studying the thought of the ancients the student should remember that he is not dealing with the expression of a civilization of an order lower than our own. In the realm of the artistic and the intellectual we have not yet reached the classical level. In the accomplishments and applications of science we have indeed excelled the Ancients, but neither the Renaissance nor the Modern World has produced individual scientists as great as those of Classical times. In politics it is the Anglo-Saxon race alone which has excelled Greece in the enlightenment of its institutions, and Rome in the extent of its

dominions. To be unwilling to look to the Ancients for inspiration is to betray ignorance and lack of cultivation, and also inability to profit by experience. For in their difficulties we can see our own problems, in their mistakes our own errors, in their successes the roads to our desired achievements, in their victories our incentive. The very fact that the ancient world is dead, that the waves of its tempests are fixed and frozen in the unyielding medium of a remote past, is greatly to our advantage, since we are thus able to observe its struggles without passion, and to view its issues without prejudice. Descartes remarks somewhere that men agree regarding mathematics and disagree regarding religion, because their will is not involved in mathematics, but is deeply involved in religion. In studying the thought of another age we have the opportunity of examining issues as vital as those of religion with a view as unprejudiced as that of mathematics.

The ancient world passed away during the first few centuries of the Christian era as a tale which is drawn to a close. In the silence of the Dark Ages in western Europe it seems as if all its voices were hushed forever, as if all its thoughts had perished. But two forms of life-giving energy remained: one was kinetic, the other, as yet, merely potential. Christianity was active over the whole of European territory formerly occupied by the Roman Empire; yet so imperfect its form, so antagonistic its representatives to the thought and reason of the world, that even Christianity itself stood in danger of perishing through the prejudice, the ignorance and the brutality of its own misguided followers. Only the Irish Church in the extreme northwest and the Syrian in the extreme southeast, lands then beyond the reach of barbaric invasion, retained some measure of culture and enlightenment. On the west the little spark of light glows at the island of Iona; it lights a candle to be set up at York, and the flame is then transferred by Alcuin and Scotus Erigena to the palace school of Charlemagne, where it flickers for a while, then steadily grows brighter, century after century, drawing to itself new sources of material, sending its beacon rays ever farther and farther over the earth. The potential energy of Greek thought has become active; a living force is working along with Christianity for the uplifting of the world. The immortal souls of her poets, her artists, her philosophers and her scientists appear once more on earth to guide the hands of the new races until they themselves shall become cunning at the noble tasks, or, like gods in Homeric legends, appear giving support and encourage-

ment to the heroes now engaged in the battle against ignorance, prejudice and ugliness.

But before modern thought began, there was a long and very necessary period of training, through which the mind of western Europe passed before it was ready to think for itself. In this, the Scholastic period, the basis of intellectual life was the expression of Christian ideas in the form of fixed concepts or dogmas. Thought centered about these truths, which were set up as standards against the forces of evil and savagery rampant in the world. They were properly maintained at all hazards, and by all the power of authority. Authority becomes necessary in things spiritual, as in things temporal, whenever people are found too ignorant or too barbarous or too vicious to pursue, and in some measure to attain, truth and righteousness of themselves. The scholastic period began with some slight knowledge of ancient thought, and the writings of the Church fathers. As time went on, gradually more and more of Greek philosophy became known, until, in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas there is a complete blending of Aristotle's philosophy and Christian dogma. The Greek spirit was, however, still unknown.

The Scholastic period passes, the period of tutelage, and, with the enlightenment of the great Renaissance of the fifteenth century, another period begun, inspired by Greek thought, arose the Modern World. Intellectual and religious freedom gradually were won, and a world began in which man has grown up and shown himself once more able to perform the great creative tasks of civilization, and has in many ways excelled the Ancients. Nevertheless, it remains true that there is very little in our political, intellectual, and artistic life which is not either Greek in origin, or profoundly affected by Greek influence. Especially is this true in regard to "those highest gifts of body and mind, which enable men and which are rightly judged to rank next in dignity to virtue only." All that we mean by culture, all that grace which is lent to life by a broad and liberal education, all that makes a State exist "for the sake of noble actions and not merely for safety or wealth or companionship," all such treasures of life, except the highest ones of religion, have come to us by working the veins of spiritual and intellectual gold first opened by the Greeks.

Philosophy was not entirely absent when her sister arts flourished so luxuriantly amid the splendor and beauty of the Renaissance, and new philosophical beginnings were made at this time, but it was not until Descartes that Modern Philosophy really began. However,

the world of modern thought which began with Descartes, the world of modern science and natural philosophy, under whose very potent influence we have lived, has not been free from certain unfortunate spiritual limitations, in that it has been characterized by the close investigation of proximate causes and an excessive disregard of aims, purposes, and ultimate results. This defect has led to materialism, and has not been among the least of those causes that brought about the Great War.

The period of naively constructive thought to which Descartes belonged, a period very like in spirit to early Greek philosophy, culminated in the philosophy of Leibniz, who shares with Newton the honor of inventing the calculus. Leibniz' soaring speculations were opposed by the cautious and blundering Englishman Locke, with whom began a period of criticism and reflection. This ultimately led to skepticism so profound that modern thought has never completely recovered from it, and has not been able, as did Greek thought after passing through its period of doubt, to produce works of lasting benefit and merit.

Locke considered that Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and the continental philosophers in general had attempted to determine matters beyond the scope of human reason. He, therefore, endeavored to inquire into the "origin, validity, and extent of our knowledge." He began his investigation in a perfectly common-sense way and with a sensible object in view; as he progressed, however, he lost much of his English good sense and objectivity. His work tended to become subjective as well as critical, and he ended in a form of Nominalism so extreme as to make science or even common sense impossible. The partial subjectivism of Locke's philosophy was made complete by Berkeley, while its critical tendencies were developed into thorough going skepticism by Hume, whose work brought into question the validity of the whole structure of European thought.

Hume's work led immediately to that of Kant, and with him began the German philosophy. Kant himself was still in sympathy with Christianity, and with the deeper currents of European civilization, and he still retains the traditional background of religious and moral ideals. His work, however, opened the way for all the monstrosities of belief which have characterized latter German political and philosophic thought.

Kant, as did Locke and Hume before him, dealt with the problem of the "origin, extent, and validity" of human knowledge, or,

as it is termed in the technical language of philosophers, the epistemological problem.

His "Critique of Pure Reason" deals with the truth of science and of speculative metaphysics which is based on activity of the intellect alone. According to him science is possible only of the world of our experience of things of sense. The forms of this world, its laws, its spacial and temporal relationships, are but our ways, human ways, of looking upon and thinking out events. They are but *forms of the mind's activity*. Their objective existence, that is their existence outside the mind, as in a real world of Nature for example, is extremely problematical. Hence the *real* existence of the Natural Universe with all its seas, its worlds, and its circling stars, not only as we perceive it, but also as science teaches us it is, becomes equally doubtful. For, if the forms of our knowledge are but forms of our minds' activity, and not necessarily the forms of external existence, it becomes evident that things in themselves may be very different from the way they appear to us. In other words, as he expresses it, science deals only with phenomena. We cannot *know* or in any way ascertain by the use of Pure Reason alone, what is the true nature of the reality which underlies the things of sense. For the mechanism of the forms of human knowledge is set up before the threshold of our minds. All our experience can come to us only after having been worked up through these mental forms, and therefore, in the last analysis, our scientific knowledge is only the way *our* experience appears to *us*. Since, however, Kant assumes that these forms are common to all human minds, and that all human experience of the natural world must be cast in them, science will be universal and valid for all human beings, and its realm will extend just so far as the human mind may care to carry out its investigations within the field bounded by its own sensory experience, which is its only legitimate field of action.

Whether there is a God upon Whom all things in heaven and earth depend; whether there exists a Soul in each rational being as the substance and eternal center of his inner experience; whether there exist free causes in the Universe or whether everything is bound together in an all inclusive causal nexus, or in other words, whether Freedom of the Will is possible or impossible; these are questions which Kant says the Pure Reason can never answer. For to do so it would have to be endowed with the power to deal with things in themselves, and not merely with their appearances in our experience.

The Pure Reason can, therefore, neither deny nor affirm the exist-

ence of God, of the Soul, or of the Freedom of the Will. To do so it would have to apply to the Universe as a whole two of its forms, causality and substantiality, whereas none of the forms of the Pure Reason are properly applicable to anything but the appearances of things in human experience. The last word of the "Critique of the Pure Reason" is agnosticism. It is not merely that we have not yet found out whether or not these deeper realities exist; but are permitted to hope that, with the increase of human knowledge, mankind will ultimately be able to ascertain the truth in regard to these things, but on the contrary, Kant maintains, that human beings can never by any searching find them out, by means of the Pure Reason alone.

However, the "Critique of Pure Reason" is not the last word in Kant's philosophy, for there are other faculties of reason in the soul whose dicta are even more weighty, more significant, than those of the Pure Reason. It is in the "Critique of the Practical Reason," which Kant considered the most important of his works, that he renders a reason for the real faith that is in him. The moral sense, our sense of obligation, of right and wrong, in short all those faculties of the soul which are concerned with our sense of duty and right action, Kant terms the Practical Reason. This implies if it does not prove, gives basis for belief and faith, if not for certainty and positive knowledge, regarding some of the more important realities of the Universe, especially the existence of God, Freedom, and Immortality. We hear in our hearts the voice of conscience. This still small voice imposes on us a mysterious and absolute obligation. We feel ourselves obliged, although not compelled, to do certain things, to accept as in duty bound certain alternatives of conduct. This implies, says Kant, that we possess freedom of choice, otherwise we should not feel ourselves in duty bound to do something which it lay out of our power to accomplish. Therefore, we postulate freedom. Furthermore, we are somewhat pathetically conscious of the fact that we never reach a state of perfection in this life. But our conscience, the voice of the "Categorical Imperative," says we ought to be perfect. Therefore, according to Kant, we should postulate another world, in which we shall be granted further opportunity to attain that perfection we fail to reach in this life. Finally, we perceive, in this imperfect mundane sphere, that virtue and happiness do not always walk hand in hand. We feel, nevertheless, that they ought to go together. And, although it is possibly not the same feeling of ethical

obligation we previously had in mind, we find ourselves urged, under the guidance of the sage of Königsburg, to postulate no less a being than a God, Who is to unite virtue and happiness.

The influence of Kant was very great, and with the work of Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer, German philosophy became the leading philosophy of the nineteenth century. Kant considered that he had "removed Reason to make room for Faith." On the whole the influence of his thought made in the opposite direction. The arguments of the "Critique of Practical Reason" are not entirely convincing to all minds, and many of those inclined to follow his argument in the "Critique of the Pure Reason" were not impressed by his attempts at reconstruction in the "Critique of the Practical Reason." Doubt in regard to all truth but that of science, and that only concerning certain phenomenal aspects of existence, became prevalent, especially in Germany. The skepticism thus engendered penetrated from the religious to the ethical sphere, and from the domain of theory into the realm of practice. Lack of conviction in regard to more abstract questions was succeeded by lack of scruple in concrete instances. Just as the Greeks, in consequence of the teachings of the Sophists, from doubting the existence of truth, passed on to doubt the existence of right and wrong, so also the Germans passed from religious to moral agnosticism. One result was to sweep out of the path of their militarism and their foreign policy in general those moral and religious scruples, which Germany had previously held in common with other nations.

Beside this negative tendency, there were new and original forces in Kant's philosophy which tended toward other results not in harmony with the desires and wishes of its author. Thus, we find him constantly rebuking his disciples for carrying ideas of his own out to their logical conclusions—conclusions which Kant's better self did not always desire to contemplate. As is true of other great thinkers, who stand at the end of an old and the beginning of a new phase of human thought, much is left implicit in his work. Thoughts germinate there which did not attain the fullness of their growth until transplanted to the soil of other minds.

Fichte was the first and in certain respects the greatest of Kant's disciples. He worshipped moral freedom, he preached patriotism, and his "Letters to the German Nation" were a potent influence in arousing his people to rebel against Napoleon. He united Will and Intellect, which were sundered in Kant's philosophy, by making the

Will absolute and the intellect subject to it. The world has its essence and origin in an epic act of Will by which God, or the Absolute Ego, willed himself to be. By this act He created both Himself and the world together, these, the "ego" and the "non-ego," interact and the developing will of the Absolute becomes immanent in the world. The Absolute Ego proceeds to divide himself up into the various finite egos, and lives in the moral progress of the race. The non-ego, the outer world and all there is therein, exists only as a means to the development and progress of the will. Indeed the intellect itself, which creates the world after the Kantian manner by forming it in its molds, is but an instrument of the Will. All the world of Nature and all the world of art are but a stage and scenery constructed by the Reason through its forms for the Will to play its part upon, and the part which Fichte wished to have it play was that of the strenuous reckless moral hero, whose image he saw in the mirror of his own soul and declared that it was good.

How many of his countrymen, before and after Fichte, have strutted their little hour upon the stage, but how few of them have lately chosen to play his role of patriot, and prophet of moral freedom. The Will being absolute is privileged to change its role, and, after playing the Puritan saint in the person of Fichte, might choose to play a very unpuritanical devil in the person of other of his countrymen. In fact the parts are always changing; sometimes they are kindly and homely, sometimes cruel and ruthless, expressing the lure of a criminal heroism, but in all the play's the thing, and the approval of the sole spectator who is also author, actor, audience in one. This dangerous illusion of unreality has its origin deep in German character, and permeates their whole philosophy. It apparently springs from an inordinate vanity and egotism which is unable to admit the independent existence of anything not in accord with their own conceptions, desires, and imaginings. Like the minds of children and barbarians, their minds seem incapable of retaining ideas in the focus of attention, which are in conflict with their will. No matter how clearly their intellect may grasp such facts, they are sure to become distorted or to be considered as unreal. Their moral didactics, their intellectual skepticism, their bombastic heroism, cruelty and arrogance may all be traced to this defective sense of reality, which attempts to substitute the creatures of its imagination for the entities of true existence. Fichte's doctrine of an Absolute Will supreme over the Intellect, is but the expression in the language of

philosophers of his countrymens' barbaric attitude toward life.

Apparently Fichte did not see that the development of moral personality, about which he talks so enthusiastically, meant nothing else than the Will assuming form. At first the Will is without form; only the germ of its conscious existence springs to life with its original act of self-assertion. Its proper destiny is moral progress, development from stage to stage. But this is exactly that kind of change from potentiality to actuality, which Aristotle terms movement, *kinesis*, and defines as the taking on of form. Form, which Fichte considers a mere mechanism of the intellect, a faculty subordinate to the will, is the source of everything valuable in what he terms moral progress.

In Fichte the Will became absolute and dominant over the Reason. In Schopenhauer it became the world substance. It is the essence and ultimate principles of Nature. This Will is impersonal in character, a striving force not subject to the laws of space and time, nor capable of being known in itself. Its manifestations occur, however, in space and time, and it objectifies itself as individual things, animals and plants, whose types 'imitate' the Platonic Ideas. The higher the organism the greater its capacity for pain, but not in equal measure its capacity for pleasure, and one has only to compare the pleasure of an animal devouring another with the pain of the animal being devoured, to be convinced of the preponderance of pain in the world. Schopenhauer is convinced of pessimism and the hopelessness of continued existence. Man's only escape from the pains of existence is by a denial of the will and the attainment of a will-less state of mind, the *nervana* of the Buddhists.

Will as the world substance, sanctioned by the import of the philosophy of Fichte and supported by the authority of Schopenhauer and others, becomes a leading motive in German thought. Will came to mean Force to the German soul. Indeed it is difficult to see what else it logically could mean, if one strips it as Fichte does of all reason and intelligence, which are its natural attributes. And if, by a certain compromise and blending of ideas derived from these two philosophies, something which was not unlikely to occur in the obscurity of German metaphysics, one considered it also as the substance of the world. All this tended to materialism.

The prophet's mantle of German philosophy next fell upon Hegel, Schoperhauer's bitterly hated rival. Hegel is considered a follower of Kant, but is free to differ with his master even to the point of main-

taining that the phenominal world, which Kant held to be ultimately so unreal, is, on the contrary, reality itself; and that the forms of reason, which to Kant were merely forms of the mind's activity, are the forms of creation itself. Reason is objective. It is in the world as the form and manner of its creation; it is in the mind as well, not only as the manner of its thinking, but also as the self-conscious expression of the Reason which exists in the world unknown to itself. For Hegel actuality and rationality are identical; but Reason itself is not altogether rational. The world does not proceed in accordance with the accepted laws of logic, but rather by strife and contradiction. There are no real norms, either of thought, or conduct, or events; the future only is the norm; only that which is about to superseded the present can set a standard for that which is. Everything which is is right, everything which is about to be is better. There can be no fixed principles, no consistent laws. Reason in the mouth of Hegel ceases to speak the unembellished words of truth, but is inspired to relate a romantic narrative of the world process.

Since Reason was not, as Kant thought, merely the form of human thinking, but was also the very grammar of reality itself, although Hegel might assert the grammar was not flawless, he nevertheless thought it was of the very first importance to examine the manner in which thought itself develops from its most simple to its most elaborate forms. He discovers that thought itself moves according to a certain formula, of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, and he shows most pleasing ingenuity in deducing all the Kantian categories, the chief forms of thought, out of one another in accordance with this formula. The evolution of the world takes place in a similar manner to that of thought. In fact, it is only a continuation of the same process, and Hegel proceeds to show how this process of evolution should occur. He begins with the astronomical universe, and with the most empty of its forms, space and matter, and soon creates the sun and stars. After the astronomical universe Hegel goes on to evolve the world of chemical processes, the vegetable kingdom, the animal world, and finally the world of human society.

It is here we find that charming philosophy of the State, which explains so much that otherwise might remain inexplicable to rational beings in German national character. The State is the highest concrete form in which the World Reason manifests itself. Only the idealistic realms of art, science, religion, and philosophy are to be considered higher. These, however much they may be dependent upon

and connected with the activities of the State, are essentially souls without bodies, disincarnate spirits, not attached to any particular portion of the material world. Morality is applicable only to the actions of concrete beings and extends only to the limits of organized society; that is to the limits of a sovereign State. The State is the end and goal of civil society. Morality begins, it is true, in mere civil life, in marriage, in commerce, and in all the more usual dealings of human beings with one another, in a state of nature as it were rather than in a state of grace. But morality finds its true home only in a highly organized modern state, such as Prussia, in the relations of the individuals to the State, and in their relations to one another as units of the substance of the State. Morality, therefore, truly exists only in the officially recognized duties of the subjects of an organized government. There can be no morality outside the State, for evidently there is no way for it to get out, since only through the State did it come into real existence, and thus only within the State can it be said really to exist. There is no morality outside the State.

However, other equally infallible sovereign States exist, and wars, strife and contentions are always breaking out between them. These wars Hegel held justified, indeed approved of God, for by means of them proceeds a heavenly dialectic to determine the right of each nation in turn to possess the soul of the World. Certain nations have appeared from time to time in history, each of which has been honored for a season by the Absolute as his chosen people, and permitted to bear his spirit through the world. He chose in turn the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, and at about the time Hegel was writing His fickle favor had turned toward the French.

Hegel's philosophy had a tremendous vogue. It seemed to have a place and find an answer to all the problems of the Universe. Even natural science fell for a time under its spell. But, in disregarding the limitations imposed by the logical principle of contradiction, Hegel had opened his doors to everything and nothing. Truth and error, wisdom and folly, entered together and found no invidious distinctions made between them in his system. Hegel's logic with a truly democratic spirit had "accorded equality to equals and unequals alike." It soon became evident that no serious scientific progress was possible in such an environment and natural science reacted violently against such sophistry, and freed itself from the hampering influence of this

philosophy. German political science, however, still remained under the influence of Hegel's thought.

In closing the century with the philosophy of Nietzsche, the Philosopher of the Will to Power, of the Master and Slave Morality, the Despiser of soft Pity and Christian Charity, the Worshipper of Force and Hardness of Soul, German thought reaches its most extreme expression. Familiar to some extent with the doctrine of evolution as it had appeared in the writings of German scientists and philosophers, Nietzsche had also acquired a smattering of the teachings of Darwin and other English evolutionists. The struggle for existence he interpreted as the Will for Power; the survival of the fittest as the dominion of the stronger over the weaker. To his mind all Nature shows this conflict. It is the ultimate reason for being. But the terrible suffering which this fierce world struggle engenders throughout the Universe would be utterly hopeless, utterly without justification, were it not for the fact of Beauty. In Beauty alone is the Universe redeemed. The fact that out of the struggle for power and dominion, in itself so irrational, so doomed to failure, there emerges Beauty in the Splendor and Glory of the Conqueror, proves to Nietzsche that in the Beauty of Conquest alone must be sought the justification of existence. The terrible suffering of myriads of sentient beings for untold ages since the world began is justified, redeemed from utter pessimism, by the glory of those who, for each vanishing moment of the earth's existence, stand pinnacled upon its summit, dominant over its foul and bloody conflicts. In human society, primarily, or to a far greater degree than amid brute creation, does this principle of "justification" prevail. It is those men able to dominate their fellows, to ride the whirlwind and direct the storm, that redeem mankind from its utter sordidness and misery by throwing a glint of glory on the pool of its blood.

Human morality is nothing but master and slave morality. Some are born to rule; others to serve and suffer. Let the Masters grow in power and produce a race of Supermen, who will be as far superior to them as they are to the rest of mankind. Then will the Glory of the Earth be heightened. So far from being evil, differences of rank and station are the inevitable conditions of any significant existence. Democracy, by attempting to do away with them, is the greatest evil of modern times. The Masters are to have no easy time of it, however. They must be hard—hard not only to inflict suffering upon others, but hard to endure suffering and pain themselves. They are

to live perilously, to lose heavily, to remain unconquered and unconquerable, no matter how many pangs they must endure or how much buffeting by Fate. No common morality is required of them. No morality at all, says Nietzsche, except such as is necessary for them to keep the mastery of themselves and to accomplish their purposes. To lie, to steal, to be cruel and murderous and lustful, is in them no fault, provided they still possess the Will to Power above all other men and the means to victory. To be hard to themselves and hard to others, to use all the lower orders of humanity as a means to power and victory is their natural destiny, and for the fulfillment of such a destiny no common morality is possible. Truth itself is only a means to an end,—a means which the Will to Power has devised for itself the better to accomplish its purposes. Let them in whom the Will to Power most truly manifests itself use truth or falsehood equally as instruments of victory. All great deeds of history are crimes, and no one who hesitates at the quality of an act or scruples at the means to be employed will ever accomplish anything truly great.

All religions are detested by Nietzsche because all endeavor to put a curb upon men's passions and to impose some regulations upon man and superman alike. Christianity is the especial object of his ire because, beyond all other agencies which have entered the world, it has enabled the weak to overcome and set at naught the domination of the strong. The Apostles and early Fathers of the Church, by the employment of such exquisite subtlety and craft as to make the Medicis, Machiavelli and Napoleon (his favorite heroes) appear mere amateurs in statecraft, devised a system of ideas of honor, of right and wrong, of justice and mercy, and, worst of all, of forgiveness and of Christian love and charity, which have hindered the progress of mankind for twenty centuries by making the masters the slaves, and the slaves the masters. All governments are bad, according to Nietzsche, but some are worse than others in curbing those of their subjects ambitious to be Supermen, by means of laws and rules and the weight of institutions.

The Superman is to be a "revaluer of values," an originator of ethical ideals, a reformer of the attitude of men's minds in regard to fundamental moral principles. Toward the founder of Christianity Himself Nietzsche is rather well disposed. He admits that no one in the course of history has been a greater revaluer of values than Christ, nor did more to overcome victoriously greater odds, nor lived more

perilously, nor stood at a greater height above the level of mankind. Apparently Christ only escaped meriting his unqualified approval by refusing to fall down and worship the devil on the mountain. Toward the end of his life Nietzsche went hopelessly insane.

"The great man," says Nietzsche, "the truly great man, is not he who is full of sympathy for his fellows, but he who is capable of inflicting the cruelest suffering without heeding the cries of his victims."

"My brothers in War, you should love peace as a means for fresh wars, and a short peace rather than a long one. . .You say a good cause sanctions even war, but I say, a good war sanctions every cause."

There are many people who find the same kind of harmless enjoyment in reading Nietzsche that they might in reading a boy's book about pirates, and who would not think of attributing any real significance to his sound and fury, or of being seriously influenced by whatever he has to say. Yet, in the history of philosophy, and in the history of those forces which were slowly gathering during the nineteenth century to burst into the most terrible of wars, the influence of the Philosophy of Crime can hardly be regarded as harmless or as insignificant. It is too symptomatic, too closely attuned to the spirit of those influences dominant in Germany, too logically the result of the whole course of German philosophical development, to be lightly set aside as a madman's whimsy, or as the wild romancing of a boyish imagination.

There is much in German philosophy which has been greatly admired, and its influence upon the thought of the nineteenth century was dominant. Yet, if one follows carefully the course of its history, one will perceive that it is constantly engaged in ridding itself of one set of principles and taking on another. It is a philosophy of transition. Its transformation represents the mind of a people gradually becoming conscious of itself, gradually throwing aside the hampering garments of a civilization which had proved alien to its genius. The admirable sentiments and ideals which find expression in the work of Kant, and to a steadily decreasing extent in the works of later writers, belong to those traditions in which German philosophy was brought up, rather than to the character it was destined to attain. They are Greek or Christian in their spirit, and originate in the common European heritage of culture from the ancient world.

In contrast with these ethical ideals, there is another and very different element in German thought. It is very different in spirit

from Kant's puritanical morality and Fichte's love for freedom, that inspiring love for freedom which roused his people to throw off the yoke of Napoleon, and yet was stamped out of their breasts a few years later, when it had ceased to be useful to the German rulers. This distinctively German spirit comes more and more into prominence as the development of German thought continues. It appears first in the form of sentiment and of a romantic mystical enthusiasm. This attaches itself to Kant's views of morality, and gives a not unpleasing touch of romance to his ethical ideas. With Fichte it becomes more prominent, inspiring him with zeal, not only for moral freedom and progress, but also luring him on to consider the Will, which is only potentially and not necessarily moral, as dominant over the reason, which becomes a mere instrument for the will. The whole world, in Fichte's eyes, is but a stage, set by the reason for the Will to play its part upon. God becomes submerged in His creatures, and lives only in the moral progress of the race. From merely lending enthusiasm and a certain mystic zeal to preaching those ethical truths which, as Aristotle says, are "wont to outlast the sciences themselves," this romantic sentiment proceeds next to obliterate and obscure these ideals, and to set up in their place goals impossible of human attainment, because inapplicable to human nature and out of accord with human life. The next step is pessimism arising from despair of such impossible and undesirable ideals ever being realized. This we find in Schopenhauer. In more virile minds, such as that of Hegel, we find romantic enthusiasm turning into a kind of idolatry, various powers or aspects of the world being worshipped by this type of philosopher under the name of Absolutes. From Hegel himself comes that most worshipful idol, the Absolute State, the State which can do no wrong, has no duties but its own interests, can be bound by no moral obligations to any other State, and to which treaties are but scraps of paper. Finally in Nietzsche, romantic sentiment had so far become perverted that some of the most depraved and criminal tendencies of man's nature are mistaken for ideals. The Philosophy of Germany, the greatest intellectual force of the nineteenth century ended by becoming a Philosophy of Crime.

The result of this course of spiritual perversion was manifest in connection with the political and militaristic activities of Imperial Germany and in her conduct of the war, when it became evident to what extent her philosophers and savants had rid the minds of their countrymen of those religious, moral, and intellectual bonds, the

whole *re-ligio* of civilization, which had previously tended to bind her to the standards of the West.

In addition to the influence of German philosophy, the growth of natural science, and the evolutionary doctrines of Darwin and Wallace are matters of first magnitude in nineteenth century thought. Science in all the civilized countries of the world continued to grow and expand rapidly during the nineteenth century, which is the greatest in all history in the attainments of pure science, and in the applications of science to practical affairs.

At the beginning of the century, considerable advance was made in Astronomy, Physics, and Chemistry, later Geography, Geology and Biology became prominent. The first few decades were marked by very considerable progress in Astronomy. The planet Neptune was discovered by calculations based upon observed irregularities in the orbit of the planet Uranus. Comets and meteor systems were observed and asteroids and minor planets discovered.

Next came important discoveries in connection with Light. Interference, polarization and spectral analysis were discovered. The wave theory of light, originated by Huygens in the sixteenth century, was greatly advanced by Young and Fresnel, and served to connect Heat, Light and Electricity together. Photography was invented. Soon the composition of the stars was determined by means of spectral analysis and further great progress in Astronomy was made possible. Next followed epoch making experiments in connection with Heat. The mechanical equivalent of heat, being determined by Joule and others, led to the theory of the conservation of energy. Fundamental discoveries regarding magnetism and electricity followed by Amphere, Oersted, and Faraday, while Seebeck discovered thermo-electricity, or the production of electricity by heat. The connection between sunspots and magnetic disturbances upon the earth was established. The electric telegraph was invented by Morse and others. In chemistry, Sir Humphry Davy discovered that nitrous oxide produces insensibility, and this led to the use of anaesthetics. He also investigated the effect of electricity on chemical affinities and Faraday followed this up with the discovery of electralysis. These discoveries led to many others connecting electricity and chemical change together; and, in the course of time, to the hypothesis that electricity forms the ultimate basis of matter. Dalton showed that different chemical elements always combine with one another in definite proportions. He stated the law of multiple proportions, and

put forward his atomic theory in explanation. This theory was immediately adopted by the leading chemists of his time and led to much of the development of modern chemistry. His interpretation of the nature of the atom has been corrected by further knowledge and by discoveries in electro-chemistry. Organic chemistry, begun by Boerhaave in the eighteenth century, was firmly established by Liebig, and attained a high degree of development in the nineteenth.

Meantime had been going on a series of investigations and discoveries in connection with the facts of life, and with the changes of the earth's surface, which were destined to lead to the accumulation of much evidence in support of the doctrine of evolution. Von Humbold founded the science of Physical Geography. He had made numerous observations of temperature and climate, of flora and fauna, of rock and terraine formations, of ocean currents and depths, and of many other facts in regard to the surface of the earth; and he endeavored to bring all existing knowledge of natural phenomena together into an organized whole in his great work which he termed the "Cosmos." In the meantime classifications of animals and plants had led to the belief that separate species were descended from common ancestors. Geothe had shown that the higher plants are composed of metamorphosed stems and leaves. Lamark had shown that a close homology, or similarity of parts, existed in invertebrate animals. Goeffrey St. Hilaire showed this to be true of higher animals also. Cuvier developed the study of Comparative Anatomy to such a point that, from a few bones, he was able to determine the structure of an entire animal. And, upon the discovery near Paris of quantities of fossilized bones, he was enabled to reconstruct the animals of the past, and to prove that many of these animals both resembled, and yet were somewhat different from, any existing forms. In many cases these were extinct races of animals which, evidently, had once existed in abundance upon the earth. This led to the belief that some of them were probably the ancestors of similar forms existing in the same regions at the present time. Von Baer developed into a science the study of embryology, and showed that the embryo passes, during the course of its prenatal development, through stages in which it successively resembles those other forms of life from which its race has apparently arisen. For example the embryo chick begins as a unicellular organism, then becomes like an invertebrate marine animal then somewhat like a fish, then like an amphibian, then like a reptile

and finally a bird. All embryos start as unicellular organisms, and pursue a similar upward course of development, until they reach the point where their race branches off from the general tree of life. This has been called the "Recapitulation Theory."

Progress in Geology came to fit in perfectly with these facts by showing that the temporal order, in which the various races of animals have appeared upon the earth, is similar to that in which the different stages appear in the development of the embryo. This furnished further evidence in support of the doctrine of evolution. About 1830 Sir Charles Lyell taught that the rocks of the earth's crust were formed by slow and natural causes, such as still continue to go on at the present time, and not in general by extraordinary convulsions of nature. Such causes are erosion, deposits by rivers, action of the tides and currents of the sea, volcanoes in eruption, earthquakes, and the gradual raising or lowering of the land, which has been perceived to go on in historic times. These and similar causes seemed to him sufficient to account for most geological events on the earth's surface; and that, "changes in the crust of our earth have been brought about in the course of long ages by causes like those which are still in action." Louis Agassiz next proved that parts of northern Europe and America, which are now temperate in climate had once been covered by huge glaciers. These had left great deposits of stones and rubble in the valleys, cut grooves in the rocks, transported great boulders hundreds of miles from their place of origin, and left many other signs of their former presence. Several of these glacial ages had succeeded one another in the northern hemisphere in pre-historic times. And between the advance and retreat of the ice of different glacial ages remains of pre-historic man were found, together with those of several extinct species of animals. Since the last glacial age was not less than 10,000 years ago, and the others far earlier, this showed the antiquity of human life upon the earth. Moreover remains of a series of beings intermediate in bodily structure between man and anthropoid forms of lower animals have been discovered. The finding of weapons and tools of rough stone, smooth stone, bronze, and iron, of earthenware and metal vessels, of numerous tombs, remains of dwellings, and temples of early man has enabled scientists to infer a more or less continuous development of human life from stages beginning with the animal, to the sub-human, human, paleolithic, neo-lithic, barbaric and finally to the civilized.

All this gives further evidence in favor of the truth of the doctrine of evolution.

In addition to the progress of the nineteenth century in pure science, many great inventions and applications of science to whole fields of human activities have been noteworthy. In connection with the new science of electricity the invention of the telegraph was followed by that of the telephone, the electric light, the electric dynamo and motor, and the wireless telegraph and telephone. The high development of the steam engine made possible steam navigation, the railroads, and the modern factory. The gas engine rendered the automobile practical and the aeroplane possible. The effect of these inventions and of numberless developments in machinery revolutionized urban and rural life, while the phonograph and the moving picture machine furnished new means of pleasure, amusement, and education. The name of Edison is inseparably connected with many of these inventions, as that of the greatest inventor of the age.

Psychology, since the days of Aristotle, one of the philosophical disciplines, became established as an independent science during the latter half of the nineteenth century. William Wundt established the first psychological laboratory at Leipzig in 1879. This was rapidly followed by the establishment of others in most of the German and American Universities; while in France, England, and the other leading countries they appeared more slowly. Progress in all branches of psychological science has been very rapid and continuous, and a great number of useful applications in education, medicine, business and the arts are already being made. Among the most interesting and far reaching of the recent tasks psychology has accomplished has been the measurement of intelligence. Mental tests were applied on a vast scale in the United States Army during the World War, and gave results which are fatal to the assumption of an equal distribution of intellectual capacity among human beings. On the contrary, men are, by birth, intellectually superior or inferior to one another. And their distribution according to intelligence corresponds, in the great majority of cases, with the customary social standing of the trade or occupation in which they are found to be engaged.

A number of the leading scientists and public men of England, America, and France became interested in the last fifty years in the phenomena of psychical research. And many of them have been

convinced that the continued existence of human personality after death has been proved by empirical evidence.

The conception of the evolutionary origin of animals and plants is as old as the beginnings of Greek science. Anaximander, in the fifth century B. C., maintained that life originated in the sea, that it there passed through many different forms, at length developing the fishes. Then some varieties of fish came out of the water and learned to live in the air. From these organisms descended the land animals, and finally man. Aristotle's philosophy is essentially evolutionary. The views of several of the early Fathers of the Church, of St. Augustine, of Scotus Erigena, and of St. Thomas Aquinas are in harmony with evolutionary doctrine. In modern times the idea is suggested in the works of several philosophers and thinkers before Darwin, as Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Leibniz, Diderot, Schelling, and Goethe; and in biology the way was broken for Darwin by the work of his grandfather Erasmus Darwin, by that of Lamark, and by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire.

What Charles Darwin did was to establish evolution as a scientific principle by adducing a host of facts to prove that the process really existed in Nature, and by putting forward a definite mechanical hypothesis as to the manner in which the various species of animals and plants arose. He gave due credit to Lamark's theory; that the use of certain organs increased their growth, and that this might in the course of many generations so modify the bodily structure of races of animals as to produce new species. He admitted that this and other hypotheses might explain some of the facts of evolution. But he contended that, in the main, the origin of species is due to chance variations of a parent stock, those individuals tending to survive which varied in such a manner as to better fit them for the struggle for existence. This struggle for existence is caused by the fact that organisms tend to multiply in geometrical progression, but, because of limitations of the food supply, depredations of enemies, crowding, injuries, disease and other causes, their numbers remain fairly constant. The more fit individuals tend to live longer and to produce more offspring, while the less fit tend to die out. In time, Darwin said, the surviving descendants would have varied so far from the original stock as to become a new species. In his "Descent of Man," Darwin applied his theory to the origin of the human species, and held that man has descended from certain animals, now extinct, which had been closely related to the ancestors of the present anthropoid apes.

Controversy raged for a long time over the Darwinian hypothesis, which, being clamorously opposed by theologians, many of whom were apparently unfamiliar with the history of evolutionary doctrine, and of their own science, became associated with the strong materialistic tendencies of the times. The principle of evolution, however, gradually won universal acceptance, and proved of great service in the advancement of human knowledge. Darwin's particular teachings as to the origins of species have, however, suffered considerable revision and modification at the hands of later biologists. Hugo de Vries, the Dutch botanist, maintains that species do not originate by the accumulation of slight variations, but by sudden considerable 'mutations' from the parent stock. Others, like Weismann, have theorized regarding the mechanism of heredity and variation. Still others declare that Darwinism merely tells the manner in which the tree of life has been trimmed, but says nothing as to its natural form and inner tendencies to growth. Finding similar structures, lines of development of organs, and other analogous phenomena occurring under the most diverse conditions of environment and heredity, biologists are beginning to speculate as to the degree to which the phenomena of life are determined from within, and to question their being wholly moulded from without in answer to the demands of the environment.

Herbert Spencer applied evolutionary principles to various branches of knowledge, but from the time of Darwin to nearly the end of the century little of significance in the History of Philosophy occurred. Science flourished abundantly, as did also materialism in a kind of half-world between science and philosophy. But in philosophy it was a time of timid, complex, and futile speculation, of threshing of old straw, and repatching of old clothes. Unsolved doubts, originating in the complexities of the Kantian theory of knowledge, paralyzed the creative efforts of men's minds, and conscience made cowards of them all.

At the very end of the nineteenth century Pragmatism was advocated by William James in America. James maintained that the truth of an idea was to be measured by its worth when applied. An idea is true if it works. If someone says the gray mare is in the stable, and when I go there with the expectation of finding her there and see her when I get there the assertion is true; if, however, no mare is in the stable, the assertion is false. Ideas are true if they make good, they are false if they do not make good. The function of an idea to lead to a

successful or unsuccessful termination constitutes its truth or falsehood. Hitherto modern philosophers had considered only the source and relations of ideas to one another in considering their claims to truth. James presented another consideration of paramount importance in this connection, namely, the relations of ideas to *action*. Pragmatism, as James intended it, was to be a method of testing the truth of philosophical doctrines, but was not, and was not intended to be a system of philosophy.

Henri Bergson a mystic in philosophy, a vitalist in biology, a spiritualist in psychology and an intuitionist in his theory of knowledge, by his brilliant originality recalled attention to a number of important problems, which were being disregarded amid the steady progress of the natural sciences, and the droning ritual of contemporary university philosophy.

Materialism is the name for that type of philosophical doctrine which maintains that matter, and no mental, intelligible, or divine entity, is the basis of all things in the Universe. Materialism, therefore, eliminates a host of spiritual values common to other types of philosophy. In the ethical sphere this means that men follow the lower and more immediate aims and impulses of life, rather than higher and more remote incentives derived from a belief in the existence and fundamental importance to humanity of other principles than matter. Such materialistic ethics, especially in European political and economic life, was among the most potent causes which brought about the war, and many of the worst evils of the times.

It has been upon a foundation of modern materialism that present social revolutionary teachings have been built. "At the time," says Windelband, "when Feuerbach's Materialism, which was a degenerate product of the Hegelian dialectic, was yet in its vigour, Marx and Engels created *socialism's materialistic philosophy of history*, in which motives from Hegel and Comte cross in a peculiar manner. The meaning of history they too find in the 'processes of social life.' This collective life, however, is essentially of an economic nature. The determining forces in all social conditions are the economic relations; they form the ultimate motives for all activities. Their change and development are the only conditioning forces for public life and politics, and likewise for science and religion."* The absence of moral or religious scruple which is characteristic of materialism, has been especially evident wherever social revolutionary

*W. Windelband, "History of Philosophy," pg. 655.

propaganda has appeared or its program has been carried into effect.

We are probably living at the end of an era of ideas. As the Mediaeval World passed away at the coming of the Renaissance, so like an unsubstantial pageant vanished, may end and fade the Modern World.

Where are men to look for guidance and inspiration in framing the ideas which shall govern a new world? Are they to return again to the ideals and institutions of the Middle Ages? To do so would doubtless do much toward supplying our lack of common world principles and aims. The two great mediaeval ideals of a Universal Church and a Universal Empire, under whatever modern constitutional forms may develop to clothe them, are apparently destined once more to claim allegiance of men's minds. Men are seriously thinking in terms of the entire world, and may perhaps be able to create institutions to make such thoughts effective.

The sciences as philosophies of life have been tried and found wanting. Excellent ministers of civilization, they are too short sighted to serve as guides. Modern Philosophy found its natural home in Germany and there its development accompanied and inspired all those atrocities of belief and conduct from which civilization turned with loathing. It is bankrupt in creative general ideas.

Proletarianism threatens to substitute for the danger of being dominated by the leaders of the German aristocracy, the peril of being tyrannized over by the leaders of the Russian mob. In both cases the chief aim and purpose is the same. It consists in the attempt by one class to domineer over all other classes, and all other peoples within reach of its power. There can be no more talk of justice in the tyranny of the lower classes over the higher, than in the tyranny of the higher over the lower, and there would exist far less enlightenment. A shift of power from aristocracy to proletariat means only that the old struggle between liberty and arbitrary government has entered upon a new, possibly less enduring, but more bitter phase.

The victory of the Allied and Associated Powers in the Great War, however bad the resultng state of peace may be, represented a victory of the older, more fundamental, and better things of our civilization, a civilization whose essential philosophy of life is derived from Greek and Christian sources. May it not be that inspiration for the future should be sought amid those things? That our age must look to the ideals which inspired both the Mediaeval and the Modern World, and recreate a view of life more sane, more whole, more human, more divine than that of either? These ideals are those of Christianity and of the Classical Philosophy.

CHAPTER II

THE EARLY CONSTRUCTIVE PERIOD

The Problem of Essence, Permanence, and Change

Long before the Greeks, with whom Philosophy may properly be said to have begun, civilization had flourished extensively in the Mediterranean basin among a people of dark complexion, but belonging to the white race, who seem to have been closely related to the ancestors of the present Basques of Spain, Berbers of North Africa, and Copts of Egypt.

In the land of Egypt the progress of mankind from the condition of the stone age to that of one of the highest civilizations of antiquity can be traced with especial clearness and continuity. The earliest Egyptian tombs, situated at the edges of the desert, are little hollows lined with stones containing flint instruments, human remains, and crude vessels. These give place to square walled tombs, which increase in height and lateral dimensions, until, about 5,000 B. C. were built the pyramids at Gizeh. At this time the country was well organized, and ruled over by a king, the Pharaoh, assisted by a priesthood and a nobility. A feudal age followed, and then an Empire whose seat was at Thebes, and whose power extended not only over Upper and Lower Egypt, but at times over Palestine, Syria, and even over the whole of Mesopotamia. At Karnak, across the river from Thebes, the Pharaohs of the Empire built the greatest religious building known to man. The arts were perfected to such a degree that treasures taken from the tomb of one of these rulers Tutunkahmen, have excited the admiration of the whole modern world. Egyptian civilization lasted from considerably before 5,000 B. C., until the Mohammedan conquest in 639 A. D. In Chaldea a somewhat similar civilization arose and "had lasted for thousands of years when it was interrupted by inroads of Semites from the Arabian desert, the "land of the bow." After much fighting, these at last made themselves masters of the whole of Mesopotamia. At first, six or seven thousand years ago, they settled in the southern portion of Chaldea, and built themselves towns in the midst of the

Sumerians and Akkadians, gradually adopting their higher civilization, and with it their system of writing, their religious literature and their gods, and finally combining into a great Chaldaeo-Semitic kingdom, with its center at Babil (Babylon). Later they spread northward from Chaldea and founded the powerful empire of Assyria with its center first at Ashur, later at Nineveh. From about B. C. 2000 to 606 Assyria was the most powerful state, extending its sway over the whole of western Asia, including Cyprus, and sometimes even Egypt, but, after the latter date, Babylon once more rose to eminence, only to succumb in less than a century to the Persian empire of Cyrus the Great (B. C. 538)."*

Egypt and Babylon were the first known countries to originate and develop to any appreciable extent the arts and sciences upon which civilization depends. They produced the first books and written records, inventing a system of hieroglyphics, and in time a phonetic alphabet; they studied astronomy, history, architecture, sculpture, painting, chronology, agriculture, navigation and mathematics. Geometry, originally the art of measuring fields, was used very extensively in Egypt, the annual overflow of the Nile obliterating landmarks and making a method of measurement most necessary.

In the social organization of these people there were three classes: first, and lowest, the workers including several different groups; second, the soldiers; and third, the priests. These three divisions of society are characteristic of all barbaric civilizations. The priests were the leisure class and some of them devoted themselves to study, the result of their labors being the beginnings of the various sciences just mentioned. Besides founding these arts and sciences they elaborated complex systems of theology, tending gradually, in both Egypt and Mesopotamia, to advance toward monotheism.

Notwithstanding all the wisdom of the Egyptians, the Greeks are considered the first to originate systems of philosophy, because they were the first to attempt to explain the world by causes and principles and not by the caprice of the gods. Philosophy is the attempt to find a rational explanation of the world in general. In this it differs from religion, which accepts its doctrines upon tradition and faith, and because of their fruits in experience. The barbarian races which preceded the Greeks, although they originated many of the sciences and had a great deal of theology, had no carefully reasoned thought about the world in general. Even their scientific accomplish-

*Davidson, History of Education, pg. 3.

ments are not achieved in a very scientific spirit. This defect extends even to mathematics, which before the work of the Greeks was more or less of an empirical and rule-of-thumb method, useful for practical purposes, but devoid of clear-cut scientific reasoning. To the disinterested, careful, sane study of either nature or man, the barbarian world never attained. This was reserved first for the Greeks, and, through them, afterwards for the modern European peoples.

The dawn of the Greek genius is clearly shown in the Homeric poems which, while celebrating the prowess or adventures of Achaean chieftains, reveal the general characteristics of later Grecian civilization—the germs of its art, literature, religion and political systems, which developed in the historic period; they disclose, also, nascent ethical sentiments, associated unto the worship of Achaean Zeus, Apollo and Athena. The Achaeans were probably of Keltic race and spoke an Indo-European language. Descending in successive waves of migration from Central Europe, they, together with kindred tribes, overspread both shores of the Aegean Sea, penetrating and conquering Greece Proper and the coasts of Asia Minor, where they impressed a new type of civilization upon that background of Aegean culture which surrounded the Mediterranean basin. The focus of this culture was the Island of Crete, with its Minoan Kingdom of Cnossos, the centre of an advanced and original art, a wide commerce and an indigenous alphabet, developed from the pictographic stage, and furnishing, to some extent, the source of the Cyprian characters and the Phoenician. Upon this ancient stratus, the slow growth of several millenniums, the Achaean invasion made a marked impression, conquering yet absorbing influences from the aboriginal race, maintaining an unstable sway, which finally vanished before the inroads and pressure of other northern tribes, summed up under the name of the Dorian migration. This wave broke over the Peloponnesus and the Aegean Islands to Crete, and was felt in Asia Minor: it brought about re-arrangements of the existing tribes, while extending widely, Doric dialects and institutions. It introduced also a period of comparative crudity, illustrated by the primitive forms of the "Dipylon Art."

Among the inhabitants of Greece the three castes characteristic of barbarian society are absent. There existed no hereditary priestly caste dominating the minds of the people with cherished superstitions, no military caste enforcing the dicta of the priests, and holding the

country in subjection. There was no central despotic government to fear as in Babylon or Egypt. But each little community became a free and independent city-state.

At first most of the Greek city-states were monarchies. Then they gradually changed to a republican form of government similar to that of ancient Rome; a patrician class arose curbing the power of the kings and establishing a firm, socialistic, military state. Sparta kept this form of government for many centuries, still, however, retaining the memory of her former condition in the persons of two superfluous kings. In about the seventh century B. C. the republican form of government prevailed, although there was the greatest independence in systems of government at all times among the different Greek cities, and various forms existed contemporaneously.

By the seventh century B. C. the Ionian Greek colonies in Asia Minor had developed flourishing city-states and were actively engaged in trading with all the nations on the coasts of the Mediterranean, and even with some lying beyond the pillars of Hercules. Wealth increased, and with it civilization and knowledge of the sciences as known to the Egyptians and Babylonians. Then, with the growth of prosperity due to trading and navigation, the lower classes came into power, and another political change was effected, converting the city-states into democracies and taking away the power from the patrician class. Thus, in several Greek cities in Asia Minor there was a group of very able men, constituting the remnants of the aristocratic party and the stronghold for anti-democratic traditions. Debarred from politics by the democrats in power, some of these men turned to study, and formed in many of the cities little groups, meeting together for the discussion of intellectual topics and interested in learning all they could of the science of the day.

Miletus, a small Greek city in Asia Minor, has the honor of producing the first philosopher, and thereby making possible a new era in human progress, for the torch of learning, then kindled, passed unquenched down the ages, at times blazing with divine light, at others dim and nearly extinguished by the storms of ignorance, prejudice, and barbarism which swept Europe in the dark ages. It burned with increasing brilliancy during the mediaeval period, and has lighted with steady and unflickering beam the stately progress of modern civilization from the Italy of the Rennaissance to one northern nation after another, to the New World and to the Orient, until the light of reason and science begins to penetrate the waste places of the earth.

Thales, who lived in 600 B. C., was the first of the Milesian school. He explained the world by saying that it arose from water; that water was the *arche* or substance, essence, or first principle, from which all else came. This moist element condensed to form solids and evaporated to form the air.

Simple, naive, almost childish as is this explanation, it surpassed in one quality all the wisdom of the Egyptians; something there present was destined to raise peoples of the earth to higher levels than any yet attained, to unite nation with nation, and bring alien races together on the basis of their common reason. For this was the first attempt to explain Nature in rational terms. And although Thales' doctrines were scarcely uttered but to be surpassed, his ideas almost infantile in their simplicity, he deserved to be ranked among the very few whose life work has introduced new and beneficent forces into civilization.

Thales' genius, however great it was, did not, of course, create a world out of nothing. He was familiar with Greek literature and tradition, and it seems probable that his knowledge of the old Greek story of creation influenced him to choose water as the substance from which all things arose. According to the old myths, in the beginning was Chaos; and the first thing to appear out of Chaos was the sea. Afterwards the dry land emerged from the sea. Thales also perceived the immense importance of water in the natural world, its intimate connection with growth and generation. While a third reason for his choosing water for his *arche* was very likely the fact that the worship of Poseidon, the god of the sea, was prevalent in the sea-coast city of Miletus, and great practical and religious importance was attached to the ocean and to everything connected with it.

Of the little group of philosophers forming the Milesian school only two names besides Thales' have come down to us. All three are alike in that each seeks to explain the world by means of some one principle or substance, which through its various transformations gives rise to all things, aminate and inaminate. This method of explanation has been termed hylozoism.

The next noteworthy philosopher of this school was Anaximander, a disciple of Thales. This man shows almost uncanny insight in his anticipation of some of the most important doctrines of the present day science. He holds that the earth originates, not from water, but from something unlimited, undefined, the *apeiron*. Now the word

ἀπείρον was used by the Greeks to denote the outer atmosphere. Thus Anaximander thought of this substance as spatially undefined and undetermined. He did not identify it with any one form of matter as earth, air, water, etc., but said that all things arose from it and returned to it again "at the hour appointed by Fate, as is just, that their existence might pass on to new beings."

Of course there are different interpretations of his meaning. If he meant that there is some unlimited or undetermined substance which when limited, becomes natural objects, then Anaximander had the first metaphysical idea. This *apeiron*, he says, takes on various forms, and everything comes from it and returns to it. In the beginning there arose from this first principle the opposite elements: dry, moist; warm, cold; and, through their interaction, various other substances. He anticipates the modern doctrine of evolution when he says that life first originated in the ocean, passed through many different forms, finally developing the fishes; then some varieties of fishes learned to live in the air and came out of the water. From these organisms came the land animals, and finally man. He conceives the *apeiron* to remain always the same, but entering into different forms, and returning in time to its original state.

Anaximander said that the earth is in the form of a short cylinder, floating in the atmosphere and held up because it is equally distant from the other heavenly bodies. This might be considered as a vague anticipation of the law of gravity.

The third of the Milesian philosophers is Anaximenes. His theory is no advance, but rather a retrogression from that of Anaximander. He says that the substance of the universe is not the undefined, which by becoming defined gives rise to substances, but that the *arche* is air; that everything arises from that. This theory differs from that of Thales only in the substitution of air for water.

The Milesian philosophers, in propounding their theories, aroused general interest in metaphysical subjects, especially in the problem of change or becoming, of motion and rest. Their speculations led to the logical question: how could any principle change, and yet remain the same? The other cities of Magna Grecia had their groups of men engaged in study, who thought over the doctrines of the Milesian school, criticised and discussed them. To the problem of change there were advanced two opposite solutions: first, that permanency alone is real, and all change is an illusion; the second, that change

itself constitutes the essence of the world, and permanence is an appearance due to the opposition of changing forces.

The first solution—that permanence alone is real—was given by Parmenides of Elea, a Greek city in southern Italy. He was greatly influenced by the preaching of a religious rhapsodist called Xenophanes.

Xenophanes was an unusual and striking figure in Greece. Fired with religious zeal, he traveled about the Grecian world preaching doctrines extraordinarily similar to those of the Hebrew prophets. He preached monotheism, smiting with the sword of his eloquence the errors of the prevalent polytheism. He contended that the writings of Homer and Hesiod, representing as they did the gods as men, were false. These poets represent the gods as immortal and beautiful; but with all the moral defects, the sins and follies of men. They are jealous; give way to anger; they steal; they lie; they commit adultery. Xenophanes preached one god, omnipotent, ominpresent, omniscient, free from the moral defects and wickedness of men.

From this theology of Xenophanes, Parmenides formulated a philosophical doctrine, which he expressed in the form of a poem, the first part of which he dedicated to Truth, the second to Illusion. He said that what we see as change is simply illusion; that the changes which we see around us are only on the surface of things; that underneath the world is a permanent, concrete, unchanging reality.

His doctrine is that the essence of the world is unitary, continuous, absolute, and self-sufficient. This essence is grasped by the reason, not perceived through the senses. Being, as he calls this essence, must be eternal, because if it were not, it came either from nothing or from being. If it came from being, it came from itself, and so must be eternal. The opposite assumption, that being came from nothing, is unthinkable. Being is likewise imperishable, because it is equally impossible to picture something becoming nothing. By means of similar arguments he shows that being must be conceived as unitary, absolute, and self-sufficient.

His ideas of space deserve special mention. He proves that being must be continuous, and shows the self-contradictory character of the ideas of movement. Movement, he says, can occur only in space, but space is either a form of real existence or it is absolute nothingness. If it is real, being moves in being; or, in other words, remains at rest. If it is absolute nothingness, motion is impossible, because it

cannot be conceived to occur in nothing. For the same reasons there can be no gaps or discontinuities in being; because if space is a real entity it serves to unite being with being; and if it is absolute nothingness it cannot separate one thing from another. Therefore, reality is motionless and unitary, or continuous.

Change, nevertheless, appears all about us, and Parmenides had to reckon with this appearance. He explained it by saying that change is an illusion of man. If it is an illusion, man should have some clue to guide him in the realm of illusion; so, in the second part of his poem, Parmenides discussed the habits of illusion. Here he explains how the senses divide illusion into darkness and light, and out of the conflict and mingling of these forces arise all the changing objects of our perception.

The followers of Parmenides devised various arguments to support his doctrine. The most interesting of these were advanced by Zeno, the foremost of his pupils. One is the argument of the flying arrow. An arrow, said Zeno, to get from one point to another, must pass over an infinite number of intervening points. It takes the arrow a certain amount of time to pass over one point. But, as there is an infinite number of points, it must take the arrow an infinite amount of time to pass over all of them. Consequently, the arrow is at rest. A similar argument is that of Achilles and the tortoise. Achilles is trying to catch the tortoise. Before he can reach the tortoise he must traverse half the distance between himself and the slowly moving reptile. When he has gone half the distance, he will have more than half the distance to go, because the tortoise will have moved a little further on. When he has gone half the remaining distance he will still have a little more than half of that distance to go, because the tortoise will, again, have moved on a trifle. So, logically, Achilles can never catch the tortoise. Another argument is the "Stadium." A religious procession is moving about within a stadium, near one side of which is a row of statues. During the course of its manoeuvres one part of the procession is passing by the statues in one direction, another part is moving by on the other side of the statues in the opposite direction, but with the same speed as the first. And it happens that each statue is opposite a person in each division of the procession. Each person will then be found to be moving by the statue with a certain speed, but at the same time he is moving by the person opposite to him in the other division of the procession at twice that speed. Each person is, therefore, moving twice as fast

as himself. These arguments show that Zeno and Parmenides had become aware of the problem of the relativity of motion. This has lately become an important subject of investigation in the higher mathematics, and has appeared in Physics and Astronomy under the form of the Einstein Theory.

The argument of "Heap" was devised to show the world is unitary, not composed of an assembly of parts. If there is such a thing as an object, it must be made up of parts. If it is made up of parts, it is both infinitely great and infinitely small. It may be divided or broken up indefinitely, and this division will result in an infinite number of quantities. An infinite number of finite quantities is an infinite quantity; hence the object is infinitely large. On the other hand, it is infinitely small, because each portion which results from the division may be considered as infinitesimal, and no amount of such quantities will ever equal a finite quantity. These arguments were intended to show, not the impossibility of perceiving or sensing movement, but the impossibility of logically conceiving it. Because Zeno's arguments were so obviously made to defeat an opponent rather than to support his own theories by constructive evidence, he has been called the father of sophistry.

Parmenides' great opponent, Heraclitus, who gave the opposite solution to the problem of becoming, that change alone is real, lived at Ephesus at 500 B. C. He was descended from a prominent family in that city, and his ancestors had been concerned in public affairs for several generations. The office of king of the priests was hereditary in his family, and although he himself never held that office, his writings have a certain priestly tone, and he loved to surround himself with mystery. Besides, the ideas which he tried to express were difficult, so he is called the "Dark Philosopher." He is also called the "Weeping Philosopher," because he was impressed—and very sadly impressed—with the fact of continual change. He saw that all things pass away; that no matter how much a thing is loved and valued it is destined to go the way of all the earth. He constantly dwells in his writings on the inevitableness and all-consuming character of change. He may have been influenced to indulge in such pessimistic speculations by reason of the fall of the aristocracy in Ephesus, which had become a democracy in his time, and he doubtless felt keenly the loss of prestige which his class had suffered in the change from aristocratic to democratic government.

It is not strange that Greek philosophers speculated so much on

change. Instability was characteristic of the Greek people. They were fickle and prone to experiment and fond of innovation in government; a people of brilliant achievements, marred by lack of constancy. Their wise men perceived this failing and felt that in the end it would lead to the fall of Greece.

Heraclitus was so impressed by the universality of change that he made it the fundamental principle of his philosophy. He symbolizes this principle of eternal change by means of fire and flood, the forces of destruction. The flowing character of the flood represents his idea of the continual flow and change of the world, as does fire, with its whirling, moving, destroying character, its ceaseless change, its all-consuming progress. Permanence is but an illusion due to the opposition of striving forces, which temporarily hold one another in equilibrium, but, sooner or later, one force or the other conquers and the object passes away.

"Πάντα χωρεῖ, Πάητα ῥεῖ.—It is the burden of Hegel on the one hand, to whom nature, and art, and polity, and philosophy, aye, and religion too, each in its long historic series, are but so many conscious movements in the secular process of the eternal mind; and on the other hand of Darwin and Darwinism, for which 'type' itself properly *is* not but is only always *becoming*. The bold paradox of Heraclitus is, in effect, repeated on all sides, as the vital persuasion just now of a cautiously reasoned experience, and, in illustration of the very law of change which it asserts, may itself presently be superseded as a commonplace. Think of all that subtly disguised movement, *latens processus*, Bacon calls it (again as if by a kind of anticipation) which modern research has detected, measured, hopes to reduce to minuter or ally to still larger currents, in what had seemed most substantial to the naked eye, the inattentive mind. To the 'observation and experiment' of the physical enquirer of today, the eye and the sun it lives by reveal themselves, after all, as Heraclitus had declared (scarcely serious, he seemed, to those around him) as literally in constant extinction and renewal; the sun only going out more gradually than the human eye; the system meanwhile, of which it is the centre, in ceaseless movement nowhither. Our terrestrial planet is in constant increase by meteoric dust, moving to it through endless time out of infinite space. The Alps drift down the rivers into the plains, as still loftier mountains found their level there ages ago. The granite kernel of the earth, it is said, is ever changing in its very substance, its molecular constitution, by the passage through it of electric

currents. And the Darwinian theory—that 'species,' the identifying forms of animal and vegetable life, immutable though they seem now, as of old in the Garden of Eden, are fashioned by slow development, while perhaps millions of years go by: well! every month is adding to its evidence. Nay, the idea of development (that, too, a thing of growth, developed in the progress of reflexion) is at last invading one by one, as the secret of their explanation, all the products of mind, the very mind itself, the abstract reason; our certainty, for instance, that two and two make four. Gradually we have come to think, or to feel, that primary certitude. Political constitutions, again, as we now see so clearly, are 'not made,' cannot be made, but 'grow.' Races, laws, arts, have their origins and end, are themselves ripples only on the great river of organic life; and language is changing on our very lips."*

Heraclitus holds that fire is the element out of which all things arise and to which they ultimately return. He is not on this account, however, to be considered a follower of Thales, who merely chose fire instead of water as the *arché*. He uses fire not as the *arché* itself, but as the symbol of mutation, of the very principle of change. Fire condenses and forms air; air condenses and forms water or the liquid element of things, water solidifies and forms earth, stones and other solids. This is the ὁδός κάτω the way downward; then the road is reascended, and earth becomes water; water becomes air; and air changes back into fire. All things of the earth may change, but this law remains constant amid the change. This is the first appearance of the conception of natural law in philosophy: the first appearance of the idea that Nature is governed by immutable laws. This natural process does not go on smoothly and without friction, but with ever-present strife and opposition. The various permanent things of earth continue only through the strife of forces. Connected with all objects is a balance of contending forces, internal or external, and when this balance is destroyed the old object passes away and a new thing comes into being. War is thus the father and king of all things, because all things arise, continue, and pass away through strife and opposition.

The permanency of the law of change was not something which one could see; it was something which Heraclitus' reason led him to think. So he has something of the feeling of Parmenides, the reason leads to truth, and the senses have to do with appearance. Heraclitus also has something to say in regard to the nature of man. Man he

*Walter Pater's "Plato and Platonism." Chap. I.

considers to be a mixture of the four elements—earth, air, fire, and water. His soul is akin to fire, the most divine element; the more he turns his mind to high things and keeps away from sensuality, the more will his soul become like unto the heavenly fire. After death, the soul returns to the heavenly fire whence it came.

This philosophy has obvious relations to some modern doctrines, as has just been indicated in the passage quoted from Walter Pater. Darwinian evolution teaches that species are not permanent entities, but are ever in the act of changing. New species arise from time to time as outer conditions change and inner conditions and the forms of life change also. This comparison should not be interpreted to mean, however, that Heraclitus formulated a theory of evolution. Evolution, although presupposing change, necessarily implies that changes progress along certain lines of development. To this idea of progressive change Heraclitus never attained.

The chief criticism of the doctrine of Heraclitus is that the idea of universal change is a self-contradictory idea, because if change is altogether universal, change itself would change. Further, if one accepted the teachings of Heraclitus, it would soon become evident that truth could only be a matter of momentary validity; since both the individual changes and the world about him changes, and whatever may seem true of the world at one time is not true at another. This led to the famous Sophist doctrine that anything is true which seems true to anyone at any time. Thus, the doctrines of Heraclitus as well as the doctrines of Parmenides, in the hands of the Sophists lead to doubt and skepticism. There were, however, certain men who did not draw skeptical conclusions from the conflict between the doctrines of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Although conscious of the difficulties involved, they endeavored to solve the problem of becoming by combining the most important ideas of these opposing schools. The principle of all these attempts is the same, namely, to show that there is permanency in the beings, or parts of the world, and change in their relations to one another.

The first of these attempts was that of Empedocles, 450 B. C. He assumes that there are four unchangeable elements: earth, air, fire and water. Besides these there are two forces: Love, and Hate or Discord. In the beginning all these elements were united in a great spherical mass by Love, by the forces of attraction. Then Hate or Discord entered and separated the elements into different habitations; so that some remained in the outer heavens, giving rise

to the sun and the stars; beneath, came the atmosphere; then the water, then the earth. Thus Discord separated the elements in the way in which they now appear in the cosmos. Then, after Discord had done its work, it ceased to act, and Love re-entered. By the influence of Love the various animals and plants arise on the surface of the earth through the mingling of the elements. This process will continue until the universe returns to the original union of elements whence it arose; and then the cosmic cycle is to be repeated again in future aeons.

Empedocles' notion of the origin of animals is peculiar. He thought that the different organs or parts of bodies arose first and were afterwards put together to form different beings. This theory would explain the mythological animals like the Centaurs. Man is a mixture of all the elements. He has knowledge of all things because like recognizes like.

The main significance of Empedocles' work is his concept of the element. This idea lies at the foundation of a very important form of scientific explanation, which has constantly been employed in modern physics and chemistry. Empedocles is not to be ranked among the greatest of scientists and philosophers because of this intellectual achievement, but among those men who are great by reason of a single idea. His work began a new form of thought, the explanation of the processes of Nature by assuming that the finer parts of the world remain permanent, but change in their relations to one another. The novelty of his doctrine consisted in his assertion that elements remain permanent and do not undergo mutation into one another, as the preceding philosophers had taught. Air does not change to water, nor fire to earth; but new objects arise by new mixtures of old elements.

Anaxagoras, an Ionian, who emigrated to Athens about 460 B. C., advanced beyond the position which Empedocles had occupied. He held that there are an infinite number of elements, which are infinitely small. No one of these is ever destroyed or changed. No element changes either in quantity or quality, but it does change in its relations to other elements. He has also the concept of a Force governing the Universe, and moreover, of an intelligent Force, which he calls the *Nous*. The *Nous* is the active factor in Anaxagoras' world; it moves and excites the elements to motion; these are powerless to move of themselves, or to change their original relations to one another in which they existed in Chaos. The *Nous* is the source of all

life. It is conscious, omniscient, purposeful. It has arranged and ordered the world. The *Nous* is the world reason, the conscious Force which organizes matter. This philosopher for the first time in history has the idea of force clearly distinguished from matter.

Anaxagoras' story of the origin of the world was that in the beginning was Chaos, with the *Nous* apart from the other elements, a kind of transcendent god. Then the *Nous* entered and ordered the world out of Chaos. The manner of the organization was mechanical after its inception. The *Nous* originated a whirling motion among the elements; the heavier ones remained at the center, forming the earth, and the water on its surface; the lighter elements were thrown outwards to form air; and then the still lighter fiery elements to form ether or the outer atmosphere. After the cosmos had thus been ordered and the elements dispersed to their proper dwelling places, Life next arose on the surface of the earth. Earthly life is life at its lowest, life in the moon and stars is far more perfect than the life we know. All living beings possess some of the vital, life-giving force of the *Nous*, and thus have a certain degree of intelligence; but man has far more than the animals, although he is excelled by the bright inhabitants of the heavenly bodies. Because of his reason, which is akin to the *Nous*, he comes to knowledge of the *Nous*.

The *Atomists* are the next important school. Materialism ancient and modern traces its origin to this school. It was founded by Leucippus, who lived at about 400 B. C. Democratus, the pupil of Leucippus, was greater than his master, and it is to him that the theoretical development of the principles of the school was due. The poems of Leucippus and the theories of Democratus have been in part transmitted by Aristotle and others, but our knowledge of this important scientific movement is not so great as one might wish, since the knowledge we possess of its doctrines and ideas has been gleaned from writers who mention it only incidentally and are not in sympathy with its views, or who, like the Roman poet Lucretius, are more concerned with its use as a weapon against religion than with its scientific possibilities.

Atoms are conceived as the elements out of which the world was made. The atoms are all composed of the same substance, but differ from one another in form and size. Force is a quality inherent in the atoms, which are constantly in motion. The qualities with which bodies impress our senses are due to the size and form of the atoms which compose them. Smooth, soft, agreeable objects are composed

of the smoother atoms, while bitter and acid substances are composed of the rough and jagged ones. The movements of the atoms are directed by Necessity, and are as little due to chance or caprice as to guidance by intelligence and purpose, but all take place according to impersonal, inevitable law. Chance according to the Atomists, is merely man's ignorance of the real causes of events.

Democratus contended that empty space or the void existed in which movements of the atoms occurred. In the beginning the perpetual movement of the atoms produced vortices. The atoms then combined according to size, form, and weight; the heavier atoms moving downward in infinite space, while the lighter are retarded in their motion. Thus arose the earth and the air.

The soul of man is made of the finest and smoothest atoms, which are found gathered together in the sense organs and the brain. Democratus explained sensation and perception by saying that effluences are given forth by all objects. These affect our senses, and then proceed to the brain, where they excite images or ideas. Sensation is thus the only source of knowledge, and all ideas are derived from that source. We know only the impressions which objects produce upon us, not things as they are in themselves. Man is conscious so long as the soul-atoms remain in the body. In sleep a certain number of soul-atoms leave the body; and when death occurs all are scattered. The individual passes away at death, but the soul-atoms are indestructible. The gods are conceived as more powerful and intelligent beings than man, but they also are composed of atoms, and their immortality is only relative. After a time they too pass away. They are not lords, but products of creation. All things, even the gods, are under the rule of Necessity. And while the gods are to be venerated as superior and divine beings; they are not to be worshipped as the supreme and governing powers of the Universe. The old Aryan idea of Fate, under this new guise, as supreme, impersonal Necessity, governs the world, gods and men.

This philosophy is significant because it furnished the concept of the atom and of the immutability of natural law; it is important in that it laid the foundations for materialism. The conception that knowledge is derived from sense impressions, combined with the Eleatic doctrine that sense impressions are false, resulted, at the hands of the Sophists, in skepticism.

The *Pythagoreans* were a brotherhood much like a monastic order, living according to fixed rules of conduct. As those monastic orders,

which take their origin from the Orient, were wont to cultivate certain virtues of the affections—pity, mercy, or charity, so, by way of contrast, the mystic brotherhood of the Pythagoreans, being Greek in origin, cultivated aesthetic and intellectual virtues. Their aim and principle was harmony. They tried to attain beautiful ways of living, to study harmonious things, to discern hidden harmonies in nature and in life. Mathematics, which with them had a broader meaning than with us, but was still essentially founded upon number, as the most perfect expression of harmony, was their especial study. In their rather mystical metaphysics number was the arché. The Universe was supposed to arise and come into being after the manner of the self-development and progress of a mathematical number sequence, and thus to take its ultimate origin and being from number. In the mathematical sciences themselves, they made considerable progress, especially in arithmetic and geometry. The Pythagorean proposition that the square of the hypothenuse of a right angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides was originated by them. Besides mathematics, they studied astronomy, seeing harmonies in the movements of the planets. Music was another of the subjects which they pursued with ardour, since in essence it was the expression of rich aesthetic and mathematical harmonies. They also studied physics and philosophy in general. In their lives they were abstemious and temperate, following the discipline and rules of their order. They flourished especially among the Dorian Greeks, and acquired considerable political influence in Crotona and Tarentum and among the Sicilian republics. The rise of democracy in those places and the accompanying disorders drove many of them to Athens, where they exerted a salutary influence in opposition to the Sophists, and influenced not a little the soaring genius of Plato.

This brotherhood traced its origin to a romantic and mystical personality, called Pythagoras, who is supposed to have lived some five centuries before the Christian era. About him the clouds of myths and legions thicken, sometimes identifying him with Buddha, and sometimes with Apollo, telling of his wonderful journeys and attributing to him magical powers, recounting that he preserved his wisdom in a book of Golden Verses.

"The Golden Verses of Pythagoras parted early into dust (that seems strange, if they were ever really written in a book) and antiquity itself knows little directly about his doctrine. Yet Pythagoras is much more than a mere name, a term, for locating as well as may be a

philosophical abstraction. Pythagoras, his person, his memory, attracted from the first a kind of fairy-tale of mystic science. The philosophy of number, of music and proportion, came, and has remained, in a cloud of legendary glory; the gradual accumulation of which Porphyry and Iamblichus, the fantastic masters of Neo-Platonism, or Neo-Pythagoreanism, have embodied in their so-called *Lives* of him, like some antique fable richly embossed with starry wonders. In this spirit there had been much writing about him: that he was a son of Apollo, nay, Apollo himself—a twilight, attempered, Hyperborean Apollo, like the sun in Lapland: that his person gleamed at times with a supernatural brightness: that he had exposed to those who loved him a golden thigh: how Abaris, the minister of that god, had come flying to him on a golden arrow: of his almost impossible journeys: how he was seen, had lectured indeed, in different places at the same time. As he walked on the banks of the Nessus the river had whispered his name: he had been, in the secondary sense, various persons in the course of ages; a courtesan once, for some ancient sin in him; and then a hero, Euphorbus, son of Panthus; could remember very distinctly so recent a matter as the Trojan war, and had recognized in a moment his own old armour, hanging on the wall, above one of his old dead bodies, in the temple of Athene at Argos; showing out all along only by hints and flashes the abysses of divine knowledge within him, sometimes by miracle. For if the philosopher really is all that Pythagoras or the Pythagoreans suppose; if the material world is so perfect a musical instrument, and he knows its theory so well, he might surely give practical and sensible proof of that on occasion, by himself improvising music upon it in direct miracle. And so there, in Porphyry and Iamblichus, the appropriate miracles are.

"If the mistaken affection of the disciples of dreamy Neo-Platonic *Gnosis* at Alexandria, in the third or fourth century of our era, has thus made it impossible to separate later legend from original evidence as to what he was, and said, and how he said it, yet that there was a brilliant, perhaps a showy, personality there, infusing the most abstract truths with what would tell on the fancy, seems more than probable, and, though he would appear really to have had from the first much of mystery or mysticism about him, the thaumaturge of Samos, 'whom even the vulgar might follow as a conjuror,' must have been very unlike the lonely 'weeping' philosopher of Ephesus, or the almost disembodied philosopher of Elea. In the very person

and doings of this earliest master of the doctrine of harmony, people saw that philosophy is

'Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute.'

And in turn he abounded in influence on the deeds, the persons, of others, as if he had really carried a magic lute in his hands to charm them.

"As his fellow-citizens had all but identified Pythagoras with him, so Apollo remained the peculiar patron of the Pythagoreans; and we may note, in connection with their influence on Plato, that as Apollo was the chosen ancestral deity, so Pythagoreanism became especially the philosophy, of the severely musical Dorian Greeks. If, as Plato was aware, or fancied, true Spartans knew more of philosophy than they let strangers suppose—turned them all out from time to time and feasted on it in secret, for the strengthening of their souls—it was precisely the Pythagorean philosophy of music, of austere music, mastering, remoulding, men's very bodies, they would then have discussed with one another.

"A native of Ionia, it is in one of the Dorian cities of Magna Graecia, at Crotona, that Pythagoras finds the fitting scene of his mysterious influence. He founds there something like an ideal republic, or rather a religious brotherhood, under a rule outwardly expressive of that inward idea of order or harmony, so dear to the Dorian soul, and, for it, as for him, ever the peculiar pledge of the presence of philosophic truth."*

The physical doctrines of the Pythagoreans are of especial interest in connection with these attempts we have been considering to reconcile the philosophies of Permanence and Change. They held, indeed, that the essence of the world was harmonious number, the object of the reasoning faculties of the soul and not of the senses, and that the sense world was not important. Nevertheless, like Parmenides himself, they were forced to a kind of compromise with the devil, and found it expedient to render some account of the world of appearance. They considered the sense world to be composed of one substance, which is divided into atoms. These atoms have different geometrical forms, squares, cubes, spheres, etc., and each element of which the world is made is composed of atoms having the same form. All changes and movements of the Universe are governed by mathematical laws. The application of mathematics to the processes of

*Walter Pater, "Plato and Platonism." Chap. III.

Nature, an exceedingly important step in the progress of science, should be credited to the Pythagoreans, since they were the first to introduce it as a means, perhaps the only true means, of scientific explanation.

The cosmology of the Pythagoreans is interesting. At the center of the Universe was, they thought, a central fire, about which revolved a series of concentric spheres. In the sphere next to the central fire is fixed the earth and the counter-earth. The inhabitants of the earth are presumed to live on the side of the earth turned away from the central fire. Next to the sphere wherein is fixed the earth comes the sphere which holds the moon, then that of the sun, then the spheres of the other planets, and finally the sphere of the fixed stars. These spheres were thought to revolve at differing speeds, one within the other, and thus the relative movements of the sun and the planets and the other heavenly bodies were explained. Furthermore, each of these transparent crystaline spheres as it revolved in contact with the other gave forth a musical note, each sounding one of the notes of the octave. The harmonies which these notes combined to produce was the famous "*Music of the Spheres.*"

To the beginner in the study of the History of Philosophy it often seems as if ideas and doctrines changed from period to period without much reason, and that the subject possessed but little apparent unity. The same is also true regarding the History of Science, but men are more apt to take the latest scientific dicta as gospel, and to consider all past science as false. They are altogether oblivious of the moral certainty that much of the latest wisdom will likewise be superseded in the near future, and, therefore, in all probability as great a portion of present day science is as false as that of any scientific age which has preceeded it. The scientist has in no way the advantage of the philosopher in this respect. It is only that his vision is less broad, that he is too much absorbed in the present problem to look before and after, and that he is too content with his paradise of apparent certainties to sigh for what is not. Moreover, in both science and philosophy, although systems vanish, facts and principles remain. Truth accumulates by precipitation. Like gold washed down from the mountains, it settles below the moving waters of the stream. Often it is only after the age which has brought a science into being has passed, that men are able to judge the worth of its alleged discoveries.

The Attempts at Reconciliation illustrate this strikingly; each

attempt taken as a whole is a failure, but each advanced a new principle or called attention to some new facts or means of explantion which have been of such importance in the history of science that it is hardly too much to say that all or almost all the ideas of a fundamental character, which have since proved useful for purposes of explanation in the physical and chemical sciences, were here discovered 400 years before Christ.

From Empedocles comes the concept of unchanging elements, which by entering into compounds give rise to all other substances. From Anaxagoras comes the conception of Force as distinct from that of Matter, and the idea that there exists an indefinite number of elements, at least as many as may be empirically found to exist. The Atomists not only invented the concept of the atom, but held in addition that all things are ultimately reducible to a single world substance, differences between elements being due to differences in the form which the atoms of such substance take; they also held strongly to the doctrine of the immutability of natural law, depicted under the guise of Necessity. The Pythagoreans, by applying mathematics to the processes of Nature, found that many of these processes are expressible in mathematical terms. Unintelligible Necessity becomes intelligible mathematical explanation, and the Laws of Nature are no longer held to be dark decrees of a blind Fate, shrouded in impenetrable mystery, but become capable of elucidation in the clearest of intelligible terms. By the year 420 B. C., the foundations of the inorganic sciences were so well laid that men have never permanently built on any other. Scientists have simply carried on the work then begun. We see strikingly exemplified in these attempts to reconcile the philosophies of Permanency and Change both the permanency and change of human knowledge itself.

With these Attempts at Reconciliation ends the first period of Greek philosophy, sometimes called the early Constructive Period. In the disagreements between the systems, profound as they seemed to be, there was nothing fundamentally contradictory. All, at least, were different interpretations of Nature. There was no doubt in the minds of any of these early philosophers as to *man's ability to discover* the fundamental things of Nature and of life, no question but that the human mind was capable of attaining to knowledge of the essence of the Universe.

With the end of this period, however, comes one of reflection,

criticism, doubt. The succeeding philosophers not only doubted particular doctrines, which their predecessors had maintained, but were skeptical as to the very possibility of knowledge, at least knowledge of anything more than the mere surface of the world. There were several influences which led to such a position. Some were political and social, which will be considered in the next chapter; some were intellectual, and arose from the contradictions evident in the teachings of the earlier philosophers. Although it will be necessary to consider them again, it may be well to state them before closing this chapter. The philosophy of Heraclitus, carried to its logical extreme, would end in skepticism, because if change permeates everything, change itself must change, and there can be no logical stability or permanent truth anywhere. Then too Gorgias, a pupil of Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides, argued that neither existence nor non-existence was logically thinkable. If anything existed it must be something which was unoriginated and imperishable, or which was originated and is perishable. But we can think of nothing without an origin, neither can we think of something arising out of nothing, nor of something becoming nothing. Therefore, there is nothing which is either unoriginated and imperishable, or which is originated and is perishable. He also argued that if anything did exist we could not know it, for thoughts are different from things, so that which is and our thoughts of it differ. Moreover, if we could attain truth, we could not communicate it to others, both because words and ideas are different, and because our ideas and those of others differ. A third factor causing men to doubt were the theories of Democratus, where the conflict between reason and sense experience also appeared. Democratus maintained that reason and perception were different, and showed that the ideas of reason were derived from sense perception. The Sophists noted the illusions and defects of the senses, and pointed out that if the senses are defective, reason is no more reliable since it receives its material from the senses. Thus germs of skepticism might be found in all these early philosophies.

CHAPTER III

THE SOPHISTS AND SOCRATES

The Basis of Goodness and Truth. Reason Versus Authority

Skepticism became prevalent as the result of the work of the Sophists. With the increase of wealth and prosperity of the middle classes came a demand for higher and more general education, and the Sophists appeared in answer to this demand. They themselves were not creative thinkers although they made beginnings in grammar, psychology, and logic, incidental to their practice of the art of oratory. They were chiefly engaged in teaching what had already been discovered by the early philosophers and in destructive criticism both of this earlier work and of knowledge in general. They also supplied the demand for instruction in rhetoric and oratory which arose because of the political changes taking place. The Greek cities were one after another changing from aristocracies to democracies, and in these democracies oratory and the power of political persuasion led to advancement. Also, in Athens especially, there was great occasion for the use of rhetoric in the law courts. In the frequent lawsuits each man must defend his own case, and a good orator had much the better chance of winning.

The aim of the training which the Sophists gave was practical efficiency under these conditions. In studying oratory as the art of persuasion it was necessary to learn something of the emotions, desires, and impulses which sway men. Therefore, the Sophists began to study psychology as far as it was applicable to oratory. They also taught argumentation—how to argue on either side of a question, how to present a case in the best possible way. This led to a study of words and their meanings, and finally to the study of logic as an art of proof and contradiction.

Through their study of practical psychology, logic, grammar, and rhetoric, they became so much impressed with the uncertainties and contradictions with which all learning seemed involved, that they finally began to doubt the validity of human knowledge altogether. For the first time in Greek history attention was turned away from

the outside world, with which the older philosophies were so exclusively concerned, to the world of inner experience. Not understanding how any firm basis for truth or knowledge could be found within the mind itself, the Sophists came to very skeptical opinions. To these, the conclusions deduced from results of several of the earlier philosophies also contributed. If, as Heraclitus said, everything was in a state of continual change, truth could only be of momentary duration, because both the individual and the thing contemplated were in process of change. The individual's knowledge had, therefore, only momentary validity. Then from the side of Parmenides' teachings, knowledge was likewise impossible, thoughts being different from their objects, and also different from the words in which we endeavor to communicate them to one another. Therefore, if anything really exists we cannot know it, and if we could know it we would be unable to communicate it. Only the surface of the world,—things as they appear to us—may be known. Of the nature or even of the existence of anything more substantial or more real we are ignorant.

These skeptical conclusions the Sophists embodied in certain phrases: "*Man is the measure of all things*," to which they added "*of those which exist that they exist, and of those that do not exist that they do not exist.*" Another saying was: "*Truth is what seems true to anyone at any time.*" These ideas the Sophists applied practically in their teaching, in politics, in rhetoric, and finally in ethics. They held that if a man could convince the people that his views were right, they were right. The truth a young man should consider was what he wanted, and how to get it.

In Ethics their intellectual skepticism developed into moral skepticism, and from saying that the truth was whatever appeared true to anyone at any time, the Sophists very quickly came to the point where they said that right was whatever appeared right to anyone at any time.

In consequence of these teachings, the authority of all moral customs, and of all laws came to be questioned, while circumstances conspired to engender license and stir up rebellion against authority, especially on the part of the younger generation. As we have said, democracy was prevailing; and for the first time in history there began to be free popular government. The Greeks had had no long course of training such as the modern nations have passed through, but suddenly in the course of a few years they passed from a very

strict, firm, aristocratic military socialism to a thoroughgoing democracy, with no traditions of self-control or conservatism. Naturally, everyone wished to do as he pleased, especially the young men who desired to break loose from the control of their elders. Sophistry made even keener the conflict between individual freedom and common government, between liberty of thought and action on the one hand, and tradition and authority on the other. The outcome of this conflict was so fraught with danger that it aroused the opposition of all the more conservative and thinking portion of the population. Laws were passed forbidding these teachings, trying to reassert stricter conduct and discipline. Aristophanes, the greatest comic poet of the ancient world, wrote a number of his comedies ridiculing and satirizing the whole tendency toward individualism. Conservatism, standing for traditional truth and morality, condemned the entire Sophist system. But the younger generation would be convinced only by intellectual arguments, and these the Conservatives did not have. So there was dogmatism in favor of the traditions of truth and morality, against the too fervid intellectualism, which tended to disregard anything not supported by reason.

In this situation appeared the great figure of Socrates. He was the one man who could solve the problem, and he did it in the only was possible, by accepting the facts and considering the reasons that the Sophists presented, but showing that the interpretations they based on them were false. In other words, he showed that the Conservatives were right in their conclusions, and that the Radicals were right in their premises. Socrates' refutation of the doctrines of the Sophists was a peculiar one, accomplished by arguing through their position, showing that they had misinterpreted facts: not denying what they asserted, but what they deduced from their assertions.

Socrates was born about 469 B. C. He was of comparatively humble origin, a free Athenian citizen but belonging to no prominent family. By occupation he was a maker of statues, but he was not a very good one. The name of Xanthippe, his wife, has become a by-word because of her exceedingly bad temper. She seems not to have understood in the least the great genius and exalted mission of her husband, but to have blamed him for idling about the city talking to still idler young gentlemen—"Plato and Xenophon, who were sure to amount to nothing. Alcibiades forsooth! What business had Socrates to be forever arguing with him and corrupting his morals with

his impious ideas. Let him stay at home and make statues and earn some money for the family."

Socrates' real work was philosophy. It is said that when he was a young man one of his friends, Chaerephon, went to the Delphic oracle and asked if there was any man wiser than Socrates, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser. When this was reported to Socrates he was much astonished, and decided to go about asking questions to discover the meaning of the oracle and find out if there were not wiser men than he.

He went first to the politicians and asked them what they meant by the virtues and noble sentiments they talked so fluently about in their orations, what account they could give of the parts and nature of that practical wisdom, or action guided by insight and reason, which the Athenians were so fond of praising, and which they demanded in their leaders. Socrates found when he questioned these men, who had great reputation for wisdom and made still greater pretensions of being wise, that they were "all but the most foolish."

Next the went to the poets who were popularly supposed to have more than human wisdom, and found that they could not explain the meaning of their own poetry. This showed him that it was not by wisdom that the poets wrote, but by inspiration, a kind of divine madness which could not be translated into rational thought. Further he discovered that on the strength of their poetry they imagined themselves wise in regard to many things about which they knew nothing. He concluded that he was better off without their inspiration and without their ignorance.

Then he went to the artizans and craftsmen thinking that they must know many fine things, as indeed they did. But he found also that they imagined they had knowledge of statesmenship and of all sorts of high matters, and that this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom.

He continued to go about the streets of Athens endeavoring to ascertain by question and answer if there were anyone who was truly wise in virtue, anyone who knew the theory of right living, who really knew what he was talking about when he used such words as wisdom, temperance, courage, or when he was advocating the pursuit of virtue as the proper way to live. This method of mutual cross-examination is called the dialectic. Socrates discovered in this manner much pretense to knowledge, much conceit and cock-sureness, but surprisingly little wisdom. He did not find wisdom among the

nice conservative old gentlemen who depreciated so strongly the individualistic tendencies of the time, and the insolence and depravity of the young men, nor did he find it in the intellectual show-cases of the Sophists, whose goods were calculated to attract rather than to continue to satisfy their purchaser. In short, he found no one truly wise, and concluded that the oracle must have meant that Socrates was wiser than other men in being conscious of his own ignorance.

Socrates loved to meet some pompous self-important person, especially if he were a Sophist, and fall into conversation with him. Soon the poor man would express an opinion about some important matter touching human life, and Socrates by his ironical cross-questioning would show the inconsistencies it involved, the pretenses to wisdom upon which it was founded. Then the conversation would either end by the person's going away angry, or it would be continued and Socrates would instruct him by trying to bring out what he really had meant, to bring the thoughts of his heart to birth, thus to make of him a man of conviction, clear in his own mind about these great questions. "Young men of the richer classes who had not much to do gathered around him of their own accord, loving to hear the pretenders examined," and it was with these young men who would not take assertion for truth, but who wanted to know why a thing was true, that he loved especially to work, and to try to develop their ideas and characters. Socrates did not think that one could learn very much of importance in regard to Nature, but that a man could know himself, know his own real aims and purposes, what he really desired of life and how to attain true and lasting happiness. Among Socrates' pupils were many who afterwards became very prominent. Plato, Xenophon, Alcibiades, Aristippus, and Antisthenes were among the number.

The source of his influence was his character and his wisdom. There were two men in him,—one simple, homely, earthy; the other noble, exalted, profound. Xenophon describes the first in his Dialogues, Plato the second. Socrates had the pungency of a Sophist and the depth and dignity of a saint. He was interested in everyday affairs, and kept up with all that went on in Athens,—who came there to teach, what the people were doing. In his Dialogues Plato shows him engaged in all sorts of pleasant, common affairs, at one time dining with his friends at a little private celebration over the acceptance of a play written by one of them, at another going to Piraeus to see a procession. He liked and made friends with men whom he

knew to be corrupt, as for example, Alcibiades, yet he kept himself free from their evil practices. Under this outer frivolity there was a profound moral mission. His whole life was devoted to a search after the truth and to the betterment of mankind. He was courageous when the time came for him to die. He met his end as a martyr for what he believed to be right.

The mission of Socrates was reason,—reason in the sense that we must think clearly, know our own meaning, know ourselves. He wanted to put reason into conduct and into the state; to introduce it into political affairs so that the city would be governed by men who had knowledge, not merely by politicians who could get the job. He wanted to infuse reason into the life of the individual that he might not lead a purposeless, capricious existence. Socrates would have men know why certain courses of conduct are right and others wrong that they might make enlightened choices. He said that no one would consciously choose the lesser of two goods or the greater of two evils. His idea was that vice arose through ignorance, not through depravity, that man does ill because he is ignorant, and does not know that he is injuring or destroying himself by his course of conduct, does not fully realize the consequences of his acts. So, by putting reason into conduct, by enlightening men in regard to what actions they should choose, he believed that he could show them the way to work out their own salvation.

Both aspects of his doctrines made a great disturbance. The Conservatives did not want principles of morality to be discussed; they did not want the younger men to start thinking about right and wrong because in their immaturity they would very probably make mistakes in judgment and become corrupt. The Conservatives, therefore, opposed Socrates and his teachings, for they considered him as one of the Sophists, one of those who were stirring up young men to rebel against tradition and to disobey their parents. Socrates had also offended many of these pompous old gentlemen personally by leading them on to expose their ignorance before the young men who came to listen "and to hear the pretenders to wisdom examined."

The Sophists were equally antagonistic to him because his doctrines would substitute reality for appearance, and they were the apostles of appearance. They did not want men to think far enough to see that the rhetoric and efficiency they taught was in reality nothing but a quack treatment of life. If men began to take things

seriously they would not come to the Sophists for instruction.

Then there were the artificers and craftsmen, the backbone of the democracy, that glorious, fickle, good-for-nothing democracy of Athens, who likewise were offended by his ironic treatment of their political wisdom, his true appreciation of their wine-shop philosophies.

All this aroused great personal feeling against Socrates on the part of those who were smarting under the humiliation he had inflicted. Not knowing anything better to say they repeated "the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers, about teaching things up in the clouds, and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause, for they do not like to confess their pretense of knowledge has been detected." These calumnies finally led to his trial and condemnation on the charge of preaching false gods and corrupting the youth of Athens.

To those men who gave Socrates a fair hearing and who followed his teaching, he brought conviction, purpose, sincerity, directing them how to guide their course through life, to walk prudently and uprightly and in the ways of truth amid the sophistries and corruption of the age.

There was a strong element of piety in Socrates' character. His last words were an acknowledgement of a religious obligation. He felt that there accompanied his whole life a spiritual influence which he called his genius or daimon. This spoke to him in crises, warning him against certain courses of action. During his trial the voice did not speak to him, so he considered that his actions and conduct on that occasion were approved by the gods. Although Socrates reverenced the gods of his country, he was somehow a monotheist. He had the kind of piety one might learn at his mother's knee,—sincerity and truth, but not necessarily speculative accuracy. Socrates was put to death by the Athenians in 399 B. C.

In the *Symposium* Plato has put into the mouth of Alcibiades an account of the personality and character of Socrates as follows:

"Then I will begin at once, said Alcibiades; and if I say anything that is not true, you may interrupt me if you will, and say that I speak falsely, though my intention is to speak the truth. But you must not wonder if I speak anyhow as things come into my mind; for the fluent and orderly enumeration of all your wonderful qualities is not a task the accomplishment of which is easy to a man in my condition.

"I shall praise Socrates in a figure which will appear to him to be a

caricature, and yet I do not mean to laugh at him, but only to speak the truth. I say, then, that he is exactly like the masks of Silenus, which may be seen sitting in the statuaries' shops, having pipes and flutes in their mouths; and they are made to open in the middle, and there are images of gods inside them. I say also that he is like Marsyas the satyr. You will not deny, Socrates, that your face is like that of a satyr. Aye, and there is a resemblance in other points too. For example, you are a bully,—that I am in a position to prove by the evidence of witnesses, if you will not confess. Are you not a flute-player? That you are, and a far more wonderful performer than Marsyas. For he indeed with instruments charmed the souls of men by the power of his breath, as the performers of his music do still: for the melodies of Olympus are derived from the teaching of Marsyas, and these, whether they are played by a great master or by a miserable flute-girl, have a power which no others have; they alone possess the soul and reveal the wants of those who have need of gods and mysteries, because they are inspired. But you produce the same effect with the voice only, and do not require the flute: that is the difference between you and him. When we hear any other speaker, even a very good one, his words produce absolutely no effect upon us in comparison, whereas the very fragments of you and your words, even at second-hand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them. And if I were not afraid that you would think me drunk, I would have sworn as well as spoken to the influence which they have always had and still have over me. For my heart leaps within me more than that of any Corybantian reveler, and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. And I observe that many others are affected in the same way. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, but though I thought that they spoke well, I never had any similar feeling; my soul was not stirred by them, nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has often brought me to such a pass, that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading (this, Socrates, you admit); and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against, and fly from the voice of the siren, he would detain me until I grew old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. And he is the only person who ever made me ashamed, which you

might think not to be in my nature and there is no one else who does the same. For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me. And therefore I run away and fly from him, and when I see him I am ashamed of what I have confessed to him. And many a time I wish that he were dead, and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad, if he were to die: so that I am at my wits' end.

"And this is what I and many others have suffered from the flute-playing of this satyr. Yet hear me once more while I show you how exact the image is, and how marvellous his power. For I am sure that none of you know him; but I know him and will describe him, as I have begun. See you how fond he is of the fair? He is always with them and is always being smitten by them, and then again he knows nothing and is ignorant of all things—that is the appearance which he puts on. Is he not like Silenus in this? Yes, surely: that is, his outer mask, which is the carved head of the Silenus; but when he is opened, what temperance there is, as I may say to you, O my companions in drink, residing within. Know you that beauty and wealth and honor, at which the many wonder, are of no account with him, and are utterly despised by him: he regards not at all the persons who are gifted with them: mankind are nothing to him; all his life is spent in mocking and flouting at them. But when I opened him, and looked within at his serious purpose, I saw in him divine and golden images of such fascinating beauty that I was ready to do in a moment whatever Socrates commanded (they may have escaped the notice of others, but I saw them.....).....

"All this, as I should explain, happened before he and I went on the expedition to Potidaea; there we messed together, and I had the opportunity of observing his extraordinary power of sustaining fatigue and going without food when our supplies were intercepted at any place, as will happen with an army. In the faculty of endurance he was superior not only to me but to everybody; there was no one to be compared to him. Yet at a festival he was the only person who had any real powers of enjoyment, and though not willing to drink, he could if compelled beat us all at that, and the most wonderful thing of all was that no human being had ever seen Socrates drunk; and that, if I am not mistaken, will soon be tested. His endurance of cold was also surprising. There was a severe frost, for the winter in that region was really tremendous, and everybody else

either remained indoors, or if they went out had on no end of clothing, and were well shod, and had their feet swathed in felts and fleeces: in the midst of this, Socrates, with his bare feet on the ice, and in his ordinary dress, marched better than any of the other soldiers who had their shoes on, and they looked daggers at him because he seemed to despise them.

"I have told you one tale, and now I must tell you another, which is worth hearing, of the doings and sufferings of this enduring man while he was on the expedition. One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve; and he would not give up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumor ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in winter but in summer),brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood all night as well as all day and the following morning; and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun, and went his way. I will also tell, if you please—and indeed I am bound to tell—of his courage in battle; for who but he saved my life? Now this was the engagement in which I received the prize of valor; for I was wounded and he would not leave me, but he rescued me and my arms; and he ought to have received the prize of valor which the generals wanted to confer on me partly on account of my rank, and I told them so (this Socrates will not impeach or deny), but he was more eager than the generals that I and not he should have the prize. There was another occasion on which he was very noticeable; this was in the flight of the army after the battle of Delium, and I had a better opportunity of seeing him than at Potidaea as I was myself on horseback, and therefore comparatively out of danger. He and Laches were retreating as the troops were in flight, and I met them and told them not to be discouraged, and promised to remain with them; and there you might see him, Aristophanes, as you describe, just as he is in the streets of Athens, stalking like a pelican, and rolling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacks him will be likely to meet with a stout resistance; and in this way he and his companion escaped—for these are the sort of persons who are never

touched in war; they only pursue those who are running away headlong. I particularly observed how superior he was to Laches in presence of mind. Many are the wonders of Socrates which I might narrate in his praise; most of his ways might perhaps be paralleled in others, but the most astonishing thing of all is his absolute unlikeness to any human being that is or ever has been. You may imagine Brasidas and others to have been like Achilles; or you may imagine Nestor and Antenor to have been like Pericles; and the same may be said of other famous men; but of this strange being you will never be able to find any likeness however remote, either among men who now are or who ever have been, except that which I have already suggested of Silenus and the satyrs; and this is an allegory not only of himself, but also of his words. For, although I forgot to mention this before, his words are ridiculous when you first hear them; he clothes himself in language that is as the skin of the wanton satyr—for his talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, and he is always repeating the same things in the same words, so that an ignorant man who did not know him might feel disposed to laugh at him; but he who pierces the mask and sees what is within will find that they are the only words which have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding in fair examples of virtue, and of the largest discourse, or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honorable man."

In the Crito his reverence for law is shown. Crito, a contemporary and friend of Socrates, comes to the prison where Socrates is confined after his condemnation, awaiting the return of a ship sent on a sacred mission to the island of Delos during the absence of which it was not customary for the Athenians to pollute their city by executions. Crito urges Socrates to make his escape. This Socrates refuses to do. Part of the conversation is as follows:

SOCRATES. "Then consider the matter in this way: Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like), and the laws and government come and interrogate me: 'Tell us, Socrates,' they say: 'what are you about? are you going by an act of yours to overcome us—the laws and the whole state, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?' What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? Any one and especially a clever rhetorician, will have a good deal to urge about the

evil of setting aside the law which requires a sentence to be carried out; and we might reply, 'Yes; but the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence.' Suppose I say that?"

CRITO. "Very good, Socrates."

SOCRATES. "'And was that our agreement with you?' the law would say: 'or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?' And if I were to express astonishment at their saying this, the law would probably add: 'Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us which regulate marriage?' 'None,' I should reply. 'Or against those of us which regulate the system of nurture and education of children in which you were trained? Were not the laws which have charge of this right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?' Right, I should reply. 'Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us: nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands?—you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? And will you, O professor of true virtue, say that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she leads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what

is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country.' What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?"

CRITO. "I think that they do."

SOCRATES. "Then the laws will say: 'Consider Socrates, if this is true, that in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For, after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good we had to give, we further proclaim and give the right to every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him; and none will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes and take his goods with him. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him.'.....

" 'Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.'

"This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic: that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be in vain. Yet speak if you have anything to say."

CRITO. "I have nothing to say, Socrates."

SOCRATES. "Then let me follow the intimations of the will of God."

In the Phaedo, the third of the Dialogues concerning the trial and death of Socrates, Plato has given us an account of his death, which in its pathos and sublimity has sometimes been compared to the account of the crucifixion in the Gospels:

"When he had done speaking, Crito said: 'And have you any commands for us, Socrates—anything to say about your children, or any other matter in which we can serve you?'

" 'Nothing particular,' he said: 'only, as I have always told you, I would have you look to yourselves; that is a service which you may always be doing to me and mine as well as to yourselves. And you need not make professions; for if you take no thought for yourselves, and walk not according to the precepts which I have given you, now for the first time, the warmth of your professions will be of no avail.'

" 'We will do our best,' said Crito. 'But in what way would you have us bury you?'

" 'In any way that you like; only you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not walk away from you.' Then he turned to us, and added with a smile, 'I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who has been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body—and he asks, How shall he bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavor to show the joys of the blessed,—these words of mine, with which I comforted you and myself, have had as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be surety for me now, as he was surety for me at the trial: but let the promise be of another sort; for he was my surety to the judges that I would remain, but you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer, then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that as is usual, and as you think best.'

"When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into the bath-chamber with Crito, who bade us wait; and we waited, talking and

thinking of the subject of our discourse, and also of the greatness of our sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him—(he had two young sons and an elder one); and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; and he then dismissed them and returned to us.

"Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the eleven, entered and stood by him, saying: To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison—indeed I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are the guilty cause. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be; you know my errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.

"Socrates looked at him and said: 'I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid.' Then, turning to us, he said, 'How charming the man is; since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good as could be to me, and now see how generously he sorrows for me. But we must do as he says, Crito; let the cup be brought if the poison is prepared: if not, let the attendant prepare some.'

" 'Yet,' said Crito, 'the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk and indulged in sensual delights; do not hasten then, there is still time.'

"Socrates said: 'Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in doing thus, for they think that they will gain by the delay; but I am right in not doing thus, for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should be sparing and saving a life which is already gone: I could only laugh at myself for this. Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me.'

"Crito, when he heard this, made a sign to the servant; and the servant went in, and remained for some time, and then returned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said: 'You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions

how I am to proceed.' The man answered: 'You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act.' At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of color or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said: 'What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not?' The man answered: 'We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough.' 'I understand,' he said: 'yet I may and must pray to the gods to prosper my journey from this to that other world—may this, then, which is my prayer, be granted me.' Then holding the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept over myself, for certainly I was not weeping over him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having lost such a companion. Nor was I the first, for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up and moved away, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out into a loud cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: 'What is this strange outcry?' he said. 'I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not offend in this way, for I have heard that a man should die in peace. Be quiet, then, and have patience.' When we heard that, we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard and asked him if he could feel; and he said, 'No;' and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said: 'When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end.' He was beginning to grow cold about the groin when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said (they were his last words)—he said: 'Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt?' 'The debt shall be paid,' said Crito; 'is there anything else?' There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.

"Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, whom I may truly call the wisest, and justest, and best of all the men whom I have ever known."

Socrates' life and teaching imparted a method for the discovery of truth and the recognition of goodness, rather than an ethical system or a code of moral precepts. By the use of his reason every man is to know the truth; to be able to discern the greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils, and to make his choice accordingly. Socrates did not, however, attempt to define very exactly the content of the good. That, perhaps, was beyond his powers, or possibly, true to his principle of reason, he refrained from making a definition because he wished his hearers to go in quest of the good themselves. At any rate, it is because of this lack of definition that we find his pupils and followers putting various interpretations on his teachings. Schools so opposite in thought as the Cynics and Cyrenaics take their origin from his teaching. In Xenophon's Dialogues we find him advocating merely those rather material goods which good management would produce. In the Dialogues of Plato the most sublime and idealistic aims are councilled, the most spiritual doctrines are put into the mouth of Socrates. The aims to be pursued in Plato are Truth for itself, Beauty for itself, and Goodness for itself, and the highest possible development of character.

Socrates is said to have remarked in regard to some of Plato's earliest work which came out during his lifetime: "How many things that young man makes me say that I never would have thought of." This seems characteristic of the Platonic Socrates,—the Socrates which appears as the leading figure in so many of Plato's Dialogues; and it is evident that, as Plato's own philosophy develops, he gradually comes to substitute his own ideas for those of his master. It is from the Dialogues of Plato that we get most of our knowledge of Socrates' personality and teachings, but often it is difficult to say just how much may be attributed to Socrates. It is, however, certain, that he believed in the principle that knowledge is virtue, and that he thought it worth while in the service of ethical enlightenment, to spend much of his time trying to obtain, by means of the dialectic method, very clear, certain, and consistent definitions or ideas, of the nature and essence of wisdom and courage, temperance and holiness, truth and justice, and of other virtues, of which men are wont to talk so glibly and to know so little.

Accepting the Sophists' skepticism in the world of nature, he

thought that one could learn but little in regard to the material universe, and that such knowledge was at the mercy of the first skeptic who appeared; but in the world of his own interests and ideas man's intellect was at home. Man was able to know himself, to know his own meaning, to look before and after, and by the aid of reason to know what he really wanted and did not want in his life, and thus by the exercise of an enlightened choice to make his life as happy, significant and blessed as possible. A truly eligible life is not necessarily the one most filled with pleasant experience, but the one most truly excellent, most objectively desirable.

Socrates accomplished two great things in his search for truth. The first was overcoming the Sophists' moral skepticism; the second, of supreme importance, his discovery of the human reason as a faculty essentially the same in all men, leading to similar conclusions, and to sure and certain standards of truth and goodness. Accounts of both of his advocacy of reason and of his refutation of the Sophists are found in a number of Plato's Dialogues, especially in the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Theaetetus. The Protagoras is concerned with the relations of knowledge and virtue. The Gorgias is a criticism of rhetoric, and the Theaetetus deals with intellectual skepticism. These Dialogues are genuine, written about five or ten years after Socrates' death, and although they contain a certain amount of Plato's own philosophy, they nevertheless set forth the main arguments and fundamental principles of Socrates' teachings.

The Dialogues relating to Sophistry are especially interesting to us at the present day. If one understands the philosophy of the Greeks as it was expressed by Plato and Socrates, one is not likely to be led away by Skepticism, either moral or intellectual. There is a great deal of unrest at present, and old philosophies are being tried out which were disproved so long ago that people have forgotten all about them. "The expression of personality" is the slogan of some people, they say they will be true to themselves, whether their life is conventional or not, whether their conduct injures and disgraces others or not. These people are getting into much the same attitude which found its expression in Sophistry and all that the Sophists stood for. So in our day, when Sophistry is becoming more and more common, it would be well for us to have some idea of how to meet the situation. To help us in this we may look at the way in which Socrates and Plato solved the problem. We shall have this problem on our hands more and more, as men break away from authority and become more en-

lightened, feeling that they must have some reason for the ethical and religious faith that is in them. It is well to go over the solutions which have been given. Plato and Socrates in spite of their Greek garb treat of present day problems.

There is also much for us to learn from that laboratory of the forms, principles, and practices of government, which the life of the Greek city states presented at this time. This fascinating field of research afforded abundant material for the intensive and continual study which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle gave to it. These three men are perhaps the greatest investigators of the art and theory of ethics, politics, and government that the world has yet produced. It might even be possible for modern sociologists to learn something from their writings in regard to the first principles and elements of their subject.

The Sophistry that might makes right, and justice is the interests of the stronger, which has appeared so prominently in the Machiavellian diplomacy of Europe, and been influential in inciting wars, is sufficiently disposed of, as far as logical argument goes, in the Republic of Plato and in certain of the Socratic Dialogues. The argument by shrapnel and machine guns, to which appeal was taken by the Germans, did not come out successfully for them and, curiously enough, for the same reasons given in the Republic, namely that wrong and injustice are self-contradictory in essence, and cannot continue long at large within the world without compassing their own downfall, or provoking the action of antagonistic forces which bring about or accelerate their ruin.

In the Protagoras we find Socrates beginning to work out his answer to the Sophists, to the form of thought which says, "Now, do as you please, it is all right if you think it is; go ahead and do it." Socrates intends to show by his conversation with Protagoras that knowledge and virtue are the same, so he asks whether the virtues men speak of are merely different names for the same thing or names for different things. Have all virtues essentially the same nature? Socrates thinks they have. He believes that they are all the same essentially, the same in essence with practical wisdom, knowing what ought to be done so clearly that one does it without question. Now wisdom may be taught, and therefore virtue is teachable, and men are made more virtuous by enlightenment. His idea is that a man does evil, not so much through depravity as because he does not know it is the worst thing to do. Men choose the worse of two evils or the lesser of two

goods because of ignorance, because they lack the wisdom to know where to seek their good.

The dialogue opens with Hippocrates coming to Socrates in great excitement and waking him up, saying that Protagoras has come to Athens and is stopping at the house of Callias. Socrates then asks Hippocrates if Protagoras has stolen anything from him. Hippocrates laughs and says no, but that Protagoras is holding something from him by keeping his wisdom to himself. Socrates agrees to go with Hippocrates to interview Protagoras and to find out what kind of wisdom he possesses and teaches, and whether his instruction will improve or injure Hippocrates.

Accordingly they go to the house where Protagoras is being entertained and find a great company already assembled, who are hanging on his words and those of two other Sophists who are there. Socrates asks Protagoras what he will teach Hippocrates if he comes to study under him. Protagoras replies that he will make him a better man the first day than he was the day before, and better each day thereafter. Protagoras professes to be able to teach him virtue, how to act more efficiently and to improve his nature. That his course of instruction has been successful with others is proved by the fact that he charges no definite fee, but if any one is dissatisfied with the price asked he has only to go to a temple and take oath before the god as to the real value of the instruction and Protagoras will accept whatever the man affirms is right.

Socrates again asks Protagoras just what he will teach Hippocrates. For,he says, if Hippocrates went to Phidias and gave him money to teach him, Phidias would make him a better sculptor than he was the day before, and doubtless better on each succeeding day; if he gave his money to Polycrates for instruction he would become better as a painter; if he were taught by a flute player he would learn flute-playing. Protagoras answers that he will make Hippocrates a better man, both in public and private life. He will make him a good citizen and a good master of a household.

Socrates says that such wisdom must be godlike, but that he has been in doubt if such virtue can be taught because of two things which he has observed. In the first place, among the Athenians, who are a very clever people, ignorant men are heard in the assembly on grave matters of public policy, and, furthermore, men without any special qualifications are elected to office. This is because the Athenians do not think that one man is better than another in statesmanship;

there are no experts in political affairs in whom they put confidence, as they do in generals, pilots, shipbuilders, and the like. People recognize these men as experts, but when it comes to political virtue, there are no experts, and they will listen to anyone who desires to express an opinion on such affairs. His second reason why virtue cannot be taught is that great men often have sons who are neither virtuous nor statesmen, and surely if this art could be taught they would impart it to their sons.

In answer to this, Protagoras tells a myth or fable showing that the arts of Athens,—the technical arts—are not equally distributed among men, but that some can perform these functions for the rest. When, however, it comes to the arts of Zeus,—of politics and individual virtue—everyone has a certain share because it is necessary for the very existence of a state that all its citizens be virtuous and have some notions of politics, and some reverence for constituted authority. But, though all citizens have some notions of politics, some citizens are born with better equipment than others. This, he says, explains Socrates' difficulty.

And, as a matter of fact, these virtues can be taught,—are taught, everywhere. Father, mother, nurse, companions, constantly teach and enforce virtue, so there are no special teachers of virtue, just as there are no special teachers of Greek because all are teachers of Greek. A man's whole life is an education in virtue. Everyone taught these things comes to a certain high level of morality, and only the one who can carry this a step farther may properly be called a teacher of virtue. Protagoras says that he can do something in perfecting virtue already acquired.

Socrates professes to be charmed by the speech of Protagoras and says he is glad to know that such a thing can be taught, that he had thought that if virtue was such a thing it could not be taught. But he would like to ask Protagoras one question, simply in regard to the nature of virtue. Socrates is not sure whether Protagoras means that goodness, temperance, justice, are all one, that they have one essence, or whether they are different things. The point of this question is that if the virtues are all one they are one with wisdom, and wisdom is an essential portion of them all; and if this is so, one can teach virtue because one can teach wisdom. But if the virtues are what Protagoras says they are they cannot be taught.

Protagoras says the virtues are unified, not as pieces of gold, but as parts of the face, which have different functions, and are not the same.

They have a certain unity of system, but one thing is good for one purpose and another for another. Socrates' own theory, which opposes this, is that the virtues are essentially the same. The argument with which Socrates supports his position is somewhat superficial, but there is an important principle underlying it. He contends that virtues are essentially the same, with wisdom as a kind of common denominator, and what they have in common is more important than their differences. Take, says Socrates, the case of justice and holiness. The opposite to the just is the unjust. But holiness, if it is essentially different from justice, as Protagoras contends, must then be essentially like the unjust.

Protagoras dodges the issue, and the dialogue is continued until the question of opposites comes up again. Protagoras agrees with Socrates that there is only one opposite to any positive quality. The opposite to richness is poverty, and no other. The opposite to weakness is strength, and no other. Then, says Socrates, let us take two virtues mentioned,—wisdom and temperance. The opposite of wisdom is folly; but the opposite of temperance is also folly. So either wisdom and temperance are two names for the same thing, or Protagoras' assumptions are wrong. Evidence shows that all the virtues are closely related. If one has sufficient wisdom he will not be intemperate, and so on. So the real trend of the argument is the indication that knowledge and temperance are alike, and the part which they have in common is more profound than the part in which they differ.

After a digression about a poem into which Protagoras lures Socrates with the intention of tripping him in argument, but which has no very close relation to the question at issue, the original discussion is resumed under a somewhat different form. The question is raised, "Would anyone deliberately choose the lesser of two goods or the greater of two evils?" All agree that if a man really understood the situation, he would choose the greater good or the lesser evil. Socrates is here showing that virtue consists in choosing the greater of two goods, but that in order to know which is greater, a man must have wisdom; therefore, wisdom is essential to virtue. Mistakes are made or wrongs committed because one does not truly know the situation in all its bearings, and the effects or tendencies of his choice of action in connection with his welfare.

Socrates is here preaching a system of ethics founded upon prudence. Such ethical systems do not seem very consonant with high

ethical ideals and aspirations. To be honest because honesty is the best policy is to be politic rather than honest. Nevertheless, a utilitarian morality is a decided advance on Sophistry, and is decidedly superior to the moral dogmatism of the conservatives as a means to moral enlightenment. Protagoras has made no real advance in ethical theory, in spite of his pretensions to be a teacher of virtue, beyond the most conservative of Athenian old gentlemen, and he also is unaware of his deficiency. Even hedonism, the ethics of pleasure, is a step out of the moral anarchy of the later Sophists. Utilitarianism is a further step in advance. Plato preaches a utilitarian system of ethics in the Protagoras, not for its own sake, but as a step to something higher still, namely rationalism. A rational life is one which has a purpose; one aim around which all things center. Wisdom forms the order, harmony, system, of the goods of life that they may conspire toward the accomplishment of the life purpose, some ideal end to be reached. Socrates, by his advocacy of wisdom, is taking a rationalistic position in the Protagoras, distinguishing good from evil, the greater from the lesser good. This, if followed out, will lead to a life of principle, of order, of harmony, the life of reason.

Protagoras finally is forced to acknowledge the close relation of wisdom, temperance, holiness, and justice, but says that courage is not like these. Socrates shows the relation of wisdom and courage. The courageous man knows where his real good lies, has knowledge of right and wrong. The coward is he who judges falsely and prefers disgrace and dishonor to bravely facing death. Thus wisdom, the knowledge of the value of different parts of life,is identical in essence with virtue, and virtue can, therefore, be taught.

The idea that one must look before and after to see the connection and results of his acts before he does them runs through the Protagoras, the Gorgias, and the Republic. One must see the consequences and the relative value of things before he can act rightly. Hence the Sophist's belief that right is what seems right to anyone at any time is not true. It might be said with some degree of truth of a wise man, but not of him whose choice is not enlightened. One must have insight as well as good intentions in order to do right.

Other important dialogues concerning the Sophists are the Gorgias and the Theaetetus. The Gorgias really consists of two parts, as if Plato, when writing this dialogue, wrote the first part, and then, being doubtful of the cogency of his arguments, added a second part as a reinforcement.

The first part consists of a conversation between Socrates and Gorgias, a leading Sophist and one of the great teachers of rhetoric. As Protagoras professed to teach efficiency or virtue, Gorgias professed to teach rhetoric, which was so practical an art in the Greek life of the time and so necessary to every man who wished to advance far in the Greek state. Socrates wishes to discover whether rhetoric is really an art at all, and to discuss the question of appearance and reality, with Gorgias, this apostle of appearance.

The conversation begins with a comparison of rhetoric to the other arts. It appears that other arts, such as mathematics, medicine, etc., have standards which are set by the nature of the art, certain essential ways of making good and accomplishing the purpose at which they aim, as the truth of number and relationship, in the case of mathematics, the healing of the sick in the case of medicine, etc. Rhetoric seems, however, to have no such norm of its own. It professes to be discourse about morality and justice; yet one may be a good rhetorician and do unjust things; he may use his rhetoric to convict an enemy unjustly in the law courts. Rhetoric, then, differs from an art like mathematics. He is not a good mathematician who makes mistakes or contradicts the purpose of his art, nevertheless Gorgias has asserted that rhetoric is an art concerning justice, yet admitted that a master rhetorician may, by the use of rhetoric, accomplish injustice. The prime characteristic of a real art—that it tend naturally toward the realization of some good—seems to be absent in the case of rhetoric. Socrates terms it derisively a kind of flattery or quackery, a routine or experience, which has no essential principle which it endeavors to reach or to maintain. It differs from the real arts just as the art of the chef differs from the art of the physician, for the physician knows what one may with safety eat and drink, while the chef simply provides what pleases one's palate. This kind of rhetoric, —the art of persuasion without giving information—has the same relation to a real art in regard to justice that cosmetics have to hygiene, which ape the appearance of health and real beauty given by perfect physical condition. Rhetoric no more imparts knowledge than cosmetics imparts health, but in a similar way this art of the demagogue apes the art of the true statesman. By the use of rhetoric the demagogue is able to make the worse appear the better reason, by a show of argument he convinces the ignorant and brings about the passage of the measures he desires, whether they are for the public interest or not. Hence the art which Gorgias teaches proves to be

"a part of flattery," a part of a not very creditable whole. Its practitioners are not really to be envied or honored, even if they hold high office, but are to be ranked with cooks and ladies' maids, to which class, says Socrates with ironical apologies to Gorgias, belong also the Sophists and all other fabricators of appearance.

That rhetoric is not an art at all but a form of flattery, with its implied contempt for appearance without reality, for chicanery in politics and insincerity in society, is the first of the paradoxes of the Gorgias. Three others follow, each more paradoxical than the one preceding. The second is that rhetoricians, tyrants, and "bosses" have no real power in the state, for although they may do as they like, they do not possess sufficient knowledge and foresight to pass measures which accomplish any good, either for themselves or for the state. Both Socrates and Gorgias agree that power is a good only when it brings good to its possessor. To have power and be ignorant of its right use is not to have real power at all. The ignorant politician in office may command what he likes; but he cannot get what he wants, because what he orders does not accrue to his good, much less to the good of the state.

The third paradox is: to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong. Those who have power unjustly must do wrong to get or to maintain it. Wrongdoing effects degradation of character and deeply injures the soul. This is the worst of all misfortunes and evils which may happen to any human being; because the soul or character is the controlling part of one's whole existence. Character is destiny. One does as one's soul directs, and if that is injured and made evil, the evil soul will constantly lead one into evil courses which bring suffering and misfortune. Suffering wrong is a lesser misfortune. It may mean pain, but not necessarily moral degradation; sadness, but not guilt. It usually is soon over, and when borne in the right spirit leaves one better than before.

This leads to the final paradox, which is that, having done wrong, it is better to be punished than to escape punishment. If a man is punished or rightfully chastised, it will tend to cure the evil in his soul, which has led him to do wrong and is increased by the wrongdoing. The pain of the punishment should purge away the evil tendency which has arisen. Whereas, if one continues to flourish in wickedness, his character becomes worse and worse, the disease of the soul increases in malignity as the evil penetrates deeper and deeper. The worst that can befall a man is to flourish in wickedness and to be

great in crime, because by so doing he injures the most precious portion of his being—that within him which controls his destiny.

Here we find Socrates, or rather Plato, propounding a very spiritual, other-worldly doctrine, decidedly un-Greek, quite different from the simple, direct enjoyment of the good things of this life we consider so characteristic of the Greeks, Here the idea of the Good has moved into another region, one of things spiritual, where the most valued of all treasures is held to be the welfare of the human soul.

These spiritual doctrines rouse the ire of one Callicles among the auditors. Callicles asks one of Socrates' friends if Socrates really is in earnest in what he is saying, and receives the reply that Socrates probably was never more so. Callicles then tells Socrates that he thinks it is a very good thing for a young man to study philosophy, but when one becomes older he should acquire worldly wisdom and interests, and not get off in a corner with a few young men and whisper about philosophical problems. He says that he has always admired Socrates' genius, but that Socrates would be better off to leave philosophy alone and do something in the State. As for Socrates' doctrines, Callicles thinks that a man ought to act according to nature and not be bound by custom and conventionality. A man should do as he likes, and live a life of enjoyment and satisfaction. Custom has called vice virtue and virtue vice. Virtue is really acting naturally, doing as one pleases, and disregarding laws, custom and the criticism of the more conventional.

Socrates' reply to these assertions, which sound so ultra-modern, that custom and convention have overturned natural right, is this: Callicles, he says, is on very difficult ground to meet, because Callicles will not be bound by custom and conventionality and, therefore, his position is unassailable by arguments based on authority or on recognized principles of morality; so they must go to the basis of the whole matter and discover what it is that Callicles desires to do. Callicles states that he desires to do as he pleases and lead a life of sensuous pleasure, asserting that such a life is truly eligible and, therefore, truly virtuous. The first question, then, is, what pleasures is he willing to enjoy? Could it be said that eating and hungering are acceptable pleasures? Callicle says, yes. Then, says Socrates, you would say that a cormorant has a blessed life? Yes. Then a life of itching and scratching would be a blessed life? Callicles reluctantly admits this. Then Socrates offers another example, pushing the comparison further, and Callicles admits that there are

limits; there are some pleasures so degenerate and disgusting that no normal person would desire them.

Socrates explains that these pleasures are mixed, in the sense of involving their opposite, evil or pain. In the case of hungering, one has pain or discomfort, and the keenness of the pleasure ceases along with the pain. Many sensuous pleasures involve evil as their constituent, and when the evil becomes too great, no one wants to indulge in them. These things are then bad because they involve evil, either as an accompaniment or as a consequence. So the principle of indiscriminate enjoyment is given up even by this bold advocate of it. The higher an enjoyment is, the less evil will be present; so what should be avoided are pleasures which involve evil.

Then comes the consideration that in all stages in life one is faced with the necessity of choice of pleasures. If one must choose, one should know what pleasures to choose. These would naturally be the ones which have the least of evil and the most of good in them. The more refined and enlightened a man's choice, the less he will have to descend from the region of the perfect to find pleasure in mixed experiences involving a portion of evil. Thus, by the very necessity of human nature, temperance is forced upon Callicles, the intemperate, and his way of living has been proven to be wrong.

There are also pleasures which do not involve evil at all, either as constituent or consequence. These are the creative pleasures of the arts, the pleasure taken in bringing something into existence which was never there before. Other good pleasures are the pleasures of beauty, either in nature or in art. The beauty and interest of science, philosophy and literature gives intellectual pleasure. All these pleasures do not involve pain and are in a region above the *mean*. The mean is the line between pure pleasures and mixed pleasures. Some people constantly move up and down below the mean, and because they do not indulge in certain evil pleasures, they think they are positively virtuous. Callicles, being below the mean, is not told much about the pure pleasures. He would not understand them. Simply the necessity of choice is forced upon him. He is forced to consider how much impure pleasure he is willing to accept, and to acknowledge that some pleasures should be avoided.

Further, he admits that there should be order and harmony among the goods and pleasures which give value to a life. Each should be disposed with regard to all the others, so that the whole life may be harmonious. A pleasure which has no regard to the integrity of such

a life cannot be called a good, and the arts which afford pleasure without regard to good, are not real arts, but forms of flattery. To these pseudo-arts belong rhetoric, as the art by which the ignorant persuade the ignorant, sophistry in ethics, and chicanery in politics. Callicles is forced by his previous admissions to acknowledge that a good life is orderly, harmonious, law-abiding, free from evil pleasures. But what is such a way of living, says Socrates, but the practice of justice and temperance? Callicles has been deriding these virtues and calling them vices because the hard living he advocates would be impossible to one who practiced them.

Toward the end of the dialogue they return to discussing the life of the tyrant, Callicles having previously asserted that a tyrant lives a most "virtuous" and enviable life, such a one as any man would live, if he only had the power." Socrates shows that by the very nature of his occupation the tyrant must become increasingly corrupt, and can associate on terms of equality only with those who are equally vile. Any one who would be his friend and not be in danger of his enmity must be even such a one as he is.

Callicles, to obtain power in the city, must become like the Athenian Demos, "and not an imitator only. And he who would make you most like them would make you what you would desire, a statesman and orator." The true statesman, however, is distinguished from the demagogue in that he leads and advises for the good of the whole people. True statesmanship is, therefore, a real art, and demands both knowledge and experience. Such experience should be gained by aiding in the improvement of individuals, and no one should aspire to leadership of the people as a whole who cannot show that he is capable of improving them individually. No one would be so foolish as to desire to be state physician and have charge of the health of all the people if he had never practiced medicine as a private physician. Callicles, nevertheless, desires political power and a position of leadership in Athens, when he has never, to any one's knowledge, made anybody better by his influence. Callicles replies that one can obtain power only by pandering to the multitude, and not by being their physician, and that, therefore, he intends to act as flatterer rather than physician, to the state. He advises Socrates again to do likewise, for by continuing as he is he will never amount to anything in Athens, but will be in danger of incurring the enmity of the mob.

Socrates replies, "I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And

if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?"

Callicles. "By all means."

Socrates. "I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who sets his hand to the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak not with any view to pleasing, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, being unwilling to practice those graces you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And the figure which I used to Polus may be applied to me; I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook."

The Gorgias ends with a myth to illustrate the truth which has already been stated in more intellectual terms. After death the souls of men are judged by three of the sons of Zeus,—Minos, Rhadamanthus and Aeacus. The souls stand naked before their judges, stripped of all external circumstances, of all the pomps and vanities of the world, and the naked soul of the judge pierces into the naked soul of the judged. And when the judge sees a soul all crooked with falsehood and wrong, scarred with the marks of perjuries and crimes, deformed by license and luxury, he sends him to undergo the punishment he deserves. "Or again he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other men in his lifetime him Rhadamanthus sends to the Isles of the Blest. Aeacus does the same; and they both have scepters and judge; and Minos is seated, looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him—

"'Holding a scepter of gold, and giving laws to the dead.' Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of all these things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judges in that day. Renouncing the honors at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and when the time comes, to die."

The soul which is good will live well, guiding the conduct of the individual in the right way. The most important goods of all are spiritual, the health of the soul, the growth of character, of that

portion of the personality which guides and determines the conduct and nature of the individual. If this part is right, happiness will come in life and after death. But if the soul is corrupt and defiled, a man's deeds will be evil and his conduct vile. With the directing mechanism broken or out of order, he can go but from bad to worse. The final teaching of the Gorgias is that the goods of character are the most important because the most fundamental of all goods.

Note the starting point and the terminus in the second part of the Gorgias. The starting point is simply that one is forced to chose between goods. The principle of choice is shown by Callicles refusing to approve of certain pleasures, which are too vile. Having thus established the principle that if there is too much evil in a given pleasure, it is not to be chosen, the question then is how much evil may be admitted into his pleasures by the individual. Next Socrates affirms that pleasure should not be merely scattered through life in spots, unrelated to consequences and antecedents, but should, if possible, be made continuous, forming happiness. Then, the pleasures should not form mere animal content, mere bourgeois happiness, but should be inspired by some purpose, arranged by some plan to form a significant life. Finally, the most important thing in any life is character, which directs and guides the whole. In this dialogue the ethical level rises from irrational enjoyment, through pure pleasure to happiness, to significant living, and finally to ethical idealism.

Plato has progressed very far from the simple ethics of pleasure, which in his search for first principles he uses as a starting point. Here we find him propounding through the mouth of Socrates a highly spiritual doctrine, the incalculable value of the health of the soul. Yet, in the successive upward progress in these Socratic dialogues, their common basis, the natural necessity of a wise choice of goods and rejection of evils, is nowhere denied, but ever reaffirmed as level upon level of ethical experience is transcended. The Socratic note that virtue and wisdom share a common essence again and again is sounded.

The answer to the Sophists' teaching is that virtue is natural—not something artificial forced upon the individual from without. Like the arts, it sets standards. It brings happiness because it is the right way of doing those acts which make up life. It is the truly natural, the normal life. Vice is pathological, destructive to any organism, whether that organism is the soul, the body, or the tissue of the state. To do wrong is to trip one's self up, to contradict one's

will, to incapacitate the best in one's nature. The enjoyment of vicious pleasure tends to make impossible some greater and higher good. This is an extremely important idea,—that wrong doing is self-contradiction. What the Sophists did not see was that virtue and truth are not simply matters of momentary inclination, but that each act in life is good or bad in relation to the whole. When a man's whole life is in harmony, then virtue is present. Man has a certain nature and to act in accordance with this is to do rightly. So, the apparent contradiction between natural right and convention is solved by showing that human nature is not that of the brute, but that of the ideal man. The raw satisfaction of uncontrolled instincts is not human, but is life on a lower level than humanity. That was all the Sophists and their followers thought to be human nature. They contrasted that with convention and considered convention to be artificial and false. Convention may be wrong at times; it may stifle the higher life as well as regulate the lower; but man's nature as a whole and in its higher aspects is what Socrates and Plato see as the measure of all things.

The Sophists' definition of right as that which seems right to man is true if by man is meant human nature at its best and highest. Virtue is natural and human in the best sense of the words.

CHAPTER IV

PLATO

Essence of the World as Goodness, Truth and Beauty. Objects of Perception and Objects of the Reason.

The spirit of Greece found many marvelous incarnations in art, in literature, in laws, in institutions. It dwells immortally in the works of Homer and Hesiod, of Aeschylus and Euripides, in the statues of Phidias and Praxiteles. It manifests itself both in the heroic disciplined soul of the Spartan and in the culture-loving intellectual spirit of the Athenian. In hero and statesman, in poet and painter, in sculptor and architect, in scientist and philosopher, shone forth the genius of the nation which for the first time in the world's history created free civic government, truly scientific thought and intellectual culture. As a world power Greece was never dominant except for a brief moment under Alexander; yet in one respect, she still continues being the most potent nation the world has known, in that in many things she touched and grasped the true ideal of culture, of beauty, and of life. Therefore, it is eternally necessary that so long as the world endure, all nations and all peoples, if they would attain whatever is good, whatever is lovely, whatever is true in civilization, must be, in many of these things, followers of the Greeks, even if in some they surpass their teachers and win a little closer to perfection.

The spirit of ancient Greece stands immortal above the cities and temples she created—like a winged victory she stands, lightly poised and joyously triumphant. "Struggle and conquer as ye will!" she seems to say to all the peoples of the earth; "Let Rome take captive my ancient abiding place, and in the dust and moil of ages, let my cities dwindle and my temples perish. For in the end I cannot fail to win the victory and the triumph over you all; since in so far as each of you succeed in gaining what you most would have, and attain the end and final cause of all your toil, you will obey my laws, do my bidding, your thought, your art, your institutions, will be even as those which I created, embodying the same principles,

tending toward the same ideals. I am eternally the mistress of all the natural goods of earth, and it is only where this world touches another that my glory ends."

The soul of Greece in its highest and loftiest aspirations, in its divinely severe simplicity, in its most sensitively subtle intuitions, finds embodiment in the philosophy of Plato. Other philosophers may be more cosmopolitan in appeal, of more universal vision, more technically correct; but there is no one else who so perfectly embodies the undying genius of a nation. A large part of Plato's philosophy has been taken over to form the very tissue of Christianity. The center of Christianity is, of course, the Gospel; but on the purely intellectual side, in so far as Christianity was a systematized way of thinking and looking at the world, it came from Plato and Aristotle.

Plato was born in 427 B. C. He is said to have been descended on his father's side from Codrus, one of the legendary kings of Athens, and on his mother's side from the great law-giver, Solon, who is credited with founding the Athenian constitution. He was named Aristocles, after his grandfather, the general and statesman. Plato was a nickname given him either by his companions or by his athletic instructor because of his broad shoulders. His origin and upbringing had a great deal of influence on his philosophy. Their effect on him is always evident. Some of the finest qualities and some of the greatest defects of his teachings are due to this influence in his life. One great merit is his uncompromising ideality. He never allows the best to suffer for the sake of the good. A great defect is his aloofness, and the remoteness of his ideals from actual life.

He was an aristocrat who found himself living in an unstable democracy somewhat like a South American revolutionary republic. His whole sympathy was with permanency, stability, discipline and high and noble principles of government. He was in his youth politically ambitious, and wished to take an active part in politics to restore the spirit of the ancient regime. He had also literary ambitions, and would probably, under different circumstances, have been a writer and politician. He received the education of the ordinary Athenian of good family.

When Plato was about twenty years old he met Socrates, and became one of the little group of young men who loved to hear Socrates talk, and who were his friends and companions. He remained under this influence for seven or eight years, until Socrates' death.

Thus the personality of Socrates dominated the most impressionable years of his life.

In 399, Socrates was executed, and after his death Plato went to study under Euclid at Megara. From Megara he went on to Cyrene and Egypt, returning about 395 to Athens, where he began his literary work, and perhaps taught a few friends. He may have written the Apology, Crito, and part of the Phaedo at this time, also some of his earliest Dialogues concerning the Sophists.

Near the year 390, Plato journeyed to Magna Grecia and Sicily, where he became acquainted with the Pythagoreans. He visited the elder Dion, the tyrant of Syracuse, and became intimate with him. But Dion turned against him, treated him as a prisoner of war, and delivered him over to the Spartan ambassador. Sparta and Athens were hostile to each other and the ambassador sold Plato as a slave in the market-place of Aegina. Fortunately, a Cyrenian who knew him, bought him, set him free, and sent him back to Athens.

In 387, Plato on his return to Athens founded the Platonic Academy. It was in a grove at the gymnasium or athletic field where those of pure Athenian descent exercised. Plato went there and taught, carrying on this academy until he died. His Dialogues are probably idealized accounts of these discussions, and of those in which Socrates had taken part.

In 367, Plato made a second journey to Sicily, and a third in 361. At this time he tried to found an ideal system of government in Syracuse. Again he fell into difficulty, but was saved by the Pythagoreans of Tarentum, who brought the influence of their city to bear on the government of Syracuse. For the rest of his life he taught and wrote in Athens. He died in 347, when he was eighty years old.

Plato's writings are in the form of dialogues or idealized conversations on philosophical subjects. The Dialogues may be divided into four groups: first, the early Socratic group,—the Charmides, the Lysis and the Laches, the Euthyphro, the Apology, and the Crito. The last two concern the trial and imprisonment of Socrates. Possibly the part of the Phaedo which deals with Socrates' death was written at this time. Second, are the Dialogues in answer to the Sophists, the most important of which are the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Theaetetus, and the first book of the Republic. Third, comes the group written during the earlier years of his teaching at the Academy, one of the most fruitful periods of his life. The most important of these Dialogues are the Phaedrus, the Symposium, and

the main part of the Republic. Fourth, and written a little later at about the time of his third Sicilian journey, are the Phaedo, the Philebus, the Parmenides, the Critias and the Timaeus. Plato discusses in these Dialogues his theory of Ideas and the origin of the world. Finally comes the Laws, the work of his old age.

In nearly all of the Dialogues Socrates takes the chief rôle. But as Plato's thought developed, the teachings he put into the mouth of Socrates became less Socratic and more and more Platonic. Plato evidently realized this, as in a few of his later works the figure of Socrates does not appear. The most important single Dialogue is the Republic, in which he touches upon all his important doctrines and ideas.

Beside the influence exerted by birth and circumstances, and the teachings of Socrates, Plato was also affected in his philosophical speculations by the doctrines of Heraclitus, which he studied under his early teacher Cratylus, and by the philosophy of Parmenides which he learned from Euclid of Megara, who was also a pupil of Socrates and the founder of a system of moral idealism, in which Reality and Goodness were identified. Finally, Plato learned much from the mystical brotherhood of the Pythagoreans, especially of mathematics and the principles of beauty and harmony.

Plato's system of philosophy is apparently dualistic: apparently a system composed of two parts not very closely related to each other. The two parts are the world of Ideas, and over against it the world of sense-experience. The world of Ideas is perfect, eternal, real, corresponding to the Being of Parmenides; the Ideas are the essence and sources of all Goodness, Truth and Beauty—in short, of all reality manifested by the world of sense. The world of sense is the world we see about us: the world of earth and sky, of sea and cloud, of flower and tree, of bird and animal, of all the objects of nature and all the objects of art. This for Plato is a realm of unreality, of things unstable, imperfect, transitory, corresponding to the Heraclitian flux. Plato was, nevertheless, much interested in this world. He felt and appreciated all the beautiful and pleasant things the sense world has to offer; but he saw also its essential vanity and proneness to change, its refusal to be interpreted in terms of permanent thought or of high ideals.

Between the world of Ideas and the world of sense objects, Plato put as a kind of bridge the world of mathematical forms, numbers and geometrical objects, triangles, squares and circles. These have

some of the qualitites of both worlds, resembling the Ideas in being eternal and objects of conceptual thought, and also resembling certain objects of the sense world in form.

The Ideas themselves are purely the objects of the reason. They exist in the intelligible world as do scientific laws and mathematical entities, and like them are never perceived through the senses, although sense-experience may suggest them to the mind. There are three distinguishable elements in Plato's conception of the Ideas. In the first place, they are thought of as functional principles; secondly, in some cases they are conceived as forms of patterns of certain objects. This second view can apply only to Ideas of things in space, not to spiritual Ideas such as the Idea of the Good, the Beautiful or the True. In some of his later Dialogues, Plato seems to consider the Ideas as the antecedent causes of events. Aristotle, who succeeded Plato, distinguished these three aspects clearly, but differed with Plato in thinking matter as well as form to be a necessary constituent of the real.

The most important aspect of Plato's conception of the Ideas is as functional principles; that is each Idea is conceived as the common aim or function of a number of objects. "The horseman knows the bridle." The perfect bridle is the best bridle with which to drive a horse. The Idea of a bridle is indicated by a bridle which is good for its purpose, and is the teleological principle of bridles. Material things are real only in so far as they succeed in imitating or realizing their Ideas. The Ideas are eternal. They may or may not be realized, but the Idea is always in existence. Plato thought of the Ideas as the sources of reality in all the things of sense, because in so far as things realize the Ideas, in so far as they succeed in embodying these principles, they are real. For example, in so far as a machine embodies the functional principle or Idea of a flying-machine it will fly, or will be a real flying-machine. So also with human beings: the person who is the best, the most real, is the one who realizes most perfectly the ideal of human character.

The most important Ideas are not those of particular objects of the sense world, but of things having spiritual, practical, aesthetic, or intellectual value, those which Socrates spent so much of his time defining: such things as justice, wisdom, courage and the like. The principal Ideas of Plato were the Ideas of Beauty, Truth and Goodness; Goodness being the highest of all Ideas, from which every other Idea and thing in the world derived its reality. The Idea of

the Good is most important and is fundamental to Plato's conception both of knowledge and of reality. It is fundamental to his theory of reality; for according to his philosophy, a thing is real only in so far as it makes good. Only in so far as anything realizes the ends of its own being can it be said to exist or to *be* anything at all. In so far as it does realize these ends it is good. And this applies both to the world of objects and to the world of men. A thing is good when it is good for something. The Idea of the Good is fundamental to Plato's theory of knowledge, for we acquire knowledge by learning what things are good for. Having discovered through experience what a certain number of things are good for, and having acquired in this way some knowledge of the Good, we go on to discover the worth of other things; thus, so to speak, taking the Idea of the Good along with us, and using it in acquiring further knowledge. Plato compares this function of the Idea of the Good to light in the visible world which "furnishes the organ of perception with its power." The good itself he compares to the sun, the source of the light which enables us to see.

The Ideas are, therefore, *not* mental images of things in the world of sense, nor are they better objects which the objects in the sense world copy, but they are wholly immaterial, entirely of the "Intelligible world." Like mathematical concepts, they are the goals of thought, the concepts one strives to get when he really desires to know the nature or function of anything. They are archetypes of the things of sense, existing timelessly in an eternal realm above and apart from this transitory world.

The world of sense is the world of matter in which we live. In itself it has no very important reality, but is real only in so far as it embodies the Ideas. Here there are many copies of the same Idea; the Idea, however, is one, being the common principle of a class rather than the pattern of an individual thing. In so far as the sense world does not realize Ideas it is less organized, less real. It is as the world of Heraclitus with all its contradictions.

Plato's philosophy is not simple or naive: it is a very sophisticated form of thought, though a sublime, idealistic one. The whole skepticism of the Sophists is accepted by Plato; yet he still maintains his own philosophy, because it has advanced into a region where such skepticism cannot touch it. Plato agrees with Heraclitus and the Sophists that the sense-world is a world of unreality, but he says there is yet another world,—a world of eternal principles suggested

to the reason by the things of sense. These the reason grasps and finds to be stable, real, eternal, of the very nature and essence of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, and the source of whatever reality appears in the material world. He, therefore, attributes appearance to the world of sense, and gives reality to the world of Ideas. The world of appearance refuses to be understood: the reason cannot grasp it fully; but the deeper it strives to penetrate, the more elusive becomes the shifting change of sense-experience. It is in the world of Ideas, above and beyond the flux and change of time, that the reason is at home. Here the spirit finds fit objects for its immortal aspirations.

Already in the Protagoras and in the Gorgias we have seen the expression of Plato's genius. There his thoughts are led and his imagination restrained by the sound sense and sober judgment of his great master, but already, in these earlier Dialogues, we see by the flashes of intuition, by the heights of the spiritual attainment, by the sudden opening of vistas, the mind of a great genius coming to its powers. In these Dialogues he has already transcended the spiritual attainments of the Greek people, preaching a doctrine and system of morality higher than that attained by any pagan nation. In the Republic we see Plato's genius at the full. Socrates' training has made the poet into a prophet, yet has done nothing to assault or hurt the poet's soul. It has, however, disciplined Plato's intellect, solidified his character, and sobered him down. Now he speaks with both strength and sublimity, with sober reason as well as soaring fancy and subtlest intuition.

The Republic is no primer for Philistines, no book for those who lack tact and understanding of an author. To follow the subtlest mind of Greece through the mazes of its thought, to soar with it wafted on the slightest airs of fancy to the summits of imagination, and there, by sheer strength of spiritual aspiration, to rise to those supreme heights where the Ideas dwell, and finally to see illumined by the flashes of his marvelous intuition, the very nature and essence of Beauty, Truth and Goodness—this is no task for mere idle curiousity, no road runs there for the vulgar and the mean. Yet, the Republic is not the most difficult of the Dialogues but with his genius for expression, Plato here sets forth the main outlines of his doctrines and the chief interests of his thought. The principles of his whole philosophy, his metaphysics, his ethics, his philosophy of Art and Beauty and of the State are here indicated. Primarily,

however, the Republic is a great parable about "justice," by which is meant that intrinsic goodness of the soul whence all other virtues, public and private, take their rise. Other subjects appear as incidents in this general theme. Man's spiritual nature, as manifested in the individual and in the state: how its harmonies may be wrought by breeding and by culture; the consummation of this task in the perfect co-operation of true wisdom, true courage, and true temperance in both state and individual; and, finally, a comparison of this true Idea of justice with the many pathological and diseased forms exemplified by the nations and individuals of the earth. This, maintained amid many digressions, is the real theme of the Republic.

The first book is very like in character to some of the Dialogues concerning the Sophists, and was probably written several years before the main body of the work. Later it was used by Plato as an introduction to the rest. Its theme is justice and morality, and it leads up very nicely to the main argument. The book opens with Socrates at the Piraeus, the harbor of Athens, whither he has gone to see a festival in honor of Bendis, the Thracian Artemis. He has seen the procession and sacrifices and is on the point of returning home, when several of his friends catch sight of him, and rushing up, insist upon his staying for the torch race on horse back to be held in the evening in honor of the goddess.

He consents to stay and they all go into the house of Cephalus, an Athenian, living at the Piraeus, and the father of one of the young men, Polemarchus, who appears here and also in other of the Dialogues. Cephalus is at home and is very glad to see Socrates, whom he has known well, but whom his age prevents from seeing very often. They enter into conversation in the course of which Socrates asks him if like many others he finds old age a burden, and what, on the whole he considers the greatest good his wealth has brought him. Cephalus replies that, unlike many of his friends, he finds old age rather a relief than a burden. It gives a great sense of calm and tranquility and frees one from the dominion of the passions. He also says that the greatest good his wealth has brought him is that it has freed him from meanness and crookedness and from the temptation to deal unjustly. Socrates then asks what he means by justice, and receives the answer that justice is to pay your debts both to men and to the gods.

This starts the Dialogue. Socrates says "Yes, but suppose you had a friend who came and gave you his arms when he was sane, and then when he became insane demanded them back, would it be right to

give them up to him?" The definition that justice is to pay one's debts does not seem to apply very precisely to this case. Socrates, who is never satisfied with anything less than an exact and universal conception of the subject under investigation, begins the cross-questioning of the dialectic. Cephalus, evidently realizing what is coming, goes away at about this time, leaving the argument in the hands of the younger men. One of them suggests that justice is to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies, to give to each his due. But, says Socrates, unless you are certain which are which—and often that is very difficult—you might do harm to your friends and do good to your enemies.

Here follows a striking passage, anticipating the Christian doctrine of love to one's enemies. "Can anyone," asks Socrates, "be acting justly who really harms another?" Can a trainer and breeder of horses by excelling in the art of horsemanship, injure his horses? Or can one by being truly a physician injure his patients? It is only in so far as the trainer lacks perfection in his art, and the physician fails and is less than the true physician, that injuries and mistakes in practice occur. In the present connection, for a man to be injured means, primarily, that he be injured in that which is distinctively human about him, namely,—his character and moral being. In other words, in his proper human virtue, which is justice. "And can the just by justice make men unjust, or the good by virtue make them bad?" This is no more possible than for the true art of horsemanship to make a horse bad, or a perfected art of medicine to cause disease. "Then to injure a friend or anyone else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is unjust?" "I think what you say is quite true, Socrates," replies Polemachus. "Then if a man says justice consists in paying a debt, meaning that a just man ought to do good to his friends and injure his enemies, he is not really wise; for he says what is not true, if as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can in no case be just."

Then, while they were still debating this question Thrasymachus, one of the auditors, very much like Callicles in the Gorgias, "came at us like a wild beast seeking to devour us," and proclaims justice the interests of the stronger and that might makes right. Socrates, to Thrasymachus' disgust, does not show a great deal of enthusiasm in regard to this definition, but, nevertheless, asks Thrasymachus whom it is he means by the stronger. Thrasymachus answers that he means the better and wiser, who are the stronger, and that it is right

for the stronger to govern and have more than the rest. Very well, says Socrates, if all the slaves in Athens should revolt and subjugate the Athenians, would they not govern in the interests of the strong? If the wiser are to govern and have more than the rest, should not the cooks have more to eat than other people, and the shoemakers have bigger shoes?

Thrasymachus says he means the wise politicians who govern cities; they are the better and the wiser. These men govern in their own interest, and give out their own codes of laws as the standard of right and justice in their states. The tyrant makes a tyrannical code and calls it justice. The monarchy calls its monarchical code justice, while the democracy enacts democratic laws and calls them justice.

Each of these codes of laws is made in the interests of those in power,—that is, those who, for the time being at any rate, are the stronger. Justice then is manifestly the interests of the stronger.

Thrasymachus evidently has no idea of a representative body governing, a body which governs for the interests of all, and by cherishing the common interest thereby makes its own interests flourish. He has simply ideas of individual wills always in conflict with one another, and of those in control giving out their doctrines as the right.

Socrates asks if every government is infallible, never makes mistakes nor commands its subjects to do things which turn out to its disadvantage, but if every government always gives out laws which best serve its purpose. Thrasymachus replies, it is true that existing governments make mistakes, but this is only in so far as they are lacking in the true art of government. In reality, it is only where the governing body lapses from being a government that it makes mistakes and commands that which is not for its own interests. The true government, like the true physician, makes no mistakes.

Then, says Socrates, government is an art, and only in so far as it is perfect is it really government. Thrasymachus hastens to agree with him. Granting then that it is an art, its interests will be like those of the other arts. Now the interests of the true physician are healing the sick; the interests of architecture are building houses; the interests of the true shepherd the welfare of the sheep. The interests of all the arts are the interest of their subject-matter. *So the true interests of any real government are the interests of the governed.* And thus, far from being the interests of the governing party, as Thra-

symachus at first asserted, the interests of government turn out to be cherishing the interests of the governed.

Thrasymachus is for the moment nonplussed at this complete overturning of his ideas. Then he asks Socrates if he ever had a nurse. He says that Socrates is manifestly devoid of worldly wisdom and has not yet learned to distinguish the shepherd from the sheep. The shepherd takes care of the sheep, not for their own sake, but for what he can make out of them. The physician, too, works for money, not for the sake of the sick. Socrates is talking like a little child innocent of the ways of the world. Socrates replies that in so far as he is a true shepherd a man will tend his sheep for their own good, but in every man there is a portion which requires food and clothing. In so far as an artist must minister to practical needs he works for money: in so far as he is an artist he works for beauty in his creation. The art of money making is another art in addition to his real art, but one which every man must practice to some extent in order to live.

Thrasymachus might have said that there were no other arts, but the art of money making, and that this art included all the others, furnishing the real motive power in them all. The answer to this would be that if no motives were present in man's nature but those concerned with the satisfaction of immediate needs, the arts would never have arisen. Man would have remained on the level of those animals, if any there are, which are satisfied merely with the gratification of present desires. Man's nature is not that of such a hypothetical brute, but is that of a rational being. His interests and motives are not confined to the immediate needs of his existence, but express themselves objectively in sciences, arts and civilization. Man's spiritual nature is the source and center from whence all these things have exfoliated. Like a hidden fountain its presence is shown by the fragrance and verdure above and around it.

The first book of the Republic continues with a little further discussion of the same theme—justice—which has been shown by the analogy of the arts to be the interest of the governed. Robbers, thieves and criminals know but little of justice, yet it is evident that even a band of robbers could not exist without some sense of justice and morality among themselves. Honor among thieves is necessary if they are to co-operate at all and accomplish a common purpose. In so far as they have justice among themselves they are strong and able to work together. From justice comes strength and harmony,

and from injustice strife and bickering. The first book ends with a reiterated proof that justice is better than injustice, but as yet, as Socrates humorously complains, "we do not know what justice is." There is very little positive content to the idea corresponding to the words justice or morality. The rest of the Republic is the endeavor to show what constitutes justice in the individual and in the state.

Glaucon, here a personage in the Dialogue, in real life a younger brother of Plato, asks Socrates at the beginning of the second book to make clear to him what morality or justice is. He has always believed justice better than injustice, but upon faith rather than upon reason. He has been glad to hear what Socrates has been saying, but he does not yet know what justice really is, nor to what class of goods it belongs. There are three classes of goods, says Glaucon. First, things good in themselves and good in their consequences; second, things good in themselves but having no consequences one way or another,—games, innocent amusements and the like; third, things unpleasant in themselves, but good in their consequences, such as engaging in some uncongenial employment for the sake of money, or undergoing a surgical operation.

To which class of goods does justice belong? The *hoi polloi* think that it belongs in the third class, among those things which are unpleasant or evil in themselves but good in their results and consequences. People in general are inclined to think morality distasteful, but wholesome, while immorality is held to be pleasant and desirable in itself, but evil in its consequences, and, therefore, prudently to be avoided through fear of the resultant evils. Glaucon would like to believe that righteousness is good in itself, as well as in its consequences, so he suggests to Socrates that they take away or even invert the usual consequences of both virtue and vice, and then see if there is anything in the nature of virtue in itself, which renders it precious and desirable apart from all consequences.

If one had the ring of Gyges, which gave invisibility, an ever-present way of escape, and was, therefore, rendered immune from the consequences of evil doing, would anyone choose virtue for itself? Let the just man seem to be unjust, and the unjust man possess the reputation of uprightness and virtue and have many friends, while the just man is despised and persecuted and tortured and put to death. Compare the two men,—one perfectly just, the other perfectly unjust, and let the just man acquire a very evil reputation and come to the greatest of misfortunes, while the wicked flourishes like

the green bay tree and by his craft avoids, not only the consequences, but even the appearance of evil. Then prove, if you can, Socrates, why men should prefer justice to injustice.

Socrates seems staggered by this proposal, and he suggests that they try to find a larger quantity of justice and injustice than is present in individuals. If someone asked us to read some very finely written letters, would we not be glad if we could find the same thing written large? Let us examine the community then for there we shall find justice and injustice writ large. We will imagine the growth of a state and see what morality is *en masse*.

Then begins the constructive part of the Republic in which Plato describes an Utopia to illustrate the essential nature of virtue and vice. The origin of the state, he says, is from needs and wants. Some persons produce more than they need of certain necessities, but lack others. An interchange of products occurs, and a community forms. The origin of the state is thus, in his opinion, commercial. At first the state which Socrates describes is small and the people lead simple pastoral lives. Glaucon objects saying that this is not a state but a back woods settlement. Socrates retorts by saying that in a more complicated state vice is sure to enter, but if Glaucon prefers that kind of city he is perfectly willing to consider it since both justice and injustice will be found side by side and can be compared with one another.

If you have luxury and wealth and all the complexities of civilization, you will need an army for defence, and possibly also for aggression since the population of such states very soon becomes too large for their territory. The soldiers must be gentle toward their friends and savage toward the enemy. They should be like finely bred watch dogs guarding the state, and should be bred and educated very carefully lest they turn against their friends. Here comes in the topic of the education and breeding of these soldiers, or guardians, as Plato calls them.

He takes Greek education and idealizes it. Ordinary Greek education consisted of gymnastics and music (music meaning everything presided over by the Muses). During childhood the future guardians of the state are to learn poetry by heart. Shall they learn Homer and Hesiod? These poets contain certain scandalous reports of the gods and goddesses and accounts of the vices and crimes of prominent men who were held up as examples to the Greeks. It is in

connection with this that Plato brings in his famous criticism of the arts.

The first point in the indictment is the criticism of the poets for their description of evil. Plato believes that because of unconscious imitation, little children will absorb a great deal of evil from these poems. Then the poets represent the gods as the authors of evil, with the weaknesses and vices of men; so when the children grow up and are tempted, they will see the gods' ill-conduct as an excuse for their own.

In the beginning of the third book there is a criticism of the poets' depicting the gods as going about in the form of men. Plato says this is wrong, for the gods could not change without changing for the worse. This leads to a criticism of acting in general, making yourself into the character depicted. This Plato considers right only when the character imitated is noble. So the guardians of the state must not act ignoble characters. Then in regard to the whole crew of vaudeville artists, they are not to be allowed in the city at all. They are to be crowned with fillets, given a good dinner, and dismissed from the city as glorious beings, but beings who have no place in a well regulated state.

Then the question of music comes up. Plato considers that it is very important what music the soldiers shall have. They should not be trained in music which makes for melancholy and passion, neither in the sensuous Lydian music nor the soft, melting Ionian drinking music: but they should be taught the Phrygian music of religion and the Dorian music of war. In regard to rhythm, it should be of the "simplicity of a noble and truly-ordered mind." Grace, beauty, simplicity and nobility were the objects of all this training.

In regard to the plastic arts, he speaks of the meanness and indecency which spring from poor architecture, scuplture and painting. Only noble architecture should be allowed in the city. If one sees on all sides images of depravity he cannot fail in being influenced for ill. For "ugliness and discord and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness." He speaks also of the beauty of right living, a kind of moral music. The guardians will never be thoroughly trained until they understand beauty of character.

The guardians are to be temperate in drink, food, and even in

athletics. Athletic training should aim to make them normal, not athletes. If this is so, lawyers and doctors will not be greatly needed, because lawyers thrive on lawsuits which arise from strife and contention, and doctors on diseases which come from intemperance.

It is best for a man to have fair health and to do his work, or if he is rendered useless by disease, to die and be done with it. A simple kind of medicine is necessary, but not the kind of practice which is engaged in keeping luxurious people alive longer than they deserve.

The best guardians are to rule—those who have proved themselves best in all the trials and discipline through which they have passed. The guardians are to be taught that in the beginning all were children of common parents, but some were of gold and silver, others of iron and brass. The gold and silver children are to be the guardians, those who have iron and brass in their make-up, are to be the citizens, the common people.

Those who have gold and silver natures should be taught that they have gold and silver in their own souls, but are never to have gold or silver in their houses or on their clothing or even to touch these metals.

Because all came originally from the same stock, sometimes gold and silver parents will have a brass or iron son. He must be placed among the workers. But if a gold and silver child is born to iron and brass parents he must be elevated to the class of the guardians.

The guardians are to live in barracks, to have no private lives, to devote themselves simply to the good of the people. The people are to live normally, more luxuriously than the guardians.

Coupled with the criticism of the arts there is a criticism of the Greek poets as theologians. They are criticised for depicting the gods as doing evil deeds and showing evil traits. This is wrong because, even were such things true, they should not be repeated.

Then follows a passage in which he transcends the ideas of paganism and maintains that God cannot be anything but perfect. The gods of the Greek pantheon were poetic renderings of the forces of Nature and of the activities of human life. Zeus is the god of the sky. Sometimes he is angry and smites with the thunderbolt, at others he is beneficent and kind. Ares is war, and Athene the art of house-keeping personified. Apollo is the god of the sun. As the personification of the sun, his sending of the plagues is quite in character, but as a god he should not send evil. In Plato's philosophy God is not a mere poetical expression of Nature, but its ultimate

principle—the reality of the Universe. He thinks of one God as the reality behind nature which nature imitates. If then, God is the source of reality, he can be nothing but good, because in Plato's philosophy good is the only true reality. So the pagan gods as represented by the poets in the light of this philosophy are but imitations of imitations. The gods of the poets are the personified forces of nature; but God is more real than nature. He is what nature imitates, and is the author not of evil, but of good.

The criticism of the arts seems strange in the mouth of Plato, a master writer living in the age of Pericles. But the point of the criticism is that Plato's ideals were so high that he would tolerate only the best. He is not opposed to the arts, but to certain phases of the arts which have immoral or undesirable tendencies. Plato is so interested in beauty that he is not interested in art as art. He wants beauty to be in everything, in the lives of the people, in the city, everywhere; hence, it will not be found merely in the form of artistic expression.

After this discussion of the arts he considers further the education of the guardians. Through the processes of education, the guardians who do not show the greatest capacity are to be soldiers, whereas those who have shown the greatest ability, intellectual and moral, will be the generals and statesmen. So the guardians are to follow the general course of Greek education in gymnastic and music, and are to be specially trained in their duties. They are to live in the citadel, and have only such food and clothing as is necessary. They are to have no private property and no private lives. Even the home itself is broken up in the case of the guardians. There are to be no private families, but the guardians are to form a general family and at certain periods of the year they come together in a kind of marriage which lasts only for a short time. Children are to be taken care of by nurses appointed by the state and brought up in public nurseries, so that no child will know its own parent, but all will consider themselves the children of the state.

Women and men are to be educated on exactly the same lines, with the same course of music and gymnastics. The women will have the lighter tasks, however.

Adeimantus here objects that although these people are the ruling class they do not get much happiness. Plato replies that he is not trying to make any one class happier than the rest, but that each class shall have its own place and appointed task and each will have

the happiness which properly belongs to it. So if a man is a guardian he will have trials and privations as well as high place. Later on in the Republic, Plato shows that much of the best which the guardians should have, would be lost if they did not share in these trials and privations and were concerned too much with common things. By cutting off gold, silver and other luxuries, he cuts away many evils which naturally go along with them.

Plato now sets out to find justice in the state, but the other virtues are considered first. It is not necessary for the whole state to be wise: there need be only a few wise statesmen who know their business and can guide the destinies of the state. As for courage, if there is courage among the soldiers and statesmen it does not matter about the others. Temperance all should have. So wisdom and courage are the properties of the two highest classes, but temperance is important for all.

Justice is the harmony or order in all the virtues; the right relation between wisdom, courage and temperance is what makes justice. The life of the individual should be guided by wisdom; it should be courageous; it must be temperate in all things. If it has these virtues in the right proportion, then the individual will be good.

In the eighth and ninth books of the Republic, Plato discusses the degenerate and pathological forms of government and character which result by disturbing the balance of these parts.

Towards the end of the Sixth book he begins the discussion of the higher education of the guardians, and in that connection sets forth his Doctrine of Ideas. The rulers, to know what is best to do, must understand the principle of goodness, must come to a knowledge of the good. For, to have the knowledge prerequisite to statesmanship, it is essential to know what that good is, which it is the aim of the art of living to attain. To do this it is necessary to understand what Goodness itself really is, so that one may endeavor more intelligently to realize it in the State and in the lives of those one governs. To this end it is necessary for the guardians to be initiated into the mysteries of the World of Ideas, for the principle of Goodness resides in the intelligible world among things spiritual and eternal. They are to have manifested to them the position which the Idea of the Good holds in this world, and learn how the intelligible world is related to the world of sense experience. In this manner they may be taught the right principles of the art of Government and understand in general how such principles are to be applied. Then, when they

have acquired practical experience in administration, they may become at last to be true statesmen and fitted to preside over the destinies of this ideal commonwealth.

In the visible world one may have "knowledge in his eyes," (i.e. ability to perceive) and objects to behold, but something more is necessary,—namely, light, which enables the eye to see and renders the object visible. This is also true in the World of Ideas. The Idea of the Good has the same function in the World of Ideas that the sun has in the world of sense. The Idea of the Good furnishes the organ of perception with its power and enables us to obtain knowledge. For we acquire knowledge by learning what things are good for, and having obtained in this manner some intimation of the good, we proceed to discover the worth of other things; thus, in a manner, taking the Idea of the Good along with us, and using it in acquiring further knowledge. The Idea of the Good gives truth to knowledge and knowledge to the subject. We know what things *are* by learning what they are good for, what their function is. Our knowledge is true when it has thus made good. Plato compares this function of the Idea of the Good to light, which renders the object visible and enables the subject to perceive. The source of this light, the sun, he likens to the Good Itself, or God, whence proceeds the Idea of the Good.

He next proceeds to consider the different kinds of knowledge, the faculties of the mind by which we know them, the nature of the various objects of knowledge, and the relations in which they stand to one another. "For the many as we say, are seen but not known, and the Ideas are known but not seen." Plato here departs decidedly from the popular conception of his philosophy as a thorough-going dualism. The two fold division between the world of objects and the world of Ideas persists, but aparently because the things which he knew best fell naturally into these two classes. But he makes provision for all the world of scientific truths and principles in a place between the world of sense and the world of Ideas, and shows how the various realms of being, according to each one's measure of Reality form a series, blending into one another like the hues of the spectrum. Had as much science been known to the Athenians as is known to the moderns, undoubtedly Plato would have painted all the hues of knowledge and of being which lie between the infra-red of sense and the ultra-violet of Ideas, with colors far stronger and more saturated than the material then at hand permitted him to do.

The relationships between the different kinds of knowledge may be symbolized by a line divided into two parts and then again divided.

Visible.		Intelligible.	
Sun.		Idea of the Good.	
Knowledge of Shadows.	Belief.	Understanding.	Reason.
Images Shadows Reflections in mirrors, etc.	Ourselves Animals everything in Nature and in art.	Natural Sciences, Mathematics, Hypotheses	True knowledge, Ideas. Dialectic

The two major portions of the line correspond, one to the visible world, and the other to the intelligible world. The Sun presides over the visible world rendering its objects perceptible, and the Idea of the Good presides over the intelligible world making knowledge of scientific laws, principles, and Ideas possible. The lowest division of the line corresponds to images and shadows, the next to objects of Nature and art. The lower portion of the intelligible world consists of the laws and principles of the sciences. The objects of this lower realm of the intelligible world have to do with the highest realm of the sense world; that is, the natural sciences have to do with animals, plants, etc. The higher portion of the intelligible world is the realm of the Ideas, which constitute the objects of the highest knowledge. "There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and by the ideas themselves.

"I do not quite understand your meaning," he said.

"I will try again," I said, "for you will understand me better now that I have made these preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which everybody is supposed to know, and of which therefore they

do not deign to give any account either to themselves or others; but they begin with these, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?"

"Yes," he said, "I know that."

"And do you not know also that although they use and reason about the visible forms, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on: and, while using as images these very forms which they draw or make, and which in turn have their shadows and reflections in the water, they are really seeking for the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?"

"That is true."

"And of this kind I still spoke as intelligible, although in inquiries of this sort the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not proceeding to a first principle because unable to ascend above hypotheses, but using as images the objects of which the shadows are resemblances in a still lower sphere, they having in relation to the shadows a higher value and distinctness."

"I understand," he said, "that you are speaking of geometry and the sister arts."

"And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will also understand me to speak of that knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a region which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, beginning and ending in ideas."

"I understand you," he replied, "not perfectly, for the matter of which you speak is too great for that but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by the sense; yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned

with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason."

"You have quite conceived me," I said, "and now, corresponding to these four sections, let there be four faculties in the soul—reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith or persuasion to the third, and knowledge of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth."*

At the beginning of the seventh book Plato introduces his famous parable of the cave. "After this," I said, "imagine the enlightenment or ignorance of our nature in a figure: Behold! human beings living in a sort of underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all across the den; they have been here from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them; for the chains are arranged in such a manner as to prevent them from turning round their heads. At a distance above and behind them the light of a fire is blazing, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have before them, over which they show the puppets."

"I see," he said.

"And do you see," I said, "men passing along the wall carrying vessels, which appear over the wall; also figures of men and animals, made of wood and stone and various materials; and some of the passengers, as you would expect, are talking, and some of them are silent?"

"That is a strange image," he said, "and they are strange prisoners."

"Like ourselves," I replied, "and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?"

"True," he said, "how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?"

"And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?"

"Yes," he said.

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*Plato's "Republic," Book VI, 511.

"And if they were able to talk with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?"

"Very true."

"And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy that the voice which they heard was that of a passing shadow?"

"No question," he replied.

"There can be no question," I said, "that the truth would be to them just nothing but the shadows of the images."

"That is certain."

"And now look again, and see how they are released and cured of their folly. At first, when any one of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to go up and turn his neck round and walk and look at the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then imagine some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now he is approaching real being and has a truer sight and vision of more real things,—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,—will he not be in a difficulty? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?"*

The prisoner will object to this new life thinking the knowledge of shadows he formerly had was better. But finally he will get used to the daylight, seeing first shadows, then reflections, then natural objects, animals, trees, plants, etc., and finally he will be able to look upon the sun itself. If this man goes back into the den, and tries to convince the people of their ignorance, they will not believe him at first because he will not be used to the darkness and cannot at first join in their contest of judging shadows. But later he will be able to do better than they, for he has knowledge of true objects. So Plato holds that men are always striving about shadows, and the most enlightened person is he who gets loose and comes out of the darkness. The man who leaves the cave entirely and lives in the upper world is the scientist and philosopher who knows real causes and conditions.

The guardians are to be educated until they can look upon the sun, until they know reality itself,—that it proceeds from the Good, which

*Plato's "Republic," Book VII, 515.

is identical with God. For no man can truly be a ruler and direct all things for the sake of the good unless he understands and comprehends fully the nature of the good. Then, when their education is finished, the guardians are compelled to go back into the cave and impart to those who sit in darkness the knowledge they have gained.

Here Glaucon objects, saying that it is unjust to compel these men to live a worse life when they might live a better one. Socrates again replies that they are not building the city that one class may be happy out of proportion to the others, and it is part of the duty of a guardian, since rank confers obligation, to return again, and teach the citizen since they themselves have received their education from the state.

The higher education of the guardians will be, first, mathematics, which to the Greek meant a science of harmony and order, not merely an intellectual routine, as with us. Then they will study astronomy and harmonics with the same intent, and finally the various kinds of philosophy, ending with the dialectic. This probing, searching, critical art, of which Socrates was the first great master, now preserved only in mutilated form as the art of cross-examination in the law courts, meant for Plato the thoroughgoing, merciless examination of all doctrines—scientific or philosophical—the blind acceptance of no hypothesis or postulate, yet essentially a constructive effort, not leading to skepticism, but penetrating to the very bed-rock of truth.

The education of the guardians continues until they are thirty-five. For fifteen years they are to act as governors, soldiers, administrators of the state. When they are fifty years old they are recalled to the city and spend the rest of their lives as statesmen and in the pursuit of knowledge, framing the policy of the state and teaching the younger men and women, and advancing the knowledge of science and philosophy. "When they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every deed and in all knowledge come at last to their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also, making philosophy their chief pursuit: but when their turn comes, also toiling at politics and ruling for the public good, not as if they were doing some great thing, but of necessity; and when they have brought up others like them and

left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart for the Islands of the Blest and dwell there."*

Plato has described in the mythical guardians of his Utopia a very wonderful type of being. Apart and different from ordinary humanity, they are the product of an elaborate system of breeding and education. Even more than a monastic order do they follow the regular life, receive its stamp and become moulded to its uses. Yet unlike monastic teaching, the result of their education is perfect intellectual freedom. Although deprived of all worldly possessions, they do not live withdrawn from the world, but play the parts of real men and women in guiding and governing the state and in protecting their humbler brethren. To show the superiority of the things of the spirit over those of the flesh, the working classes are to possess all the material comforts and the wealth, while the guardians must even be content with Goodness, Truth and Beauty. Everything within the state is completely in the power of the guardians; yet they must never touch gold or silver, but must be content with not quite enough to eat and not quite enough to wear. They alone are thought worthy to undergo this more than Spartan discipline. The pampered working class corresponds to the slaves in other Greek cities. There are to be no slaves in the Republic, a reform almost inconceivable to the Greeks at the time. Plato alone conceived it possible. Even his great successor, Aristotle, thought slavery a natural institution.

Neither in desire for wealth, nor in ambition, nor in love of glory lie the motives for ruling, but the guardians govern "out of necessity, when their turn comes, and not doing it as some great thing," but as a part of their duty and office, much as an officer of the day at a military post performs his special duties. An example which rulers in both monarchical and democratic lands might well consider and imitate.

Strange and splendid figures do, indeed, dwell within the citadel of the Republic. Women athletes, learned in all sciences, more beautiful than other women of the earth, ruling as queens, fighting as soldiers, and in spite of their occasional maternal activities, with more than a touch of the nun about them. The men, knight, soldier and monk together, like the Knights of Malta, the Hospitalers or other military order, rulers wise and philosophical, statesmen and

*Plato's "Republic," Book VII, 540.

savants—together these men and women form one great family, a government, an army, a university and a church.

Do we not begin to understand what Plato really means when he says each class should be content with the happiness properly belonging to it? All this the guardians would lose if they did not undergo their trials and privations. Now their lives are filled with all that is most beautiful, most wise, most honorable in Greek traditions and civilization. All that was loveliest and truest and most exquisite in Greek culture filled their minds. Yet how quickly would their glory fade were they to allow themselves to lapse into luxury and ease! "Luxury is well enough," says Plato in effect—Plato the arrogant, the aristocrat, the descendent of Solon and of the royal Codrus; "well enough for the lower classes, provided they can continue reasonably temperate, but is unworthy, impossible, in a gentleman or a lady."

Having pictured his Utopia and its rulers, Plato then goes on to compare with this ideal community several more or less degenerate, pathological, or otherwise imperfect varieties of government and individuals. There are four of these imperfect forms of government. The Republic is the true form. Below this come the wrong forms,—the timocracy, the oligarchy, the democracy, the tyranny—each form worse than the one before.

The first of the imperfect forms, the timocracy, is a government for honor and glory, military conquest. True government directs all things wisely for the sake of the good. The aim of the next form would be honor and glory. Plato does not know of any government which corresponds to the Utopian government. But the Cretan and Spartan governments correspond to the next best form, timocracy. This arises from the true form through luxury. Conflict arises between the guardians and the plebs which is finally settled by allowing individuals to hold property. The guardians having won, hold property and enslave some of the plebs. Then appears a government where the aim is conquest and wealth. Such a government will be characterized by everlasting wars, order and subordination of one rank to another, respect for authority, and ambition. Those who are rulers will be the successful generals and soldiers rather than the philosophers and statesmen. The citizen of this state is the one who gives up virtue for ambition; who goes into the army or politics for the glory and honor that he may get; who becomes unscrupulous in furthering his ends and forgets honor in his ambition.

The next form of government is the oligarchy. Accumulation of wealth ruins the timocratic government. The leaders begin to hoard up wealth; and although it is against the law to have private hoards of wealth, they indulge in luxury and display. They and their wives begin to rival each other in entertainment, clothes and show. As wealth accumulates, virtue shrinks, and finally men agree that a sum of money shall be fixed as a qualification for citizenship. So the poor are excluded, even though they may have more ability and virtue than the rich. In an oligarchical state there are two states, divided against each other,—one a city of the poor, the other a city of the rich. An oligarchical state is always weak in war; for if the rich let the poor fight, there is danger of rebellion, and if they do not there is danger of defeat.

In such a state there accumulate ruined men who have spent more than they could afford and are bankrupt and desperate. These men remain in the city without occupation and form the material for conspiracies, plots and rebellions. Of these there are two classes: one, the merely idle, lazy and shiftless, who are generally harmless, and the other the murderers and criminals. Where there is great wealth there is always great poverty, and great poverty means great crime.

The man corresponding to the oligarchical state is often the son of an ambitious man who has been politically shipwrecked. The son gets a distaste for politics and turns to making money, using his reason only in accumulating wealth and turning his ambition to still greater accumulation of wealth. He is not likely to be well-educated or interested in art or beauty. There are two men in him, one which desires good things, and another who has many vices he would like to indulge, but which he holds under because he is too mean and avaricious to indulge them.

Then the next form is the democracy, developed from the extremes of wealth and poverty of the oligarchy. Men who have lost property incite the poor to rebel. The property is taken from the ruling class and everyone is free and has equal rights. After the revolution is over we have the democracy, everyone having an equal share in the government. In such a system there is the greatest variety and freedom. "This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of states, being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as women and children think a variety of colors to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this state,

which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of states."*

The man corresponding to the democratic state is the son of an oligarchical man. He leads a life of pleasure, indulging his desires as they come, not trying to hold them under because they are expensive. After a while he comes to a kind of mean in which he follows one thing and then another; at times spending this time in athletics, again in hunting, then in studying philosophy, then in money-making —living a life of no order or purpose.

In the democratic state, anarchy creeps in and develops. Liberty has no limit in a democracy, and by degrees anarchy finds a way into private houses and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them. The son has no respect for his parents and this is his freedom. Nay, "no one who does not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the domination of man have in a democracy than in any other state; for the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them; and all things are just ready to burst with liberty." Finally tyranny, the worst form of government arises from the excess of liberty and lawlessness in the democracy; and the worst slavery comes from the extremest liberty.

There are three classes in a democracy: first, the idle spendthrifts and drones; second, the richest class, whom everyone envies and the politicians blackmail; and third, the working people. The politicians "take the estates of the rich, and give to the people as much of them as they can, consistently with keeping the greater part themselves." When the rich rebel against this the demagogue comes and incites the people against them. Then something occurs like the story of what occurred at the temple of the Lycian Zeus, when someone happened to eat the entrails of a human victim and became a wolf. By false accusation and judicial murders the demagogue puts out of the way some of his enemies. Then some one whose friend or relative he has murdered tries to assassinate him, and he is given a body-guard, that "the people's friend" may not be injured. This is the beginning of tyranny. To protect himself, the demagogue is forced to exile and kill and punish, until everyone is turned against him. Even some of his own followers oppose him; so he turns out the best, and finally calls in mercenaries recruited from the criminal classes of other cities,

*Plato's "Republic," Book VIII, 557.

and stirs up wars to put his former friends out of the way. "The tyrant cannot stop while he has a friend or enemy who is virtuous." He fears even the criminals and mercenaries he has hired and he has to flatter and serve them. So in the end he is compelled to live pandering to slaves and criminals and to be the enemy of everyone who is good or wise or happy.

The man whose character corresponds to tryanny is the man who has one evil passion ruling over an evil soul. In sleep, says Plato, sometimes in horrible dreams we find ourselves engaged in acts which fill us with horror at their recollection. The tyrant is such an evil being in living, waking reality. He is ruled by what is worst and maddest in his nature. The lowest desires control his conduct and activities. Thus the criminal and mad tendencies of man's nature find themselves embodied in the man whose character corresponds to the tyrannical form of government.

In these different types of men, corresponding to each different type of government, the first is the man who is ruled by the highest faculty, reason; then the man who is ruled by ambition; then he whom avarice rules; then the one who is ruled by all desires; and the lowest man is he over whom one base passion has assumed control. This is the last and worst stage of degeneracy running on to madness.

Toward the end of the ninth book we have a discussion about pure and mixed pleasures. Many people do not realize that there are pure pleasures; they simply move up as far as the mean which is the borderline between pure and mixed pleasures. And "those who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining table, they fatten and feed and breed, and in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron, and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent.

"Their pleasures are mixed with pains—how can they be otherwise? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are

colored by contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade so that they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth."*

At the end of the ninth book is Plato's famous image of the soul, brought in like many of his myths, to illustrate by a figure what he has already stated in more intellectual terms.

"Well," I said, " and now we have arrived at this point I may resume the beginning of the argument, which arose out of some one saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just. Was not that said?"

"Yes, that was said."

"Come then," I said, "and now that we have determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a word with him."

"What shall we say to him?"

"Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes."

"What sort of an image?"

"An ideal image of the soul, like the creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cereberus, or any other in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one."

"There are said to have been such unions."

"Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, polycephalous beast, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will."

"That," he said, "implies marvelous powers in the artist; but, as language is more pliable than wax or similar substances, I have done as your say."

"Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second."

"That," he said, "is an easier task; and I have made them as you say."

"Then now join them, and let the three grow into one."

"That has been accomplished."

"Now fashion the outside into a single image, as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull or vessel, may believe the beast to be a single human creature."

"That is complete," he said.

*Plato's "Republic," Book IX, 586.

"And now let us say to him who maintains the profitableness of injustice and the unprofitableness of justice, that his doctrine amounts to this: he is asserting that his interest is to feast and strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, and to starve and weaken the man; who in consequence of this is at the mercy of either of the other two, and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another, he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one another."

"Certainly," he said, "that is what the approver of injustice says."

"To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he ought rather to aim in all he says and does at strengthening the man within him, in order that he may be able to govern the many headed monster. Like a good husbandman he should be watching and tending the gentle shoots, and preventing the wild ones from growing; making a treaty with the lion-heart, and uniting the several parts with one another and with themselves."

"Yes," he said, "that is quite what the maintainer of justice will say."

"And in every point of view, whether of pleasure, honor, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong, and false, and ignorant?"

"Yes, truly."

"Come, now, and let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. "Sweet Sir," we will say to him, "what think you of the noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to man, or rather the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?" He can hardly avoid admitting this,—can he now?"

"Not if he has any regard for my opinion."

"But, if he admit this, we may ask him another question. How would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large the sum which he received? And will any one say he is not a miserable caitiff who sells his own divine being to that which is most atheistical and detestable, and has no pity? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin."

"Yes," said Glaucon, "far worse, I will answer for him."

"Is not intemperance censured," I said, "because in this condition that huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?"

"Clearly."

"And pride and sullenness are blamed, as occasioning the growth and increase of the lion and serpent element out of proportion?"

"Yes."

"And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mud, and from being a lion to become a monkey?"

"True," he said.

"And why are vulgarity and handicraft arts a reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle, and the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his only study is how to flatter them?"

"That appears to be true."

"And, therefore, that he may be under the same rule as the beast, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of him who served, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if that be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government?"

"True," he said.

"And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which is exercised over children, and the refusal to allow them to be free until the time when, as in a State, we have given them a constitution, and by cultivation of the higher element have established in their hearts a watchman and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways."

"Yes," he said, "that is a further proof."

"In what point of view, then, and on what ground shall a man be profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, even though he acquire money or power?"

"There is no ground on which this can be maintained."

"What shall he profit if this injustice be undetected? For he who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected

and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength, and health, in proportion as the soul is more honorable than the body.

"Certainly," he said.

"The man of understanding will concentrate himself on this as the work of life. And in the first place, he will honor studies which impress these qualities on his soul, he will disregard others?"

"Clearly," he said.

"In the next place, he will keep under his body, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he would regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will be always desirous of preserving the harmony of the body for the sake of the concord of the soul?"

"Certainly," he replied, "that he will, if he has true music in him."

"And there is a principle of order and harmony in the acquisition of wealth; this also he will observe, and will not allow himself to be dazzled by the opinion of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?"

"I think not," he said.

"He will look at the city which is within him, and take care to avoid any change of his own institutions, such as might arise either from abundance or from want; and he will duly regulate his acquisition and expense, in so far as he is able?"

"Very true."

"And, for the same reason, he will accept such honors as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those which are likely to disorder his constitution, whether private or public honors, he will avoid?"

"Then, if this be his chief care, he will not be a politician?"

"By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own, though in his native country perhaps not, unless some providential accident should occur."

"I understand; you speak of the city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not think that there is such a one anywhere on earth?"

"In heaven," I replied, "there is laid up a pattern of such a city, and he who desires may behold this, and beholding, govern himself accordingly. But whether there really is or ever will be such an one

is of no importance to him; for he will act according to the laws of that city and of no other?"

"True," he said.*

The tenth and final book of the Republic comes to round out the whole and to touch again on several topics already discussed in the body of the work. Plato takes up the subject of the arts again, and elaborates somewhat upon his idea that art is far less admirable than beauty because art is an imitation of an imitation. That is, the things of the sense-world are imitation of reality, which is found only in the world of Ideas, while artistic representations are but imitations of things in the sense-world, and hence are thrice removed from the real.

He speaks of justice not only as being good in this world, but also of its place and connection with the world to come. In the second book Glaucon has asked Socrates to prove that, even if the just man were to appear unjust and always in trouble and misfortune, while the unjust flourish like the green bay tree, nevertheless, justice is to be preferred to injustice as something good in itself and not merely because it is good in its consequences. Justice has now been shown to be the right activity or functioning of the soul of man, the harmony and right relationship of his several parts and passions comprehended under Wisdom, the virtues of the mind, Courage, the virtues of the heart, and Temperance, the virtues of the appetites and desires. This was demonstrated first by Plato's analysis of the parts and factors of man's moral nature in the third and fourth books. Secondly, by illustration and example, in his description of the guardians and of the ideal city and his discussion of the principles of true government. Thirdly, by the comparative examination of imperfect and degenerate forms of government and of individual character in the eighth and ninth books. In each of the imperfect forms one or more of Plato's cardinal virtues is out of harmony or proportion to the rest, or absent altogether.

Justice, then, is an essential good, the essential good of the soul, the harmony of its life; therefore, the most important because the most fundamental of all human goods. On it depend the efficacy of all human activities, the real success or failure of all human enterprises, political or individual. For all human actions are initiated and guided by the soul of man. If this, his guiding and directing principle, is as it should be, all that is possible and desirable for human

*Plato's "Republic," Book IX, 587,.

beings will be accomplished. "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things will be added unto you." Whereas, if the soul is bad, nothing will be worth the seeking, for no amount of external goods can really be of benefit to a man of evil character.

Virtue, thus having been proved to be good in itself, and all mankind being agreed that the consequences of virtues are good, it is evident that it belongs in that class of things which are both good in themselves and good in their consequences. Virtue ought, therefore, to receive the praise and glory she is accustomed to receive from men as a matter of right. "Look at things as they really are and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners who run well from the starting point to the goal, but not back again from the goal; they start off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just: he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men bestow."

"True."

"And now you must allow me to repeat the blessings which you attributed to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of the just as you were saying of the unjust, that as they grow older, if that is their desire, they become rulers in their own city; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whomsoever they like; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And on the other hand, I say of the unjust that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and come to those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly call them; they will be racked and burned, as you were saying; I shall ask you to suppose that you have heard all that. Will you allow me to assume that much?"

"Certainly," he said, "for what you say is true."

"These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by the gods and men in this present life, in addition to those other good things which justice of herself gives."

"Yes," he said, "and they are fair and lasting."

"And yet, I said, all these things are as nothing, either in number

or greatness, in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death, which are more and greater far."*

The tenth book contains a discussion of immortality. Plato is fond of talking about immortality. In the Phaedo, the Dialogue which describes Socrates' last words and death, Plato pictures him as discussing the question during that last long afternoon, and setting forth many arguments in favor of immortality.

Plato introduces another at the end of the Republic. He says that each thing has its own special evil. The body has disease; the plant or tree has blight; things decay or wear away; and everything has its own evil which eventually destroys it. The evil of the soul is vice or wrongdoing, which assaults and hurts the soul and is its own particular defect. Now in the case of these other things, their evil destroys them, ends their existence. But vice does not have that effect on the soul, during the life of the body, at least. Vice intensifies the psychological processes, makes activity run on to madness. So the psychological process is not decreased by vice; the soul is not put out of existence by its evil. Therefore, the evil of the soul affects merely its function, its activity. The soul works badly, but works at a higher pitch. Therefore, if vice is the evil of the soul and yet does not destroy the soul, the soul will live after death as the evil of the body could not affect it.

When the soul goes to the next world the characteristics which it has acquired in this will determine its existence. This is pictured in a myth. Those who come into the next world come before the judges, who are seated there. The good are sent to Paradise for a thousand years. The evil are sent to the nether world for a like period. Every bad thing they have done they are punished for ten times over, and they are rewarded tenfold for every good act. After the thousand years are over, they can return to the world, and they are to choose their own lives, whether they wish to be men or animals, and what kind of men or animals they wish to be. They draw lots as to the order of their choice. The drawing the lots and the choosing of lives is pictured. Some men who draw the first lots and are freest to choose their lives choose badly. These are not guided by reason, but are those whose goodness is merely a matter of habit and unthinking custom, and they are the most likely to make wrong choices. Those whose virtue is a matter of insight and knowledge,

*Plato's "Republic," Book X, 613.

and who possess reason and wisdom are far more likely to make the better choice of lives. Finally, all the others having chosen lives, the wise Ulysses, who draws the last choice, is delighted to find the life of a private individual, which everyone else had neglected. This he chooses gladly because he is wearied of wanderings and public life.

After all the souls have chosen, they pass under the throne of Necessity, over the plain of Forgetfulness, drink of the river of Negligence, "whose waters no vessel can hold," and return to the world, having forgotten all their experience amid the realms of the departed.

"And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and may be our salvation if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus we shall live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been reciting."*

Thus closes the Republic, the greatest of Plato's Dialogues, a masterpiece of ethical and political analysis, a magnificent fable to teach "Justice," or that essential virtue of the soul upon which all human goods in this world and the next depend. Upon the harmony and balance of those powers and forces which constitute the human personality depends, in the ultimate analysis, human blessedness and human welfare. The right functioning of the chief divisions of these forces of personality is indicated by the possession of the virtues of Wisdom, Temperance, and Courage. These virtues must be trained, disciplined and developed to attain that fine healthiness and perfect cultivation of all the capacities of body and mind, which exist only when each part is in its due order and relationship to the others and to the whole. And the whole man must act in subordination to that Wisdom which is enlightened by the Idea of the Good, and be ever mindful of the Good Itself, the divine source of that Idea. In the attainment of a higher life, both the individual and the institutions of society have a value of their own. The State itself exists for "the sake of noble actions," and should be governed

*Plato's "Republic," Book X, 621.

by wisdom under the guidance of the Idea of the Good. The virtue of the human soul is indeed the foundation of a perfected society, but the individual will not attain this virtue except he be moulded, trained, disciplined and developed by the institutions of a noble and enlightened nation.

Profound and lofty as are the doctrines of the Republic, significant as has been its teachings in philosophy, politics, and ethics, no one would wish to leave the companionship of Plato without learning something of the Symposium. Both as a philosophical and also as an artistic achievement this Dialogue ranks very high indeed. In this and in the Phaedrus are given Plato's philosophy of Love and Beauty. The Symposium is probably the most read and perhaps the most beautiful of all Plato's Dialogues. The scene is laid at the house of Agathon, a tragic poet of Athens, who has just had a play accepted by that city for public presentation. In the evening of the day on which this award was made there had been a public banquet, and on the following day Plato pictures Agathon inviting a few friends to dine at his house and have a little private celebration. The Dialogue consists of after-dinner speeches on the subject of Love. Under this rather frivolous form a serious and profound philosophy is indicated. Not only in the speeches themselves is exquisite literary workmanship shown, Agathon's speech especially being of most exquisite beauty, but Plato has also drawn the portraits of several of the most prominent men of his time, depicted them together in intimate discourse, and put into the mouth of each words not only characteristic of each one's own ideas, but also of his peculiar literary style and the very form of expression of his thought. It would be difficult to find a writer of our own day who would have the audacity to attempt to do such a thing in a serious discourse, or who, having attempted it, would have the ability successfully to carry it off.

There are seven speeches in the Symposium. First, Phaedrus speaks, making such a speech as one might hear at any dinner at which clever men were present; then Pausanias, and then Eryximachus, who speaks of the harmony of opposites. Evidently Plato feels the sophistry of this conception and opposes it, maintaining that so long as things disagree they are not in agreement. Things may be harmonized which formerly disagreed, and by means of art brought into proper relation with one another, but there is no such thing as a harmony of opposites.

Then comes the speech of Aristophanes,—a wonderful piece of

work. Aristophanes was a great comic poet, a man of very pronounced character. He was a sympathizer with the older ideas of a strict military state. He was wholly opposed to the individualism and the license which had sprung up. So in all his comedies he makes fun of all these new ideas. He has an unusual sense of humor and pungency. He is indecent at times, but always devoted to the principle of combination, order and co-operation for the good of the whole.

He begins his speech by saying that in the good old days men were different; they were much more powerful and stronger. They were double, having four legs and arms and two faces, one pointing each way. They could not only walk or run as men do now, but they could move faster by rolling over and over. There were three sexes, —some male, some female, and some both. They became so powerful and insolent that the gods took counsel against them. It was proposed that Zeus destroy them utterly by thunderbolts; but the gods decided not to do that. Zeus instead split them all down the middle and sent Apollo to sew them up. Apollo did so, and then each part desired and needed the other; each, being only a part, desired its other half. So, not being whole or entire, each needed the support and companionship of someone else. Love was the desire each had for the other.

In this strange myth Aristophanes is pictured as presenting his most characteristic ideas. He shows that each member of the human race is incomplete; that any one alone is weak and more or less useless, but by co-operation the race is carried on. So individualism is merely to split humanity up into scattered forces; but in unity there is strength and progress.

Then Agathon speaks, and his speech is the most beautiful of all. He praises love in itself and in its gifts. His speech is a follows:

"The previous speakers, instead of praising the god Love, or unfolding his nature, appear to have congratulated mankind on the benefits which he confers upon them. But I would rather praise the God first, and then speak of his gifts; this is always the right way of praising everything. May I express unblamed then, that of all the blessed gods he is the blessedest and the best? And also the fairest, which I prove in this way: for, in the first place, Phaedrus, he is the youngest, and of his youth he is himself the witness, fleeing out of the way of age, which is swift enough, surely, swifter than most of us like: yet he cannot be overtaken by him; he is not a bird of that feather; youth and love live and move together, like to like, as the

proverb says. There are many things which Phaedrus said about Love in which I agree with him; but I cannot agree that he is older than Iapetus and Kronos; that is not the truth; as I maintain, he is the youngest of the gods, and youthful ever. The ancient things of which Hesiod and Parmenides speak, if they were done at all, were done of necessity and not of love; had love been in those days, there would have been no chaining or mutilation of the gods, or other violence, but peace and sweetness, as there is now in heaven, since the rule of Love began. Love is young and also tender; he ought to have a poet like Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of Ate, that she is a goddess and tender.

'Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps,
Not on the ground, but on the heads of men.'

which is an excellent proof of her tenderness, because she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love; for he walks not upon the earth, nor yet upon the skulls of men, which are hard enough, but in the hearts and souls of men: in them he walks and dwells and has his home. Not in every soul without exception, for where there is hardness he departs, where there is softness there he dwells; and clinging always with his feet and in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he be other than the softest of all things? And he is the youngest as well as the tenderest, and also he is of flexible form; for without flexure he could not enfold all things, or wind his way into and out of every soul of man without being discovered, if he were hard. And a proof of his flexibility and symmetry of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in an especial manner the attribute of Love; ungrace and love are always at war with one another. The fairness of his complexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers, for he dwells not amid unflowering or fading beauties, whether of body or soul or aught else, but in the place of flowers and scents, there he dwells and abides. Enough of his beauty, of which, however, there is more to tell. But I must now speak of his virtue: his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer wrong from any god or any man; for he suffers not by force if he suffers, for force comes not near him, neither does he act by force. For all serve him of their own free-will, and where there is love as well as obedience, there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice. And not only is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no pleasure

ever masters Love; he is their master and they are his servants; and if he conquer them he must be temperate indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for him; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs; and the master is stronger than the servant. And if he conquers the bravest of all he must be himself the bravest. Of his courage and justice and temperance I have spoken; but I have yet to speak of his wisdom, and I must try to do my best, according to the measure of my ability. For in the first place he is a poet (and here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art), and he is also the source of poetry in others, which he could not be if he were not himself a poet. And at the touch of him every one becomes a poet, even though he had no music in him before; this also is a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the musical arts; for no one can give to another that which he has not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge. Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing? Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him? And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires had the light of fame?—he whom love touches not walks in darkness. The arts of medicine and archery and divination were discovered by Apollo, under the guidance of love and desire, so that he too is a disciple of Love. Also the melody of the Muses, the metallurgy of Hephaestus, the weaving of Athene, the empire of Zeus over gods and men, are all due to Love, who was the inventor of them. Love set in order the empire of the gods,—the love of beauty, as is evident, for of deformity there is no love. And formerly, as I was saying, dreadful deeds were done among the gods, because of the rule of necessity; but now since the birth of Love, and from the love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things. And I have a mind to say of him in verse that he is the god who—

'Gives peace on earth and calms the stormy deep,
Who stills the waves and bids the sufferer sleep.'

He makes men to be of one mind at a banquet such as this, fulfilling them with affection and emptying them of disaffection. In sacrifices, banquets, dances, he is our lord, supplying kindness and banishing unkindness, giving friendship and forgiving enmity, the joy of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and precious to those who have the

better part in him; parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace; careful of the good, uncareful of the evil. In every word, work, wish, fear,—pilot, helper, defender, savior; glory of gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose footsteps let every man follow, chanting a hymn and joining in that fair strain with which Love charms the souls of gods and men. Such is the discourse, Phaedrus, half playful, yet having a certain measure of seriousness, which, according to my ability, I dedicate to the God."*

Finally comes the speech of Socrates, in which Plato's scientific conscience speaks after his flight of poetry and rhetoric. Socrates learned about love from a priestess named Diotima, who told him of Love's origin and works. Love was not, as Agathon said, all fair and beautiful, but was a mean between the possession of the good and its lack. Love is not a man, because more than a man, but not a god because less than a god. Love is base-born, the son of Plenty and Want. Plenty is his father, Want his mother; so he is always desiring, never fully in possession. He is ignorant yet wise in that he has not knowledge but desires it. There are two classes of people who do not desire knowledge: the ignorant, who do not know they lack it; and the gods, who have it. What then does Love desire? The desire of goodness and happiness is due in all places to Love. Love desires the everlasting possession of the good; love is the desire for beauty and in the possession of beauty one possesses goodness and happiness. The progress of the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and happiness is by love, which desires beauty. The progress is from the particular to the general. First the love of some person, then of the qualities admired in that person and then the beauty of the qualitites themselves, and finally beauty absolute.

"These," says Diotima, "are the lesser mysteries of love into which even you, Socrates, may enter; to the greater and more hidden ones which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you follow if you can. For he who would proceed rightly in this matter should begin in youth to turn to beautiful forms; and first, if his instructor guide him rightly, he should learn to love one such form only—out of that he should create fair thoughts; and soon he will himself perceive that the beauty of one form is truly related to the beauty of another; and then if beauty in general is his pursuit, how foolish would

*Plato, "Symposium," 195-198.

he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same! And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms; this will lead him on to consider that the beauty of the mind is more honorable than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and teach him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until his beloved is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and understand that all is of one kindred, and that personal beauty is only a trifle; and after laws and institutions he will lead him on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and calculating, but looking at the abundance of beauty and drawing towards the sea of beauty, and creating and beholding many fair and noble thoughts in boundless love of wisdom; until at length he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention.

"For he who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty—and in this, Socrates, is that final cause of all our former toils, which in the first place is ever-lasting—not growing or decaying, or waxing and waning; in the next place not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, nor existing in any other being; as for example, an animal, whether in earth or heaven, but beauty only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who under the influence of true love rising upward from these begins to see that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair

forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates," said the stranger of Mantineia, "is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, which when you now behold you are in fond amazement, and you and many a one are content to live seeing only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible—you only want to be with them and to look at them. But what if a man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of morality, and all the colors and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty, divine and simple, and bringing into being and educating true creations of virtue and not idols only?"*

The pure soul impregnated by the power of divine love and beauty thus conceives as by a kind of immaculate conception, "not images of beauty, but realities." The work of Plato itself is one of those realities, and its very existence demonstrates how mistaken were the Neo-Platonists, when later they misinterpreted the teaching of the Symposium. They imagined Plato here sanctioned a sentimental, world-avoiding, aesthetic mysticism, and they enjoined upon their followers the avoidance of civic duty and natural obligations, in order that they might devote themselves to such lackadaisical pursuits. In the Republic it is the man who escapes from the dark cave of our common human ignorance, and gets out into the light of day and into the real world, and sees things as they are, realities not mere shadows of puppets, and comes finally to understand the true nature of goodness, the foundation of reality, the sun of knowledge, and becomes wise in the knowledge of true being—one from whose eyes the scales have fallen, who descends again into the world, joins in our contests of shadow guessing, and lives amidst the pomps and vanities of human life, in order that he may teach his benighted and unwilling brethren the knowledge he has gained of the true upper world of beauty, truth and goodness. Neither are the guardians of the Republic allowed to devote themselves exclusively to a life of contemplation, "imagining themselves already in the Elysian fields," but must spend the best and most active years of their lives in guiding,

*Plato, "Symposium," 210-211.

guarding, and administering the affairs of the people and the state. Even here in the Symposium, the most poetic, the most lyric, of the Dialogues, the idea of service, of *noblesse oblige*, of the duty of creative effort, is not forgotten. Inspired, not paralyzed, by the contemplation of divine beauty, pure, clear, and unalloyed, the soul is enabled, "to bring forth not images of beauty, but realities."

The Symposium ends with the entrance of Alcibiades drunk. His half coherent speech in praise of Socrates has already been quoted in the last chapter. This sudden descent to earth from the heights of poetry and rhetoric is perhaps symbolic of the return of the soul to the things and thoughts of earth from the world of the Ideas, to whose essence her own is akin. But in this mortal life she must absent herself from felicity awhile, and undergo the labor of turning the hearts and minds of those more benighted and bewildered than herself, by the evils, the confusion, the vanities of the world, to some true knowledge and realization of the eternal, to a vision of the Good, the Beautiful, the True. Alcibiades' speech in praise of Socrates itself indicates the misunderstanding, ridicule, dawning respect and comprehension, reluctant praise, and finally the confidence, love and admiration felt by one of the most corrupt and shameless dwellers in the cave toward one of those few who have really seen the true upper world and beheld the light of the sun of goodness, and with the humility of true greatness endeavored to enlighten others.

It may seem to many that the philosophy of Plato, while interesting and valuable as a work of art, as a source of inspiration, as a pleasant voice to soothe the spirit, yet is not, when all is said and done, in very close relation to life, in any very real sense a practical philosophy. Its closeness to life can better be judged by considering the spirit of the times in which it was written, and comparing the spiritual difficulties of those times with our own. Athens was then at the very height of her wonderful civilization. The age of Pericles was just closing, the age in which were produced many of the world's most beautiful works in art and literature—statues by Praxiteles and Phidias, tragedies by Aeschylus and Sophocles, comedies by Aristophanes. At the same time, there was considerable unrest, lack of moral poise and mental stability. The mass of the people were becoming restless, individualism had developed suddenly and was fast running into license. Skepticism,—intellectual, moral and religious—was rampant.

Plato feared, as did all the better spirits of the times, that the char-

acter of the Greeks, never apparently to be hardened in the mold of their institutions, was now with the breaking of the mold, flowing into the ugliest and most unlovely forms. He was, therefore, looking for something fixed, stable, insoluble, amid the dissolution of all temporal things; and he finds the object of his search in the power of the reason over the fleeting things of sense. The intelligible world is a world of fixed unchanging entities, scientific laws, mathematical truths, functional principles, moral principles, Ideas of Beauty, Truth and Goodness. In this world there is no possibility of change nor shadow of turning; no faintest scent of dissolution. Forces inspired by the unruly wills of sinful men may dash themselves against it only to go down in the ignominy of self-defeat. Only in accordance with its unchanging principles can anything temporal really come to be at all. It is this potency of the eternal in the temporal that Plato uses as the principle of his moral and political reforms. The potency of the Ideas was to be substituted for the force of tradition, the habit and discipline of the old regime, the old aristocratic military socialism. The Greeks would no longer obey authority: they might perhaps be saved from the follies of their own hearts' lusts if they could only be persuaded to obey the eternal principles of their own being; to know themselves sufficiently well to understand that only in accordance with unchanging principles, those Ideas which preside over human life, is the attainment of a good life possible. Human life, in imitating these Ideas, manifests certain constant forms of action. These are the laws of social and political ethics. In this manner alone may order, righteousness and liberty be found together.

Clearly Plato pointed out, like the Hebrew prophets of old, a way of escape for his people. Like them he asserted that salvation lay not in the fleeting world of sense, the world of material possessions and material accomplishments, but in the realm of the eternal, in the moral world, the world of reason, the world of Beauty, Truth and Goodness. If his fellow-citizens would only fashion their souls on these eternal principles, he knew that they and Greece itself would be saved. His prophetic faith in the eternal, in the reality of the world of Ideas, is never shaken for a moment by the foredoomed failure of his reformation of the Greeks. And in truth, it was because of the instability and fickleness of character of his fellow-citizens, the shallow hearts and minds of the great majority, and not to any inherent defect in his plan, that made his work of so little immediate effect. But to all those who speak to unwilling ears the words of Truth;

who tell men blinded by self-interest and sordid selfishness of a world apart of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness; tell soft and luxurious worldlings of the nobility of simplicity and arduous labors for high ends; preach honor to corruption, truth to falsehood, beauty to ugliness and good to evil men, Plato is ever the master and companion.

What has his eternal realm to do with us here and now? How do the Ideas touch every man, enter into each one's experience? Because all true aspirations, all high things, which we as moral personalities aim to do, the principles of our progress, the spiritual goals of our actions are nothing else than the Platonic Ideas. The functional principle or aim of any significant course of action is one of the Ideas. For example, Truth is the final goal and imminent aim of all knowledge, Goodness the end and aim of all action. The material world, the objects of the senses, is but a half-world, in itself but a demi-mondaine affair, having value and significance, nay existence even, only in so far as it "imitates" the Ideas. Directly, only in so far as material things reflect spiritual values, "mirror the Ideas;" indirectly, only in so far as they touch life for moral good or ill are they to be regarded as participating in true being, to be recognized as factors properly influencing one's course of action. What a stinging rebuke to our materialistic, property-mad civilization! The treasures of earth have value only in so far as they manifest some intelligible aspect, ultimately some flash of the True, the Beautiful or the Good, or in so far as they may serve man's spirit as a means for the accomplishment of good ends. Otherwise, as treasures they are as non-existent as the gold and jewels children gather in their dreams. What abysmal stupidity, therefore, to make wealth in itself the end of life! It becomes valuable only as a means to a good life, to the accomplishment of high and noble purposes, to significant and not merely happy—far less luxurious—living. The danger of mistaking means for ends, the prime deceitfulness of riches, is so great that the guardians of Plato's Republic, although they possess and rule the whole state, with all its wealth and property, are most abstemiously trained and are forbidden to touch gold or silver lest the precious metal of their inner natures be corrupted by too close proximity to its baser counterpart. Yet as prosperity is not necessarily and of itself a good, neither is it in and of itself an evil, but requires in proportion to its greatness a greater strength of soul and purpose, higher ideals and intellectual ability to govern and control it, to make its power a good and not an ill, to make it the servant of the State

and not its master, the means and not the end of the individual's existence. Is there nothing practical for us in this?

Is there nothing practical for humanity in a philosophy which proclaims the absolute existence of Ideas eternal, unchanging, which preside over the things and thoughts of this world as archetype to copy, which proclaims the power of the human spirit, enlightened by education and culture, to discover and clearly know these Ideas, and to apply such knowledge to the betterment of human life? In what manner does the welfare of humanity seem more likely to be attained by following courses of action in harmony with such doctrines, or by following opposite courses? If the matter concerned a problem in engineering such as building a bridge across Niagara, would there be any question as to whether it would be better to follow the objective principles of engineering or merely to pile up stone and steel to suit one's fancy? And yet, in regard to matters of human conduct, no principles are expected to apply. A government, recently supposed to be among the most enlightened in Europe, has been led by its most illustrious philosophical, intellectual and military personages to adopt as the principles of action quite the opposite conceptions. Its savants maintain that there are no Ideas, functional principles, Forms, scientific laws, or objects of the reason, existing objectively, either in the world or above the world; that all these things are but ways of looking upon events, forms of the mind's activity, dependent upon the mind, ultimately and finally upon the Will. The Will has created them, posits them as they are useful to it, and is free to disregard one and all of them when they no longer serve its present impulses, quicken the fires of its lusts, or tend to dampen the enthusiasm with which it desires to follow its propensities. Thus with perfect self-consistency the German government proclaimed by the mouth of its cannon the dissolution of all ethical ideas, wrote this proclamation in blood over the face of a continent, and illustrated it with murders which incarnadined the seven seas.

CHAPTER V

ARISTOTLE

Essence of the World an Evolutionary Process Inspired by an Imminent and Transcendent God.

After Plato's death the academy he had taught for more than forty years degenerated. His followers put aside the theory of ideas to make room for the Pythagorean doctrine of number. They became absorbed in trying to solve the problems which Plato had considered in his later thought. Attempting to find mediating concepts between the world of Ideas and the sense-world, they interpolated between the two worlds the Pythagorean numbers, which were regarded as disembodied spirits. This idea of spirits raised religious problems and the problem of evil, with these problems the philosphy of the Middle Ages was largely concerned. There arose also another problem, that of the relation between final and proximate causes. A final cause is the end or aim of an event: proximate causes are the antecedent events which bring it about. In ethics, turning aside from the practice of Plato and Socrates, the members of the academy studied particular problems rather than great ethical principles.

Aristotle, by far the greatest of Plato's pupils, did not become the head of the academy, as he should have done, on the death of Plato. Plato appointed as his successor his nephew Speusippus, who was by no means a remarkable man, but merely a plodding student. Feeling aggrieved at the favoritism shown by his master, Aristotle left the academy and later founded his own school.

Aristotle was born in Stagira, a city of Macedonia, in 385 B. C. His father was physician to the King of Macedonia, and for several generations his family had been connected with the court. Thus from his boyhood he was familiar with court life, government and politics. He was brought up and educated by an uncle, and when eighteen years old he went to Athens and entered Plato's academy, where he soon became a leading member. He remained there seventeen years, studying and giving instruction. While he was a member of the academy, he not only acquired a thorough knowledge of Plato's

philosophy, but also gave much time to rhetoric and literature, writing dialogues after the Platonic model.

After Plato's death, Aristotle travelled for a time, and in 343 he was called by Philip of Macedon to take charge of the education of the young prince, Alexander. He was tutor to Alexander the Great for seven years. If we may infer from Alexander's career anything in regard to the quality of the instruction, it must have been excellent. After his pupil had begun his career of conquest in the East, Aristotle returned to Athens and founded a school in the grove of the Lycian Apollo. From its situation, the school was called the Lyceum, and because of the custom of teacher and pupils to walk in the gardens discussing philosophy, it was also called the school of the peripatetics. Alexander aided Aristotle greatly in his scientific work by sending him all kinds of animals, plants, and curious things which he collected on his progress through the countries which he conquered. Thus Aristotle was able to gather together a scientific museum, to make many biological investigations, and the beginnings of a classification of living beings. Aristotle remained as head of the Lyceum only twelve years. After the death of Alexander he became unpopular in Athens as a supporter and friend of the Macedonian dynasty, fled from Athens to Chalchis, on the island of Euboea, and died there in his sixty-third year.

Although Aristotle wrote voluminously, relatively few of his works have come down to us. They consisted of three different kinds. He wrote dialogues after the Platonic manner when he was a member of the Academy. These are all lost, except a few fragments. Of his "Compilations"—scientific notes and collections of material for investigation— only a few remain. The third group of his writings is the Treatises. Most of these are not in finished form, evidently written as lecture-notes and waiting until he had leisure to rewrite them for publication. The Treatises form the main body of the works of Aristotle which have come down to us. His style is poor as far as literary merit goes, but it has a decided scientific value. There is a very concise, delicately worked-out terminology, with fine gradations of meaning scrupulously maintained.

Of the Treatises there are three main groups. First, the treatise on Logic and Rhetoric. His Logic is mainly deductive,—that is, it is the kind of logic which starts with general principles and reasons down to particulars. Aristotle thought the most fundamental of such principles were above proof, but that examples illustrating them

might be found in all the sciences. He discusses the art of discovering general principles by investigating facts, and points out that such inductive methods yield only probable results, the universality of the principle discovered not being proved by the particular examples which led to its discovery. This doctrine, misunderstood and carried to an extreme by mediaeval scholars, caused them to despise empirical investigations. It remained for the modern world to restore inductive methods to their rightful place in scientific procedure.

To the second group belong his writings on theoretic philosophy, consisting of an important work on Metaphysics, treatises on Mathematics, Physics, Biology and Psychology. These have been preserved with the exception of the book on Mathematics, which is lost.

To the third group of his Treatises belong his works on Ethics and Aesthetics. There are two versions of his Ethics,—the Nichomachean and Eudemean, a work on Politics, and the Poetics included in this group.

Aristotle "took all knowledge to be his province," and wrote on every subject known to his time. He divided knowledge into three parts: first, the theoretical sciences which have truth as their object, —that is, philosophy and pure science of all kinds; second, the sciences which treat of the useful, the applied or practical sciences, —that is, ethics, the sciences of conduct, and politics (ethics is always linked with politics in Greek thought); then in the third group he put the sciences which have as their object the beautiful,—that is, poetry, literature and aesthetics, and the science of beauty in general.

His aim throughout his work was to give sound scientific treatment to his subjects, not to write poetically about them. Perhaps he inherited this scientific tendency from his father, the physician, and from his family in which for several generations there had been the tendency to careful empirical research. He was the opposite of Plato in this respect. Aristotle was sound and elevated, but not always inspiring or sublime. His aim in philosophy was so to transform Plato's doctrine of Ideas as to make it applicable to the world of sense. He said that the Theory of Ideas doubled the world but did not explain it; that it is necessary to know not only the Ideas, but also how events take place in order to have a truly scientific explanation, and this the Theory of Ideas was inadequate to give. Therefore, said Aristotle, the *Forms* (which is the term he uses in place of Plato's word Idea), to be means of explanation must be constituents of existence, not separate from it, existing above and apart from the world

in an ideal realm. So, for Aristotle, Matter and Form are not separate as they are in Plato, but are always found together. Reality is neither the Idea, as with Plato, nor matter, as with Democratus, but is the combination of Form with Matter.

The Forms or formal essence of things are known to the reason by means of concepts. Many apparently very different phenomena are thus often brought together and explained by a single principle, explanation being, for Aristotle, relating the particular to the general. For example, a wood fire, bodily heat and rusting iron are phenomena apparently quite unlike and unrelated to one another, but if we study Chemistry, we ascertain that these different phenomena are in essence the same, and consist in the combination of oxygen with other substances. The strong tendency of oxygen to combine with other elements furnishes the common explanation of all these processes. Thus all are brought together and explained by modern Chemistry, exactly in the Aristotelian sense of explanation as phenomena which are related to one another as particular examples of a general principle, or in other words, as processes of oxidation. Another example of what Aristotle means by explanation would be Newton's explanation of the revolutions of the planets about the sun by means of the law of gravity and the laws of motion. Scientific explanation thus consists in making the particular known by means of its causes, i.e., the general principles which it illustrates and under which it properly belongs. Aristotle believed that thought or reason in giving an explanation grasps the same relations of general to particular which actually exists in things as their essence. The world being a combination of Matter and Form, we thus understand its particular events when we know their essential character, general principle, or *Form*.

Aristotle differed from Plato in regarding reality as a combination of Idea or Form, and Matter. Either apart from the other, he says, is simply an abstraction, a mental figment which we can think of but cannot experience. Whiteness does not exist apart from particular white things: it is merely an abstraction apart from white objects or white visual images. Matter always possesses Form: Form always informs Matter. We can indicate the difference between Plato and Aristotle as follows:

PLATO		*ARISTOTLE*	
Matter		Material Cause	
Reality { Ideas	Form	{ Formal Causs Efficient Cause Final Cause	} Reality

The material cause of Aristotle corresponds to the world of sense experience in Plato, Aristotle's Forms to Plato's Ideas; but whereas Plato considered reality to reside in the world of Ideas only, Aristotle says all reality consists in the combination of Matter and Form. In his conception of form he analyses Plato's notion of the Idea into three aspects: the formal, the efficient, and the final cause. Matter is also a cause. According to Aristotle, then, everything which exists has four causes: first, the Material Cause,—the stuff or substance of which it is made; second, the Formal Cause,—the shape or design or plan of the object; third, the Efficient Cause,—the force or agency which brings it into being, the antecedent phenomenon; fourth, the Final Cause,—which is the end or purpose realized by the thing. To illustrate: the Material Cause of an automobile would be the steel, brass and wood; the Formal Cause would be its design; the Efficient Cause would be the workman, tools and the factory; the Final Cause would be the purpose for which the automobile was made, whether it was to be a truck or a passenger car.

Aristotle considered everything in the world to have these four aspects. He thought of them, not as existing apart from one another, but always together. This conception he applied especially to works of art or works produced by human ingenuity, and to living beings and biological processes. In any work of man these four aspects are apparent. In nature the same is true, except that the Final Cause is inherent in the natural object not in the mind of some outside being whose purpose this object may happen to realize. For example, the Material Cause of a plant would be the tissues of the plant, the Formal Cause would be the shape possessed by the particular species to which the plant belongs; the Efficient Cause would be the uniting of the germ cells of the male and female plant and the beginning of the development; the Final Cause would be the full grown organism itself. These categories of Aristotle apply very well to the world of human activity and to the biological world, and in the hands of careful thinkers they work well, but some of his mediaeval followers were far too much inclined to lay stress on incidental Final Causes and neglect Efficient Causes.

In applying his ideas, Aristotle develops a system of evolution: the taking on by Matter of more Form. No matter is absolutely without form; all matter has some form and movement. So matter, being the stuff or material from which anything is made, becomes a relative term. What is Matter for one thing may be actuality or Form for

another. For instance, the wood of the table, in respect to the raw material from which it comes, is Form, but in respect to the table which is made from the wood it is Matter. Thus each thing is the actuality of some lower form and the material for some higher one. The child is the *actuality* of the baby and the material or *potentiality* of the man. Everything in the world may be considered as the *potentiality* of some higher Form, or the *actuality* of a lower Form. This is a process of evolution, the process of Matter taking on more Form, going up in the scale of being. Aristotle is not content with merely calling attention to the existence of that great process of Nature, which we are accustomed to call evolution, nor with advancing a theory of the manner of its occurrence in particular instances and pointing out that each particular phenomenon of evolution is brought about by an efficient cause, but goes farther and advances an explanation for the process of evolution as a whole.

Here arises the question of the ultimate cause of the evolving world. Each finite thing has its efficient cause which brings it into being, but the whole process is not explained by any one factor in it. This leads Aristotle to infer the existence of a Prime Mover to whom all development, all progress, is due. Since Form and Matter are never found apart from one another the existence of unformed Matter is impossible. That, like immaterial Form, is but an abstraction, a figment of the mind. Form is necessary, for Matter alone is passive; it cannot move itself. Form has to be added to it somehow because, not having any form, it would not acquire it of itself. But there is no beginning of motion. The world-process has been going on from eternity. Motion is, therefore, as eternal as being, because being is a combination of Form and Matter, and the cause of development is the action of Form on matter. Furthermore, if Form is moved, if it can be changed, if the thing in which the Form is actualized is capable of progression, the thing is material for a higher form of reality. Thus there is a succession of potentiality, actuality, then a higher stage of existence. If Form can be changed it must be the material for something higher. We may think of this carried to infinity, and even then, in order to explain the highest form, there must be something still higher in the scale of being *preexisting*, and this must necessarily be a pure Form which is unmoved, which is not itself the material for anything higher, in which all potentialities are realized, which is absolutely perfect. This is God, the source of all Form, all movement, all progress. The existence of such a being is implied

by the fact of progress, of growth, of movement. The evolution and movement of the universe can only reasonably be explained by the presence of a Prime Mover as the source of all Form and the stimulus to all progress.

Aristotle conceives this in a very sublime way: God Himself is not moved. He is perfect and incapable of further change or progress because He has already reached perfection and always from eternity was perfect. The question, however, arises: how can that which does not change act and be the source of action in all other things? Aristotle says that God acts as the beautiful acts, which is itself unmoved and yet is the cause of movement in other things. God acts not by compulsion, but by inspiration: not as a force from behind, but by the ideas and aspirations He excites in the beings which compose the world. The world is moved by this force of the idea. The conception is practically identical with Plato's conception of the Good Itself,—that which everything imitates and strives toward, and, in so far as it is real, embodies. The thing which incites this heaven-directed progress is Love. Love causes the whole movement of evolution upward toward God. Aristotle thought of God as beyond the heavens, causing the movement of the stars, which in turn caused the movement of the planets, and planets caused that of the earth. Literally, in his philosophy it was "love that made the world go round." As evolution progresses, beings become more and more conscious, more and more spiritual. At the lowest stage we have the rocks and stones, then plants, then animals, which possess the faculties of association and memory, and then at a further stage is man who has the forms and attributes of reason. Aristotle considered God to be pure thought or intuitive reason, which is the highest and most spiritual thing. The activity of God is the activity of thinking or contemplation—"thought thinking thought." In the case of God matter is spiritual substance, for God has substance as well as form.

This completely realized Form must be conceived as different from mere abstract Form or Form merely as an object of thought. Abstract Form and pure Form are two different things. Aristotle does not mean that God is Form in the abstract, but that in God all potentialities are eternally actualized. So God is immaterial, if we mean by matter that which is imperfect, below the acme of reality. In God's nature matter exists perfected, fully formed. God is a spiritual form of existence, spiritual in that he is a conscious, thinking mind in its

perfection. Thus, though God is a substantial being, possessing substance, He is not composed of matter.

The entire realm of beings intervening between God and matter, between pure activity and the most passive element of reality, constitutes the world of Nature, or the physical universe. The science which deals with this world Aristotle terms Physics. His plan of the cosmos is as follows: On the outermost boundaries of the heavens, in the most perfect of the heavenly regions, moves the sphere of the fixed stars revolving majestically with a constant regular motion. This region imitates most closely the perfect changelessness of the divine nature. The stars are incorporeal deities who exert a beneficent influence upon the lower regions of creation. Within this outermost sphere are contained other hollow spheres, the spheres of the planets and the sun and of the moon, each less perfect and less regular in its motion than the sphere of the fixed stars. These other heavenly bodies also have influence upon events. At the center is the earth, spherical in form, in imitation of the form of the cosmos. In the sublunar region the changeless motion of the heavenly bodies no longer is retained, and rectilinear, chaotic, irregular forms of motion occur.

The least organized forms in which matter appears are those of the four elements,—earth, air, fire and water. On the surface of the earth matter takes on successively higher and higher forms, and the organic world of plants and animals evolves, culminating in man, who in his bodily form and physiological processes partakes of the nature of both the vegetable and animal worlds, in perception and memory shares in the mental processes of the higher animals, and in his reason is akin to heavenly beings. Each stage in this biological development presupposes a lower stage as its condition and implies the existence of a higher Form to be embodied in it. The soul is Form "and doth the body make." Vegetative and animal souls are present in man's complex nature, but they only furnish the material and offer the occasions for the activity of the reason—the form peculiar to the human soul. This form is imperishable, the lower elements of man's soul passing out of existence with the death of the body. Man is the least perfect of rational beings. More perfect beings exist in the heavenly spheres. These beings are arranged in a hierarchy whose various grades inhabit the different heavenly bodies, the most perfect animating the outer heaven of the fixed stars.

Aristotle's Ethics differ from Plato's much, as one might anticipate. In Plato, the Idea is reality, and activities are excellent in so far as they are spiritual, guided by and contemplative of the Ideas. Plato's chief goods are other worldly; for man a high and noble character, temperate, resolute, and guided by wisdom and knowledge of the good, harmonious withal, and with order in its parts, nothing in excess and nothing lacking. Not in the immediately, but in the ultimately, practical lies its advantage. In this world the soul may suffer tribulation although even here righteousness is in the long run far more successful than the most nicely devised cunning, not only in the external affairs of life, but also in a far larger measure in its effect on the health and integrity of the soul. Character creates destiny, and so of all things wrought by human activity, character is the most precious, the most to be desired. In following after virtue the soul lays up her treasures in heaven, "where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt nor do thieves break through and steal," and comes into the secure possession of Beauty, Truth and Goodness, treasures eternal and incorruptible.

In Aristotle, Matter and Form in combination are reality; and in connection with human life, happiness in right activities constitutes the *summum bonum*. Pleasure is the test and gauge of goodness, but is not its sole constituent, and is indicative of good only when found in connection with right activity. If a life is good, pleasure will accrue from the successful results of its activities, but the mere presence of pleasure does not necessarily imply that every act it accompanies is good.

Since the happiness of right activity is the highest good of human life, we must know what right activities are. Aristotle tells us that those activities are right which are proper to man,—in other words, which are in accordance with his nature. What then is the nature of man? Man, says Aristotle, is by nature a social being, and, therefore, his true happiness is to be found not in individual, but in social activities. The right acts will be acts which are social in their nature, and wrong acts those having anti-social tendencies. Such social ends in modern as in ancient life will be the ends of the family, of the home, of religion, of politics, of good civic conditions, of education, of commerce. The highest end Aristotle thought to be the exercise of reason the most distinctive attribute of humankind, manifesting itself in rational action, speculative thought and spiritual insight.

If a man desires to live up to the ethics of Aristotle he must first

acquire a life-purpose of a social character. All the above ends are social and natural to man. In so far as he fulfills these ends he will be doing what is right and natural. Which of them he chooses to make especially his own, or whether he will choose other creative activities also, will depend on conditions and circumstances. Thus each man, in the exercise of those gifts or traits of character common to mankind and those peculiar to his own nature, will find the happiness of a good and useful life. The sense of proportion will prevent a man or woman from being one-sided, barren in virtue, narrow in outlook.

This sense of proportion enables one to find the golden mean. Aristotle considers that every virtue is a right mean between two unrighteous extremes. Courage is a golden mean between cowardice and foolhardiness; temperance is the golden mean between Puritanism and riotous living; courtesy is the golden mean between servility and boorishness; liberality a golden mean between prodigality and stinginess. How much of a quality is the right amount will be determined by the circumstances of the act, the end to be realized, and the persons concerned. The golden mean, therefore, is no fixed quantity but is a matter requiring the exercise of good sense and judgment in particular cases. Such practical wisdom in good and evil is acquired through experience, by the skill gained in the habitual endeavor to act rightly, and is aided by education and good breeding. It is in this connection that there arises the most subtile, dangerous and yet illuminating point in Aristotle's ethics.

The Jesuits in their applications of Aristotle's theories expressed this doctrine in a very unfortunate manner by saying that the end justifies the means; and many people have been led to believe it therefore followed that any end justified any means. If we expand the Jesuit phrase and say that the end justifies or condemns the means, we may perhaps understand Aristotle better. What he means to say is that no act can be considered right or wrong in itself, out of connection with the aim and purpose of the doer, the circumstances of the deed, and the result that it tends naturally to bring about. If the purpose, judged from all proper standpoints, is high, noble, social, then no matter how repulsive or disagreeable the acts are which accomplish that purpose they will be good. The doctor, the nurse, the social worker may have many times to do repulsive things—sometimes even horrible and loathsome ones, but these become good deeds in accordance with the nobility of the purpose and the good

results accomplished. It is in connection with the determination of what course of conduct is the right one in unusual or complex situations, how the golden mean of action is to be discovered in the face of moral doubts and difficulties, that there is demanded the utmost spiritual insight. Such wisdom is not acquired in a day, but ripens slowly as the sweet and mellow fruit of a life devoted to the pursuit of virtue and in the endeavor to acquire "those highest gifts of body and mind, which ennoble men and which are rightly judged to rank next in dignity to virtue only."

Such enlightened judgment must decide amid all the complicated linkage of events the circumstances under which it may occur, the results it actually is to bring about, the usual tendency of such deeds, and the influence they exercise upon mankind, the moral quality of an act, most necessary perhaps, and yet as to right or wrong most perilous. If the purpose is high, noble, social, the means used to accomplish such a purpose will be good provided they do not defeat other equally good or better ends. It is just here that difficulties of conscience arise. One is forced to choose, and yet, amid perplexities, any choice may mean something dear destroyed, some value lost, someone injured, sacrificed, undone, perhaps aspirations blasted in some heart which if fulfilled would have led it upward into heaven.

The decision of our peaceful nation to enter the Great War came only as a result of multitudinous moral conflicts, not only in the heart and mind of the President and his closest political advisers upon whom the more immediate duty fell of framing the decision, but upon all honorable and thoughtful persons in the country by whom public opinion is swayed and guided. For over two years of the Great War our country found itself the spectator of a stupendous conflict, with whose inciting causes it had absolutely nothing to do. The immediate physical results of the war, such as the rectification of frontiers and the ownership of colonies in Asia and Africa seemed but most distantly to affect us. Yet our concern with the outcome of the War in the matter of intangibles and of things *in potentia* if not *in actu* became ever greater and greater as our people gradually woke to the battle of ideas being waged amid the shell bursts and the horrors of the battlefields and in the desolated districts. The submarine warfare branded on our consciousness the kind of thing to be expected everywhere if one side rather than the other were victorious. Clearer and more clear became the moral issue. Finally the hearts and consciences of the whole nation were prepared to accept whatever defeat

of cherished ends of peace might be involved, the temporary surrender, or even the sacrifice, of many of those ideals which as a nation we have endeavored to realize in tranquillity, in order to join in averting by force of arms the peril threatening all that progress in freedom, toleration, and right reason which our age was endeavoring to realize. Similar conflicts appear in the life of the individual.

In the life of the individual those acts are good which tend to make up a rational, happy, normal, human life, ordered and significant because it has some serious social purpose. This purpose and organizing principle would justify or condemn many acts. In a plague-swept city it might be laudable for a lawyer or business man to leave as fast as possible both for his own sake and for the sake of his family. For a physician or priest, however, to desert the sick and dying would be contemptible. Thus, the very quality of the act would be determined by the end and purpose of the doer and whether this were proper to him. The ends common to human lives in general are shared by all, and condemn practices tending to the detriment of the individual or of society and sanction those which are of a generally beneficent character. In short, those acts are good which go to make up a good life: those acts are evil which compose an evil life.

Both wisdom and prudence are necessary for the attainment of the highest good. By wisdom in this connection Aristotle means ethical enlightenment and knowledge of sound ethical principles. Such knowledge is necessary to determine which principles it is proper to apply in matters of ethical difficulty. By prudence he means the good sense which results from practical ethical endeavor. This one must possess if he is to act rightly in concrete situations, and determine the golden mean in particular instances, and how much of anything is the right amount. Aristotle's ideas in this connection are like those which underlie modern professional training, which requires not only theoretical but also practical knowledge gained only through experience. Aristotle recognizes in the moral realm this truth, which has become so evident to Americans in the world of practical constructive endeavor.

Prudence, or the common sense of ethics, comes only through the endeavor to lead a good life. By so doing we may learn in time, as a result of our failures and successes, to make progress in right living and acquire ethical judgment. As we learn to swim by swimming and to walk by walking, so we learn to do well by well doing. Continuing to do well tends to form the habit of acting virtuously, and

the continuance in virtuous action forms character, and this becomes a permanent possession of the good man, which cannot easily be taken away from him. As Aristotle says, "impulses acted upon tend to form habits, and habits tend to combine into character."

Certain things such as wealth, influence, power, position, etc., are, according to Aristotle's teaching, neither good nor bad in themselves, but become good or bad according to the use to which they are put. The man "of means" is the one who has an abundance of these things and is thus able to turn them to the accomplishment of those ends which he may choose. Their possession is, therefore, not an unqualified good, nor is it an unqualified evil, but by increasing the scope of one's power, it may render his virtues more efficient or his vices more destructive. In so far as they constitute the means of a good life, material or social possessions are good; but if they are used to defeat good ends, to destroy character in their possessors and to cause discord in society, they are evil. Certain good things in our social and political life cannot be accomplished except through the instrumentality of great material possessions. As means for the accomplishment of these forms of good, such possessions acquire a value proportionate to the good accomplished. Such things, therefore, are literally means—things neither good nor bad in themselves, but valuable in so far as they make possible the accomplishment of good ends.

Morality does not imply that all men should be alike, or that all should be equally gifted, or of equal fortune, but it does imply that all should be granted a certain equality in those things in which by reason of their common humanity all men are equal, and a difference in those things in which, by reason of their differing gifts and capacities men are by nature different. In all such things there should be a certain moderation. Too great equality among men leads to mediocrity of accomplishment, because of lack of superior leadership; and to the general pursuit of rather low ends, because of the lack of discernment and example above the average. The inordinate pursuit of wealth in a democracy is due, in the case of many individuals, to the lack of knowledge of anything better to pursue, and to the absence of any higher ends toward which people are commonly seen to devote their energies. Where too great inequality prevails, it leads to servility among the lower classes and to arrogance and conceit among the higher, and the loss of personal daring and initiative among all but a very few. Contempt and lack of decent consideration for

one's fellows are bred among the leaders, since the bonds of a common humanity are apt to be lost sight of where natural differences are exaggerated, among the members of society. The sense of justice is apt to be blunted or to remain uncultivated, and when a revolution occurs the tyranny of one class is succeeded by the tyranny of another, and is unchecked by any sense of the rights of others or of the welfare of the whole.

In regard to affairs of fortune a sound morality does not demand an equality such that the intelligent, skillful, and industrious should be put upon a level with the stupid, lazy, and vicious, but it does demand a sufficiently equitable distribution of wealth that all virtuous people, even of very humble capacities be able by the exercise of industry to live in decency and comfort, and also that opportunity be given to all of superior natural endowment to develop their capacities to the benefit of mankind. Likewise in regard to nations, it is not necessary or even desirable that all should be alike in customs, manners, and accomplishments, or in their institutions and forms of government: but only that each should follow its genius without violating the rights of others. States "should exist for the sake of a good life and not for life only; if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a State."

Morality cannot be limited to relations between persons, nor merely to relations between the State and its citizens, as the Germans have held, but is inevitably present whenever human beings come into relation with one another, whether the relations in which they find themselves are personal, economic, national, or international in character. It is, therefore, world wide in its scope and not limited to any nation, race, or age, since the principles upon which it is founded are eternal in their character and are involved in all intercourse among rational beings.

Aristotle would not say as Plato might that certain things are good or bad in themselves: he says that things are good in so far as they make good, evil in so far as they tend toward destruction. However, human nature being such as it is and relatively stable, and the conditions of human life varying only within certain limits, some forms of passions and some impulses Aristotle regards as always and under all actual conditions which occur in human life as evil. Envy and malice are examples of this sort of thing. Any practice or course of action which tends to evil, on the whole and in general and in the long run, is likewise something to be avoided, although exceptional

circumstances might conceivably arise, or even may actually exist, under which such actions are not necessarily injurious. This principle is somewhat more flexible than Kant's dicta, "so act that the maxim of thy will may be made a universal rule," in that Aristotle takes cognizance not only of the generality of cases but also of the proper influence of exceptional circumstances to modify the rigid character of the rule in particular instances.

Man's highest aims and pursuits are indicated by saying that "Every being becomes happy by the unfolding of his own nature and of his own peculiar activity—*man* therefore, through *reason*. The *virtue* of man is accordingly that habitude or permanent state of mind through which he is made capable of the practice of rational activity; it develops out of the endowments of his natural disposition, and has for its fruit satisfaction, pleasure.

"As in the animal soul impulse and perception were to be distinguished as different expressions, so, too, the reason develops itself, partly as rational action, partly as rational thought: as perfection, on the one hand, of character or disposition; on the other, of the faculty of intelligence. Thus there result, as the excellence or ability of the rational man, the *ethical* and the *intellectual* or *dianoetic* virtues.

"The ethical virtues grow out of that training of the will by which it becomes accustomed to act according to right insight. It enables man, in his decisions, to follow practical reason, i.e. insight into what is correct or proper."*

His ethical principles Aristotle applies not only to individual, but also to political life. In fact ethics itself is regarded as simply a part of the great science of politics, and the same fundamental law holds throughout. In the state man finds himself, and only in the life of the community is the truly ethical life to be found.

In regard to the origin of the State, Aristotle considers that it arises from various needs and wants which bring people together into the life of a community. However, the state transcends its origin and comes to have other aims in addition to those with which it originated. One of the primitive needs is safety. A community of human beings is more secure from the attacks of animal and human enemies than a mere wandering group of individuals. And so in answer to the need of safety, men tend to gather together into larger groups. Wealth is also a reason. Property tends to accumulate in more settled communities and the inhabitants of villages and cities

*Windelband: "History of Philosophy," p. 151.

usually have more of the comforts of life than the scattered dwellers upon the land. Companionship furnishes another reason for the formation of villages and tends to draw people together into those groups from which the state may take its rise. "When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life."

While the origin of the state is in the needs of life, yet the end of the state is by no means fulfilled by the mere satisfaction of these needs. Political society exists for the sake of noble actions and not merely for safety or wealth or companionship. In other words, the state, like the individual, has a higher function than merely the satisfaction of basic wants. These must indeed be satisfied, but the life of the state, like that of the individual, will not come to full fruition if these needs only are satisfied and no higher and more comprehensive and nobler needs are felt. "For a state exists for the sake of a good life and not for life only; if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state."

In regard to forms of government Aristotle is very liberal. It is not the form which matters so much as the spirit which permeates the form. In general, he says there are six forms of government of which three are good and three are evil. First is the monarchy, where one man rules. This is a good form of government if the monarch rules for the happiness of his subjects; but if he rules not for the good of his people but for his own private interests, the monarchy changes into a tyranny, the worst of all governments. A republic or aristocracy, in which a certain group governs, is good if the governing group rules for the welfare of the whole, but is bad in the form of an oligarchy, in which a few govern for their own selfish purposes. There are several varieties of democracy, but, in general, democracy is good if the people are governing for each other's good; but democracy is bad if carried on in the interests of special classes, whether these classes are the rich or the poor.

Aristotle's teachings in regard to the forms of government are in many respects an elaboration of the teachings of the first book of Plato's Republic, in which Socrates demonstrates to Thrasymachus that if government is a true art the real interests of the government will be to cherish the interests of the governed. Just as the quality of his paintings is the measure of the capacity of the artist, so the

condition of those governed,—mentally, morally and physically—is the measure of the capacity of the government. The true aim of a government is to cherish the interests of the governed. So what makes government good is not so much its form, but the spirit which animates it, the end it realizes.

The relations of Plato and Aristotle have been a fertile subject of discussion. By some, Aristotle is considered as preaching a doctrine very different from that of Plato. Personally, I believe that it has been much more frequent to exaggerate than to minimize the differences between them. Aristotle is to be credited with initiating truly scientific work in several directions. There existed no systematic science of Biology, of Logic, of Psychology, or of Ethics before his time. All these sciences have existed ever since. There is no question as to his intellectual greatness, his constructive power, his originality, nor, on the whole, the wisdom and soundness of his general views.

Yet the deeper one penetrates into Aristotle the more of Platonism does one find there. The bed rock of his doctrine is the Platonic philosophy. This does not prevent him from differing decidedly from his master on certain important matters, the most important one being, of course, that both substance and form are inseparable from reality. Sometimes Aristotle seems to delight in accentuating differences between his views and those of his master, and not infrequently animus is apparent behind his criticism of Plato's views. Yet, what the two philosophers have in common is far more important than their points of difference. Aristotle has added exposition to Plato's intuition. He extended this philosophy into scientific regions outside the scope of Plato's interests. He made the truth Plato was endeavoring to express understood of a multitude of thinkers, scientists, systematizers, scholastics, who are not infrequently lacking in intellectual intuition and insight, but who may, nevertheless, possess good discursive intellects, logic, and common sense.

What substance of doctrine is common to Plato and Aristotle? What is the common essence of their thought?

Both these philosophers teach that it is through the Form or Idea, the definite, knowable, articulate side of things, that it is possbile to reason about them and by acting upon such knowledge to act properly in regard to them. Both agree that the knowable world exists independently of the individual's will, although it is capable of being grasped by his reason. Both agree that the objects of the reason are

Forms or Ideas (either amid the things of this world or above them but, at any rate, existing in the universe at large). In accordance with these patterns changing things come and go. Such temporal things are by no means always perfect, but approximate more or less closely to their distinctive Forms.

Thus it is the Forms or Ideas, the system of intelligible entities in the Universe at large, that constitute its guiding principles, its fundamental realities. But these explicitly in Aristotle and perhaps implicity in Plato are identical with reason in the world. Thus reason in the world is its reality.

Yet this reason is not the mere eddying of the world currents. It is not the unlogical reason of Hegel, nor the eternal flux of Heraclitus, but is the eternal norms of things, their essential natures. This is the normal, the natural, the thing to count upon. Chance plays a role in temporal affairs, but the chances are in favor of the normal. The universe is essentially reasonable, essentially founded in Beauty, Truth and Goodness. Even in our sublunary sphere, though chance and evil exist, the Idea is everywhere suggested, healthy potentialities are everywhere discernible, admirable actualities by no means uncommon.

However knowledge is acquired,—by instinct, by trial and error, by deductive thinking, by experiment and investigation, by reasoning or intuition, by empirical or by *a priori* means— the same goal is sought and to some extent attained. The final cause of all such toil,—the Truth Eternal—is attainable in many of its regions by the human spirit.

It is upon such doctrines as these, upon philosophic foundations not different from them, constructed upon the same engineering principles as least, that all sound knowledge has been built, all satisfactory human progress attained. Modern science is a success because it has rested upon them. Modern philosophy has failed wherever it has attempted to build on others.

Great historical conflicts are not merely the clash of material, or even national or political forces, but just as the rise of modern nationalism was mirrored in the disputes between the Nominalists and Realists of the later Middle Ages, so the Great War mirrored the conflict between the German school of thought and the classical philosophy, which conjoined to Christianity which has been guiding the world to order, to peace, to democracy, to justice.

CHAPTER VI.

GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.

Essence of the World a Spiritual Personality.

With the death of Aristotle in 322 B. C., closes the golden period of Greek thought. Greek philosophy then begins to degenerate, and for the next two or three hundred years its history is rather that of a decline than the history of a progressive development.

Grecian life continued for several centuries gradually going to pieces. Aristotle was the last great creative thinker. Schools arose and several sciences became independent of philosophy. Further, pressing needs of practical living came into the focus of philosophical attention, and individual ethics was the burden of the teaching. Yet this teaching proved inadequate to meet the needs of men, and the need of religion became more and more evident until is was met by the Christian religion. The Hellenic world—not only Greece itself, but the world Hellenized by Alexander, especially Egypt—became the center of learning and of attempts to frame a new religion out of what was already at hand. Men tried to form a religion out of Platonism and Mysticism. The result was Neo-Platonism, formed as a rival and in more or less conscious opposition to the growing power of Christianity.

The first part of the period of Greco-Roman philosophy is concerned with ethical culture; the latter with religion. There were two great systems of ethical teachings—the Epicurean and the Stoic. Both of these schools arose not from Aristotle or Plato, but from various aspects of Socrates' teaching. The Epicureans developed from the Cyrenaic school founded by a Sophist, Aristippus. He followed Socrates' views to the extent of thinking that the good of life arose from pleasures which have no evil consequences, and that one should remain master of himself and avoid too much riotous living and other pleasures which involve evil and disturb the soul. But he did not follow Socrates' teachings to their logical conclusions, and established only the beginnings of an ethical system. After a time Epicurus, an Athenian, contemporary with Aristotle, improved upon

his doctrines. What has been called the Epicurean school is simply the doctrines of one man followed by all his disciples.

Epicurus was born in 341, and died in 270 B. C. Personally he was a man of gentle, lovable disposition, of no great scientific or literary ability. He exacted absolute obedience of his followers, and this is probably one reason why so little originality obtained in the school. His aim was the attainment of individual happiness. The ethics of Epicurus are a somewhat riper form of hedonism than the original doctrine of the Cyrenaics. He says that the Wise Man is free from the course of events. He finds happiness only in himself and in his virtue. Intellectual enjoyment he prizes above bodily pleasure because it brings more peace to the soul. He is to act justly and honestly from fear of society, benevolently because it would pain him to be merciless. He avoids family life and does not engage in politics for these involve ties and responsibilities which would disturb his mental equilibrium. Friendship was the great Epicurean virtue. It rises among the virtuous to disinterested social intercourse, and in this happiness reaches its zenith.

This is the sum of the doctrines of the Epicureans. They sought pleasure, but gentle pleasure; and condemned excess. Epicurus says: "The end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear; and when once we have attained this, and the tempest of the soul is laid, seeing that the living creature has not to go to find something that is wanting, or to seek something else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. Wherefore we call pleasure the Alpha and Omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. From it is the commencement of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come back and make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal, or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood by some who are either ignorant and prejudiced for other views, or inclined to misinterpret our statements. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking feasts and revelry, not enjoyments of fish and other delicacies of a splendid table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the reasons for every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which great tumults take possession of the soul. Nothing is so productive of cheerfulness as to abstain from meddling, and not to engage in difficult undertakings nor force your-

self to do something beyond your power. For all this involves your nature in tumults. The main part of happiness is the disposition which is under our own control. Service in the field is hard work and others hold command. Public speaking abounds in heart-throbs and in anxiety as to whether you can carry conviction. Why, then, pursue an object like this, which is at the disposal of others? Wealth beyond the requirements of nature is no more benefit to men than water to a vessel which is full. Both alike overflow. We can look upon others' goods without perturbation, and can enjoy purer pleasure than they, for we are free from their arduous struggle."*

The essence of Epicureanism was to pursue pleasure temperately and to avoid pain and trouble. Epicurus' doctrines of life and death were much in the same vein. He thought the end of life was a pleasant, untroubled existence. The gods were to him rather superior Epicurean wise men, paying no attention to humanity, or, as one American philosopher has dubbed them, "self-sufficient, self-existent, insufficient gods." The world and all that is therein, both gods and men, arise from a shower of atoms, by necessity, because of physical forces. The gods have a longer span of life than men, but after a while they, too, will die. Epicurus considers that death is no evil because there is no life after death—"While we are, death is not; and when death is, we are not." Death is simply the end of experience.

This doctrine had many followers both in Greece and in Rome. When it appeared in Rome, it appeared as the characteristic doctrine of the imperial court,—those who wished for the splendors of an empire rather than the simplicity of a republic. It was the doctrine of Horace and Caesar and of many prominent Romans.

In striking opposition to Epicureanism was the doctrine of the Stoics. They, like the Epicureans, developed from a formerly existing school which originated from Socrates. Antisthenes, a philosopher who was familiar with Socrates' teachings, considered that virtue was the sole end of life. He founded the school of the Cynics in the gymnasium at Athens called the Kynosarges, the place where the sons of emigrants and "hyphenated" Athenians exercised. Antisthenes thought that virtue is the only aim and purpose of existence. The cynics were despised and condemned because they carried their doctrines to absurd degrees. They did not see that man is a social being, or understand that virtue has meaning only in connection with

*Hyde, "The Five Great Philosophies of Life," pg. 2.

man's relations to his fellow man. They said that a man should not care about the opinions of other people, but should be satisfied with what he is in himself. He should be indifferent to society, or despise it utterly. The object of the Cynics was to steel themselves against trouble and evil by not caring. They are said to have been shameless in regard to ordinary conventions simply to show their contempt for society.

The Cynics had existed for some time in Athens, much to the amusement of the Athenians, when Zeno of Citium, a man of Semitic origin, a Jew or Phoenician, became acquainted with their doctrines, modified and elevated them, and founded the Stoic school. His teachings had a religious tone and unction distinctly Semitic and un-Greek, which Stoicism never entirely lost. Persuaded of the righteousness of suicide, he killed himself in 260 B. C.

The first phase of Stoicism was in Greece, the second in Rome. Here some of the noblest men of antiquity, among whom were to be found Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, were followers of its doctrines. Stoicism was not the work of one man or group of men, but of many men in different parts of the world. It, therefore, never had the logical consistency of Platonism nor of Aristotelianism, and is properly called a school of thought rather than a system.

Upon ethics, practical right living, was laid the main emphasis of the Stoic philosophy. Its final cause and aim is the production of the Wise Man, the man who is free from the evils of life and who knows how to face existence bravely. The means of accomplishing this ideal is the cultivation of virtue and the freeing one's personality from the influence of evil and misfortune. The way this freedom is to be won is a little hard to grasp, but may be understood through its resemblance to the psychological doctrine of apperception.

By apperception is meant the receiving into the mind, by the ideas already present, of a new idea or impression. The way in which a thing is apperceived depends on the ideas which are present at the time in the mind. The same word, for example, may have very different meanings according to the ideas which are present in the mind when it is heard. If one is talking of woods and trees, and he hears the word *bark*, he will think of the bark of a tree. But if he is talking about dogs, the same word will mean quite a different thing, the bark of a dog. Again, if he should be talking about boats or ships, the same word may mean two still different things—a small boat or a certain type of three-masted vessel. Thus the same im-

pression may give rise to quite different experiences. The Stoics applied this principle of apperception to life in general, and especially toward the attitude of the mind in regard to the ills of life. Life's ills might be borne cheerfully, mitigated, indeed even transmuted into blessings, by the attitude taken by the soul toward them. Epictetus say there are two handles to everything, by one of which it can be carried and by the other it cannot. A man ought, therefore, to endeavor strenuously, if necessary, to grasp things by the right handle. If my brother tries to cheat me, I may think of the treachery of the act, or I may think that he is my brother, and, therefore, entitled to consideration and forgiveness. The latter attitude is the handle by which such trouble may be borne. Essentially, Stoicism was putting one's self into that attitude of mind by which the evils of the world could be most easily endured, resisted, or overcome.

The Stoics further believed that the world is presided over, infused by, a great spirit or soul which they termed Providence or God. God is present everywhere and all the facts and events of the world are the results of His will. Whatever may happen should be borne, then, with equanimity because it is the will of God, and if one identifies himself with this will he can turn misfortune into good. A man, by identifying his will with the will of Providence, desires what God desires, becomes a part of the great world-process, a soldier in the army of God. Therefore, one should regard personal evils as events decreed by the will of God which is working for good. By thus freeing oneself from the narrow, individual, personal outlook one is enabled to regard personal evils as events incidental to the designs of Providence, and thus to bear them bravely, as soldiers may endure their sufferings as incidental to the success of a campaign. This was the Stoic doctrine of subordination of the individual to the world-soul and to society, the losing of the narrow individual point of view in the good of society and of the whole world.

Friendship became the great Stoic virtue, as it was of the Epicureans. In politics, the Stoics held that one should forget the narrow ties of Nationalism, and identify himself with common humanity. Thus the Stoics became cosmopolitan in their outlook upon the world.

In striking contrast to their doctrines of morality was their outspoken materialistic metaphysics. They thought the world was composed of matter, fire being the *arché* and representing Providence. The world is so well-determined that it repeats itself in cycles, and we live the same lives over and over again. The pantheistic character

of their conception of nature acted, however, as an antidote to their materialism by giving a strongly religious turn to their attitude toward the world. Materialistic determinism was logically in flat contradiction to their ethical doctrines, for, according to their ethics, everything bad happened contrary to Nature, but according to their metaphysics, there is nothing which can happen contrary to Nature. They believed that the soul of the body is the breath, and emanation from the divine soul of the world, bearing the same relation to the divine soul that the human soul does to the human body.

From these two philosophies, Epicureanism and Stoicism, are to be derived two principles that are good—the Epicurean idea of avoiding worry, trouble, unnecessary unhappiness; and the Stoic idea of fortitude, mental stability, freedom from the domination of misfortune, rising above chance and evil. After all, the evils of this world are finite, not final, and one may rise above them. One Stoic is said to have taken a sentence of death in a very calm manner, so much so that his friends commented on it. He said: "It is true that I must die, but must I die howling, too?"

There are several defects in the two systems, especially in the system of the Epicureans. Most of these have their roots in the exclusive emphasis laid on the self-directed impulses of man's nature, in the essential selfishness of Epicureanism. The enjoyment of the pleasures of art, literature, science and of the society of cultivated friends, while infinitely superior to vulgar dissipation or dissolute living, implies the presence of all the goods which come from the work, labor, sacrifices and cooperation of many members of society in building up a stable government and a highly developed civilization. To these blessings, so necessary to the very existence of Epicureanism, Epicurus desired his followers to contribute nothing. He says that the wise man should keep out of politics and avoid the responsibilities of family life, and, turning away from all social service, should consider society merely as a means to pleasure. If everyone were an Epicurean there could be no Epicureanism possible. Epicureanism is a poor system of ethics, not because it is wholly evil, but because it is not good enough. It is too short and too narrow to cover the whole of man's interests, or to remain satisfactory throughout the span of his existence. A life without purpose and without principle, no matter how temperate its pleasures or how enjoyable its intellectual pursuits, soon palls on its possessor. Moreover, many of the

keenest as well as the most exalted human interests lie outside Epicurus' course of living altogether.

The virtues of Epicureanism are cheerfulness, temperance, and a rational choice of pleasures. It is far superior to the irrational heathenism of the multitude, ancient and modern. The character of Petronius in "*Quo Vadis*" is an excellent example of the best kind of Epicurean. Although morally insignificant in comparison to the saints of the Christian church, Petronius stands out in almost angelic whiteness and nobility in comparison with the bestial cruelty and senseless depravity of Nero's court.

The Stoics have taken a step in advance of the Epicureans, valuing not only the pleasant, but also the useful and the good. They cultivated the possession of high-mindedness, fortitude, and of several remedial virtues. The main difficulty with Stoicism is that, although it is often very good if applied to one's self, it may be very dangerous if applied to other people. To consider others' misfortunes as the workings of Providence is a bad attitude, leading to indifference to the sufferings of others. In Walter Pater's "*Marius the Epicurean*" Marcus Aurelius, the great Stoic emperor, is pictured going to see the games at the Colosseum. In some of them a great many animals were hunted and killed and there was much bloodshed. Marcus Aurelius was essentially a good man, wise, beneficent, and pious. He was not in sympathy with such brutality, but he could not prevent it. Why should he show concern? His presence in the amphitheater being necessary, he sat calmly by, writing state documents. This attitude of indifference and callousness of mind is the great defect in Stoicism.

The recognition by the Stoics of the equality of all men under divine Providence, the emphasis they laid on the common humanity in all, rather than on racial and national differences, is one of their greatest merits, and entitles them to a share of the credit due to Greek thought and Christian religion in introducing a truly humanitarian form of civilization.

Stoicism and Epicureanism attained their widespread popularity and maintained their hold over the ancient world because each touched a definite responsive chord in human nature, each making its appeal to a different type of mind. The two types were common, not only in Greece and Rome in the centuries just preceding and just following the birth of Christ, but are to be found at all times and in all ages. We all recognize Epicureans among our friends and ac-

quaintances. Some follow with more or less exactitude the life of pleasant enjoyment, sociability, and a reasonable but not too strenuous pursuit of the pleasures of art, literature and knowledge marked out for them by Epicurus, a man whose precepts they have never read, and whose name conveys to their minds only the popular distorted views of his doctrines. Not infrequently such people profess to be followers of Christ, rather than of Epicurus, although they never do anything which is Christlike and their general attitude toward their fellows is wholly determined by their self-directed instincts.

Stoicism is likewise the characteristic attitude of a certain type of mind, although less frequent and more noble than the Epicurean sort. Whenever hardship is to be endured, spiritual or material, whenever fortitude is necessary, there will be found echoes of the Stoic teaching, in a different form, Christian or modern, as the case may be, but still essentially the same. Its doctrines are like one of the two modes of music, which Plato desires his guardians to hear, "one warlike, which will sound the note which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing and he is going to wounds and death or is overtaken by some other evil, and in every such crisis meets fortune with calmness and endurance." It finds echo in every age not wholly lost to nobility and heroism. Maeterlinck has given expression to a very fine type of stoicism in many of his writings.

"The event itself is pure water that flows from the pitcher of fate, and seldom has it either savour or perfume or colour. But even as the soul may be wherein it seeks shelter, so will the event become joyous or sad, become tender or hateful, become deadly or quick with life. To those round about us there happen incessant and countless adventures, whereof every one, it would seem, contains a germ of heroism; but the adventure passes away, and heroic deed there is none. But when Jesus Christ met the Samaritan, met a few children, an adulterous woman, then did humanity rise three times in succession to the level of God."

"It might almost be said that there happens to men only that which they desire. It is true that on certain external events our influence is of the feeblest, but we have all-powerful action on that which these events shall become in ourselves—in other words, on their spiritual part. The life of most men will be saddened or lightened by the thing that may chance to befall them,—in the men whom I speak of, whatever may happen is lit up by their inward life. If you have been

deceived, it is not the deception that matters, but the forgiveness whereto it gave birth in your soul, and the loftiness, wisdom, completeness of this forgiveness,—by these shall your eyes see more clearly then if all men had ever been faithful. But if by this act of deceit, there have come not more simpleness, loftier faith, wider range to your love, then have you been deceived in vain, and may truly say nothing has happened."

"Let us always remember that nothing befalls us that is not of the nature of ourselves. There comes no adventure but wears to our soul the shape of our everyday thoughts; and deeds of heroism are but offered to those who, for many long years, have been heroes in obscurity and silence. And whether you climb up the mountain or go down the hill to the valley, whether you journey to the end of the world or merely walk round your house, none but yourself shall you meet on the highway of fate. If Judas go forth to-night, it is toward Judas his steps will tend, nor will chance for betrayal be lacking; but let Socrates open his door,—he shall find Socrates asleep on the threshold before him, and there will be occasion for wisdom. We become that which we discover in the sorrows and joys that befall us; and the least expected caprices of fate soon mould themselves to our thought. It is in our past that Destiny finds all her weapons, her vestments, her jewels. A sorrow your soul has changed into sweetness, to indulgence or patient smiles, is a sorrow that shall never return without spiritual ornament; and a fault or defect you have looked in the face can harm you no more. All that has thus been transformed can belong no more to the hostile powers. Real fatality exists only in certain external disasters—as disease, accident, the sudden death of those we love; but inner fatality there is none. Wisdom has will power sufficient to rectify all that does not deal death to the body; it will even at times invade the narrow domain of external fatality. Even when the deed has been done, the misfortune has happened, it still rests with ourselves to deny her the least influence on that which shall come to pass in our soul. She may strike at the heart that is eager for good, but still is she helpless to keep back the light that shall stream to this heart from the error acknowledged, the pain undergone. It is not in her power to prevent the soul from transforming each single affliction into thoughts, into feelings, and treasures she dare not profane. Be her empire never so great over all things external, she always must halt when she finds on the threshold a silent guardian of the inner life. For even as

triumph of dictators and consuls could be celebrated only in Rome, so can the true triumph of Fate take place nowhere save in our soul."*

After the death of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic philosophy, in 260 B. C., no great philosophers arose until Plotinus and Saint Augustine in the third and fourth centuries A. D. So for four or five hundred years there was a lack of great constructive genius in philosophy. But this was a very active period in science and in the development of social and political ideas, of a new religious consciousness, and tendencies toward a better and higher civilization than the world had yet seen.

In Athens there remained the four schools,—the Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, and the school of the Epicureans. They were active in their work and kept intellectual activity alive by their disagreements with one another. In philosophy, at Athens, the period which followed the Stoics was one of skepticism. The schools ceased to believe in the doctrines of their founders, and a recrudescence of the Sophist attitude permeated them. Outside of Greece, as a result of the conquests of Alexander, came a very important movement, the Hellenization of the world. The ideas and doctrines of the Greeks spread, following the course of conquest. The language of the world was changed so that even in conservative Palestine, Greek was spoken. The wave of culture spread eastward to India, south to Egypt, changing the intellectual attitude of the peoples whom it reached.

When Greek philosophy reached Rome, the Romans picked out the ideas which were of use to them and let the rest go. This kind of philosophy, simply making use of doctrines which appeal to one, caring nothing for consistency or for knowledge in itself, but only for its practical value, is called eclecticism. The educated Romans were usually followers of Epicurus or of the Stoics; and some of the greatest Stoic literature was written at Rome by Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. However, no system of philosophy ever originated among the Romans, who took their philosophy at second hand from the Greeks. Cicero was an eclectic dilletante in Greek philosophy, and Plotinus, the last great philosopher of antiquity, lived the latter part of his life at Rome during the middle of the third century A. D. The seeds of philosophy fell upon stony ground at Rome, and when they did spring up had no great depth of root. With the development of Roman Christianity, which from the beginning was controlled by

*Maeterlinck, "Wisdom and Destiny."

intensely conservative influences among the early Christian population, in which a strong Hebraic element and one decidedly anti-Greek held sway, there arose decided opposition to philosophic thought and speculation, and even in the end to intellectual culture. What was beautiful, idealistic, sublime, or a product of genius, was apt to be valued by the Romans, not for its own sake, but for the sake of its practical results. The Roman Church, however, clung stubbornly to the Christian faith, and in western Europe during the night of the dark ages, within the Church alone survived the spark of life handed down from Classical civilization.

The civic stage of culture considers only its own nation. The Romans, Greeks, and Jews never got beyond that stage. But, as a result of the spreading abroad of Hellenism in the wake of the conquests of Alexander, and the organization of differing peoples into the Roman Empire, the beginnings of a new spirit appeared, one which emphasized common humanity rather than national differences. Nations may differ in language, in customs and traditions, even in physical characteristics, but they are fundamentally alike in feeling and in intellect. In reason they find a common basis for higher spiritual and intellectual attainments. So by spreading abroad the ideas of reason, of philosophy, literature, art and science, the Greeks gave something to other nations which enabled all to find a common basis for mutual help and advantage. This basis was scientific, philosophical and religious.

At this time, moreover, there were laid the foundations upon which, after the passage of more than a millennium was to be reared the structure of modern science. "In Sicily where Pythagorean traditions had been perpetuated, Hicetas and Archimedes of Syracuse taught a system of astronomy (as early as the third century B. C.) that closely resembled the Copernican system. Archimedes gave to physics the method of determining specific weights, invented the sun-glass and the endless screw, and created the science of mechanics by his theory of the lever. At the same time, a fellow countryman of Pythagoras, Aristarchus of Samos, proposed that the distance between the earth and the sun be measured by the dichotomy of the moon, and, what is more important—for this method proved to be impracticable—attempted to substitute for the geocentric system of Aristotle the hypothesis that the earth revolves around the sun. This theory was accepted and developed by Seleucus of Selucia in Babylonia, but was stamped as impious by the Stoics, and rejected

by Ptolemy himself, the most celebrated, if not the greatest, among the astronomers of Alexandria. It did not succeed in supplanting the old conception until the dawn of modern times, when it was advanced by Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo."

"On the opposite shore of the Mediterranean arose the city of Alexandria which was founded in the second half of the fourth century by the conqueror who gave it his name. Under the Ptolemies this became the educational as well as commercial centre of the world. Here rather than at the schools of Athens are to be found the legitimate spiritual descendants of Plato and Aristotle. Athens had banished the king of science, and its star went down forever. The spirit of the Stagirite descended upon his pupil, and from Alexander to Ptolemy and his successors. The Museum which they founded in the new capital of Egypt was a wonderful institution. Nothing in ancient or modern times can be compared to this attempt to organize science. Here scholars from every nation were entertained at public expense; thousands of students flocked hither from all the surrounding countries. Here the naturalists found a botanical garden, a vast zoological collection, and an anatomical building; the astronomers, an observatory; the *literateurs*, grammarians, and philologists, a splendid library, which contained, during the first centuries of our era, 700,000 volumes. Here Euclid wrote (about 290) his "*Elements of Geometry*," his treatises on Harmony, Optics, and Catoptrics; here Eratosthenes, the royal librarian under Ptolemy Philadelphus, pursued his remarkable astronomical, geographical, and historical labors; Apollonius of Perga published his treatises on *Conic Sections;* here Aristyllus and Timochares made the observations which led to the discovery of the procession of the equinoxes by the astronomer Hipparchus; here Ptolemy wrote the *Almagest* (*μεγάλη σύνταξις*), which remains the authoritative system of astronomy until the time of Copernicus, and his *Geography*, which was used in the schools of Europe for fourteen centuries. Ever since this epoch, the conceptions of the sphericity of the earth, its poles, its axis, the equator, the arctic and antartic circles, the equinoxial points, the solstices, the inequality of climate on the earth's surface, have been current notions among scientists. The mechanism of the lunar phases was perfectly understood, and careful though not wholly successful calculations were made of intersidereal distances."*

*Weber, "History of Philosophy," pp. 160 *et seq.*

East and West met at Alexandria, and the hard outlines of Greek thought were softened by religious sentiment derived from the eastern nations. The Roman Empire had made the world cosmopolitan. In Alexandria, Egyptians, Jews, Greeks and Orientals came together living on very friendly terms,and in the mutual search for a satisfying religion they exchanged ideas and formed new systems. The old religions had lost their hold, and systems of ethics were not enough to satisfy men's desire for a saving faith. A spirit of religious unrest was abroad in the land, and a great need of redemption was felt by all the better minds of the time. As a result, this, the second period of Greco-Roman philosophy, is very strongly religious in character.

Several systems arose at Alexandria, which closely resembled one another in the fundamental doctrines by which they combined Greek thought with Oriental religion. Each assumed at the center and source of the universe a God, conceived after the manner of eastern mysticism as above all definition and beyond the reach of reason, but capable of being felt by the soul of man in religious ecstasy and contemplation. Intermediate between God and the world are many demons, powers, spirits and angels.

Plato's philosophy and the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, who had at this time become merely one of the many mystic cults, were blended into these Alexandrine systems. The Platonic Ideas and the Pythagorean numbers were identified with the various spirits and demons which intervene between God and matter.

Philo-Judaeus, a Hebrew philosopher, combined in this manner the Jewish religion with the ideas and doctrines of Plato. The transcendence of God he especially emphasized, so much so that God can be described only negatively, as the Being who is beyond all power of the human reason to define, who is not truth because above truth, who is beyond beauty and goodness. Nevertheless God forms the Universe by His goodness, and rules it by His power. Potencies which go out from Him form the world. The Platonic Ideas are identified with these potencies, as are also the Angels or messengers of God, of the Jewish religion. The Logos is a second god, the unity of these forces, the sum of the Ideas. The soul of man is so bound by its sins that it cannot escape the universal moral degradation without divine help. The way of salvation lies through an ascetic course of ethical endeavor, having as its goal mystical absorption in the Divine Being.

More important than the ethical schools and the mystic Alexan-

drine systems, as a growing influence and force in the world, came the Christian religion. It spread abroad among all ancient peoples and came in contact with every phase of ancient life. Its contact with ancient philosophical and religious thought led to much controversy and discussion. The new religion had to defend itself against the criticisms which were brought against it, by making such an exposition of its doctrines and beliefs as would appear reasonable in view of the accepted science and philosophy of the times. This meant the development of Christian theology. The Apologists were the first to undertake such an attempt, and unintentionally Hellenized the gospel in seeking to prove that Christianity was the only true philosophy. They said that only by divine revelation does knowledge come to man, whose mind is dulled by sense and is in the toils of the devil. Inspiration has, however, never been wholly lacking. Plato and Socrates were vouchsafed much of it, as were also Moses and the prophets. The perfect revelation comes in Jesus Christ. All former teachings were only sporadic. In Christ is the perfect revelation of God. The Apologists, moreover, identified reason and revelation. Christ is also the Logos, the divine reason and formative principle in the world.

In addition to the need of external defence, the Church needed an inner unity and definiteness of belief, so that the doctrines of the Apostles might not be changed as they passed from mouth to mouth. Christianity had to be defined in intellectual terms to meet the arguments of the pagan philosophers; and it needed to have a creed that it might not become perverted by the intellectual vagaries of its own converts. One of the first attempts to form a system of Christian philosophy was that of the Gnostics. They were unsuccessful, in that the system they proposed was so different from Christianity that it ultimately led to their being thrown out of the Church as heretics, and provoked, especially in the Church at Rome, a decided reaction against the speculative use of the reason in connection with Church doctrines. And the attitude then assumed has been characteristic of the Roman Church until this day. The Gnostic heresy was an aberrant form of Christianity in which many cults and mysteries found a place. They attempted a philosophy of history, thinking of the world as a battleground for gods and creeds, whose conflicts, defeats and victories history records. Christianity has entered the conflict to emerge victorious over all its rivals. In their theological system the dualism of matter and spirit is bridged by emanations from

God which take the form of all sorts of spirits. This filling the world with spirits and demons, while characteristic of the general thought of the time, opened the door for much superstition. The fantasies and mysteries which the Gnostics evolved also led to their excommunication.

The first real beginnings of Christian theology were made by Clement of Alexandria. His work was overshadowed by that of his pupil, Origen, but his philosophical point of view remained after his doctrines had been surpassed. He organized the faith from within and drew the outlines which were filled in afterwards. God is pure Spirit, the everlasting Author of all things. His essential attribute is the creative activity of His will which is as eternal as himself. He deals with the things of the world through the Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity. The Holy Spirit is related to the Logos as the Logos is to the Father. Creation is the endless creation of spirits and souls who are destined to participate in the divine blessedness but have free will and some of them fall away. The fallen spirits strive to rise from matter which has been created for their purification. Of their freedom they aspire to rise, but they cannot act without grace, and this is always active in man but is perfectly revealed in Jesus Christ. The grades or stages of redemption are faith or the religious understanding of the perceptual world, knowledge of the Logos, and finally mystical absorption into God's Being. Through the combined action of freedom and grace all souls will finally be redeemed, matter will vanish, and the salvation of all things be perfected in God.

These doctrines were taught at the celebrated catechetical school at Alexandria established by the Christians under the direction of Clement and Origen. At first the Christians were one sect among others of the Jews, who were a very rich and important part of the Alexandrian community, and differed from the other Jews in considering that the Messiah had already appeared. They became powerful and numerous enough to form a synagogue of their own, coming into close relation with the scholars and teachers of the University.

"A large and rich (Christian) community, existing in the bosom of a great university town, could not long submit to exclusion from the paramount interests of the place. Their most promising young men attended the lectures of the heathen professors. Some, like Ammonius, relapsed into Hellenism, some drifted into Gnosticism like Ambrosius, some like Heracles passed safely through the ordeal, and,

as Christian priests, still wore the pallium or philosopher's cloak, the doctors' gown, we may call it, of the pagan academy. Learned professors like Celsus, like Porphyry, began to study the Christian scriptures with a cool interest in this latest development of religious thought, and pointed out with the acumen of trained critics the scientific difficulties of the Older Testament and the contradictions of the New. It was necessary to recognize, and if possible to profit by, the growing connection between the Church and the lecture-room. Hence the catechetical instruction, which in most other communities continued to be given in an unsystematic way by bishop or priest, had in Alexandria developed about the middle of the century into a regular institution.

"This was the famous Catechetical School. It still continued to provide instruction for those desirous of admission into the Church, but with this humble routine it combined a higher and more ambitious function. It was partly a propaganda, partly we may regard it as a denominational college by the side of a secular university. At the outset the student's power of reasoning and exact observation were strengthened by a thorough course of scientific study, embracing geometry, physiology (that is, of course, Physics, or Natural Philosophy) and astronomy. After science came philosophy. The writings of all the theological poets, and of all the philosophers except the 'godless Epicureans' were read and expounded. The object of the teacher was no doubt in part controversial. He endeavored to prove the need of revelation by dwelling on the contradictions and imperfections of all human systems, or he pointed out how the partial light vouchsafed to Plato and Aristotle was but an earnest of the dayspring from on high. But the attitude of Clement or Origen toward Greek thought was not controversial in any petty or ignoble sense. They looked up to the great master-minds of the Hellenic schools with a generous admiration, and infused the same spirit into their disciples."*

Thus, the aim and object of the Alexandrian teachers was Christian theology, with the proper sympathy and understanding for the Greek thought, in order to combine science and faith into a rational system of belief.

With the rise and growth of the Christian religion came a reaction on the part of pagan thought and social consciousness in opposition and rivalry to the Christian system. While Christian theology was

*Chas. Briggs, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria," Chap. II pg. 41.

taking over many ideas from Plato and Aristotle and incorporating them into its theory of religion, the pagan world founded a philosophy on the doctrines of Plato, giving them a new form, Neo-Platonism.

Neo-Platonism was founded by Plotinus, who was born in 204 A. D. at Lycopolis, Egypt. He was educated at the university at Alexandria, where he became a distinguished scholar. He is said to have accompanied the Emperor Gordian on an expedition against the Persians and returned in 244 A.D. to Rome where he taught with great éclat until his death in 267 A.D. He had a very large and influential following at Rome, the emperor and empress attending his lectures and aiding him in an attempt to found a community, modeled upon Plato's "Republic," in the Campagna; but the attempt failed.

The philosophy of Plotinus is more or less similar to the mystic systems of Alexandrine Platonism which arose in answer to religious need. The central point of his whole system is the Godhead, which is inaccessible to the reason, above all possible definition. God thus mystically conceived he calls the One.

Mysticism now first appeared at Rome in a philosophic garb. In itself the doctrine is Oriental, tracing its origin to eastern religions, more particularly to the Hindoo Vedas. The essentially mystic doctrine is that God is not an object of the reason, but is perceived by the devout in a state of contemplation, not grasped by ideas, but felt by the religious consciousness; knowledge of God is a matter of the affections, not of the cognitive faculty.

God, said Plotinus, was such a Being; He could not be defined except as the mystic One, the source of all things. Reality in all its grades, Ideas in the Platonic sense, consciousness, and matter result as emanations from the divine. In this overflow God remains the same, eternally superior to all of His creation; the Godhead is unchanged.

The emanations which give rise to the world pass through three stages: spirit, soul or consciousness, and matter, gradually becoming less real, less exalted as they proceed, as the rays of the sun gradually fade away into darkness. The first emanation is a kind of second Godhead corresponding somewhat to the idea of the Logos. The Nous is this first emanation, the image of God, a great spirit which bears in itself the principle of duality. The first breaking up of the mystical One in Plotinus appears in the mind of the Nous, this second god.

The form in which this first dividing takes place is the distinction

in the nature of the Nous between the subject and the object of thought. In all our thinking we can distinguish the person, the ego, who has the thought, and the thought itself. The Nous is a great mind which contemplates its thoughts. And these thoughts are the Platonic Ideas. So the Nous is like the god of Aristotle, thought thinking thought, a great spirit contemplating the Platonic Ideas. The Nous is then unitary, one mind, but distinguishable into subject and object, and includes the multitude of Ideas as its thoughts. These Ideas have each a certain personality of its own, as each of our thoughts has its own little personality. The Ideas form a realm of spirits or angels or heavenly beings, each being both a Platonic Idea, a functional principle of some aspect of the world, and also a spirit. So he combines the idea of personality with the conception of a Platonic Idea. Just as certain of the Greek gods presided over certain aspects of the world—Aphrodite, love; Ares, war—so, purified, idealized, each one of the Platonic Ideas is a patron saint of a certain part of the world. This first stage of emanation, the Nous and his ideas, constitute the realm of spirits.

The next realm is the realm of souls, of finite consciousness. This has the same relation to the spirit realm as the spirit realm has to God. There are higher and lower souls. Souls are, in a sense, copies of the Platonic Ideas. Plotinus thought of the souls as animating the various heavenly bodies, that is, there is a world soul, a moon soul, etc.,—a general soul animating the stars.

The soul of the world he thought to be divided into two parts: the lower entering into matter as Form or formative powers; the higher akin to the spiritual realms. The world soul divides as the Nous divides, and makes the souls of animals and of men. So the system is a constant branching, budding. The world-soul discharges itself into the souls of individual men and other animate beings. Each of these beings has a higher and a lower soul. In man the higher is akin to the world-soul, the Platonic Ideas, the Nous, and at times to God Himself. The lower soul is Aristotle's Form, a generating principle in the body which forms the body after its proper manner. The higher part has pre-existence, and will undergo change after death according to its deserts, either going up in the scale of life or downward.

Matter, which is the third stage of these emanations, is the gradual fading into nothingness of the divine effulgence. The souls create matter out of themselves and enter into it as formative powers. So

matter is as eternal as the souls themselves. Plotinus thought of each event in nature as due to the activity of a soul. This belief opened the way for magic and all kinds of superstitious practices.

Plotinus has one very significant idea which has not received the recognition it deserves,—his doctrine of the beautiful. The world of sense is beautiful in so far as it shows the activity of the soul; the object of sense is beautiful when it manifests its Idea in a perceptible form. Anything in nature, any work of art, when its perceptual form expresses the Idea which is at the heart of it, is beautiful. So the world of sense is beautiful because, to its lowest depths, it is permeated by the divine essence. In Nature, in art, in animals and in people there is something of the nature of the divine.

Plotinus' ethical doctrines teach a retracing of the way, a road up toward God, sharing finally in the divine life. This involved a turning away from the sense world, freeing the soul from the body by purification from the grosser things in life. Plotinus considered that taking an active part in national and social life was of little account as it involved the soul still farther in the natural world. Thus his is an anti-social ethics. The return of the soul to God means first a return to the Nous, accomplished through the cultivation of the intellect and of love for the beautiful. He thought that the progress of the soul was as Plato describes it in the Symposium, "from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is." The stages in this progress are the increase of the sensitiveness to beauty and the insight into higher forms of thought, the contemplation of the Ideas, and finally the mystical ecstasy of the presence of God. In this union one forgets self and the objective world entirely and becomes one with God. Plotinus considered that he himself had experienced this union only two or three times in his life.

In Plotinus we have a very remarkable expression of mystical philosophy,—a philosophy which does not put at the center of the Universe an object of knowledge, but the object of the religious consciousness in contemplation. The way followed by the mystic in his search for Truth differs from that typical of the Greek who follows the intellect toward the ultimate object of knowledge, and that of the Jew who follows the will to the ultimate embodiment of righteousness. The mystic follows to their ultimate object the highest

affections of the soul. Mysticism appears now and again in western Europe in all the succeeding ages.

After Plotinus died, his doctrines were taken up by Jamblicus, a Syrian, who systematized them into an elaborate form of a theology of polytheism in opposition to Christianity. In order to include all the cults of the heathen world in his system he gave their gods the position of intermediaries between the One and matter, interpreting them allegorically. He collected all the divinities he could, all the gods of the Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Indians, as many as he could find, and placed them in order, rank on rank, between the Nous and the world. To find place for this fantastic pantheon he had to increase very greatly the number of the intermediaries between God and matter, and for this purpose he used the Pythagorean number system. His elaborate structure finally fell by its own weight.

After this system had lost its hold, another man, who was the last of the school, took it up in Athens,—the teacher Proclus. He made it into a kind of scholastic system of pagan theology, without inspiration, without force, without a spark of genius, a mechanical working out of the Pagan system.

The succeeding period is decreasingly fertile in thought. Plotinus' metaphysics of beauty is a kind of winter flower of Ancient Philosophy, the last spark of true or elevated thought we find. Philosophy degenerated with the rest of the ancient civilization until, in 529, Justinian closed the Platonic Academy at Athens. Ancient philosophy disappeared and gave place to a new world of thought and ideas.

While St. Augustine's work ends the period of ancient philosophy, it arouses so many new problems that it is rather to be considered the beginning of a new era than the close of an old one. Beginning his philosophical career as a Roman educated under Greek influences, he looks upon reason as the source of all truth and inspiration, as the voice of God Himself communing with the soul, but during the course of his life he comes to believe more and more in the principle of authority and in revelation. His philosophy is therefore difficult to classify. It passes from the attitude of mind typical of one age to that typical of another. New philosophical problems appear in his work which are characteristic of Mediaeval or Modern rather than of Ancient Thought. Some are passed over by the philosophers of the Middle Ages, and find elaboration and adequate treatment only in Modern Philosophy. Thus we may regard St. Augustine as beginning

a new era in human thought, and consider Ancient Philosophy as closing with Plotinus and Neo-Platonism.

We have now come to the end of the story of Ancient Thought. It is rounded like a well told tale. It has its plot and proper characters, and moves logically to a close. It emerges with increased strength after its crisis of doubt and criticism at the time of the Sophists. It was not overwhelmed by skepticism as is Modern Philosophy, but retained its head and confidence, resolved its doubts and continued to teach with calm assurance, having lost only a certain naive and unreflecting quality of youth. Results so hardly won, so carefully scrutinized, are at least worthy of the most attentive consideration, especially since in the main the same results were secured by different thinkers, proceeding from different starting points and by different routes. Moreover, it is upon these principles that the half of our civilization has been based; they have stood the test of time, and become, through the effects of use, experience and custom, a part of the controlling motives of our race. The common language of science, not merely its vocabulary, but its determinate meanings and ideas, are in large part derived from Ancient Thought. Ancient Thought is inseparable, not only from Christianity, but from the whole spiritual heritage of Western Civilization.

There are two matters in Classical Philosophy upon which emphasis may be laid in closing. The one, which may well be contrasted with certain destructive tendencies of present day philosophies, is the objective existence of that realm of being, which, for want of a better name, men have called the *intelligible world;* and the other the substantial agreement one finds in all phases of Ancient Thought, regarding the nature of Reality.

The Intelligible World is that world of objective existences which are the goals of thought, the objects of the reason just as trees and stones and flowers and birds are the objects of the senses. Such entities as Plato's Ideas, Aristotle's Forms, the laws of mathematics and the laws of Nature, and other scientific principles and laws form the content of the Intelligible World. According to this view material objects constitute but a part of the totality of the Universe, and are not of themselves sufficient to account for what we know of the world as a whole. Beside the material factor, the objective existence of a formal factor is necessary, for which the material factor is not sufficient to account. Reduce the world to force or atoms, if you will, and the

pattern in which force acts, or in which the atoms pursue their courses, is something in addition to the forces and the atoms. The existence of Form, inherent in or in addition to, but at any rate in coexistence with the material aspect of the world, must necessarily be acknowledged.

Such Forms were considered by the Classical philosophers as objects of the reason rather than as objects of the senses because while certain Forms, as Plotinus points out, are perceptible among the things of sense, yet even these are in the vast majority of cases, but very imperfectly 'imitated' by the sense object, some as the objects of geometry, mathematical squares, triangles, etc., are but in part the objects of the perceptual faculties, while the most important, Ideas, Forms, ethical Norms, scientific principles, and the Laws of Nature, are not objects of the perceptual faculties at all.

The objective existence of such things as Ideas, Forms, Principles, Norms, and Scientific Laws in both the existential and the moral worlds is everywhere emphasized in Classical Philosophy.

We of the Modern World are ready enough to believe in the objective truths of natural science, in the inevitableness of natural law in the physical realm. We are not so ready to believe that in the world of politics and ethics, norms of national and individual conduct exist which are quite as inevitable in their way as those of mathematics and physics. This lesson we should learn from the Greeks as well as from Christian theology. In the tangled web of human affairs there is a latent order, in accordance with which alone may its disorders be composed. This order is not an alien one imposed by force from without, but is one inherent in the nature of man as a 'political animal,' as a free and rational being. We all know that it is impossible to build an aeroplane, for example, except in accordance with certain principles; not because our machinery lacks the power to shape the material differently, but because of the nature of the thing we are constructing (its Idea is exactly the Platonic sense) demands that it be constructed after a certain manner. This determines the form and strength and other characteristics of the different parts, and this in turn determines what manner of machinery shall be used and the amount of force necessary to make these parts. It is the functional principle of the aeroplane which ultimately determines all these other things. The more perfectly the structure of steel, wood, aluminum, etc., succeeds in imitating this Idea of the Aeroplane the more perfectly will it perform its function, the better aeroplane will it be.

The builders are, however, free to follow the right principles or not, as they choose, but if they do not follow them they will not arrive at the desired result. We realize keenly enough the determining weight of such considerations in regard to building aeroplanes and automobiles and other mechanical contrivances. But we do not so clearly understand, or are perhaps less willing to recognize that the same kind of thing unyieldingly holds true in the world of personal, social, economic, national and international relationships. There is at present a strong tendency, in many parts of the world, to try to overcome by military force or by legal enactment certain laws of nature that exist in the world of human relationships, but which do not happen to appeal to particular groups of individuals. The failure of all revolutionary programs, which attempt to perfect society by trying to make it something other than it is, to violate its natural laws, to reverse its natural tendencies of growth, is already amply recorded on those pages of history most stained with human blood and tears. More than two thousand years ago, it was said by Aristotle, that every being becomes happy by the unfolding of its own nature, and of its own particular activity. And yet, on every side, arises now the clamour of those who, knowing nothing of the nature, activities, or structure of society, endeavor to dictate to it and to their fellows all things to be done in matters great and small. Blindfolded they would drive the ship of state upon tempestuous seas, along a rock bound coast beset with reefs and shallows, guided by neither vision, compass, chart, or soundings, in the attempt to reach some place which exists only in their imaginations, or is unfitted or impossible for human life. Violation of law, human, natural, or divine does not suffice to stop them, through motives of pity, fear, or conscience.

It may be well to remind ourselves, in this scientific age, that men only defeat their own aims in trying to go counter to the laws of nature, that in spite of all misguided efforts to the contrary the current of human events resumes its natural courses, and that improvements can be made only in accordance with the nature of the thing we are trying to improve, and not in accordance with that of some other entity or Form. The revolutionary leaders of Europe, in place of free popular government, desire to set up, over the whole world, the dictatorship of the proletariat, a class whose members by scientific test and as a matter of common knowledge are found to constitute the least intelligent and most irresponsible elements of mankind.

In regard to the merits and possibilities of such a program, it might be well not to forget what took place in the southern states under the domination of the negro, the scalawag, and the carpet bagger, during the reconstruction period following the civil war. As against the whole present tendency to invert the right and normal order of society, and reverse the progress toward political freedom, wisdom, and virtue, for the benefit of all classes and of all mankind, which has taken place in a world inspired by Greek thought and guided by the Christian religion, it does not seem improper for a student of the history of philosophy to urge that we profit by the wisdom of the ages.

Let us close this book with an allusion to another matter, in regard to which Ancient Thought is in agreement. There are three phases in Classical Philosophy, one intellectual, culminating in Aristotle; one volitional, represented by the ethical schools of Hellenistic Philosophy, whose search and groping for a practical philosophy of life was so characteristic of the period immediately preceding the Christian era; and one affective, represented by Neo-Platonism and early Christian Philosophy. The first or intellectual phase is the most articulate, and includes the three great names of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Yet, all three phases are distinct in purpose and of great significance, since each represents a different aspect of the human spirit and a different method used by it in its endeavor to grasp the true meaning of the Universe. All three of these attempts approach a common goal of thought and arrive at substantial agreement, although each proceeds by very different route and employs quite different means of arriving at its conclusions.

Greek Philosophy began with the purpose of discovering the essential nature of the Universe, and it never relinquishes this task, although the means it uses in accomplishing it vary greatly from century to century. The purely intellectual method began with the Milesians, who asserted that the essence of the world is a form of animate matter, water, air, or the boundless ether, and this they called the *arché*, or first principle of being. Knowledge of the nature of the world essence is the goal of the thought of Parmenides and of Heraclitus, and of those who immediately succeeded them, and made various attempts to reconcile the philosophy of Being with the philosophy of Becoming, by means of the concepts of the atom and the void. Then, at the time of the Sophists, there arose grave doubt as to the possibility of discovering the world essence, or even whether

there existed an essence of the world to be discovered. Then followed Socrates to allay skepticism and overcome doubt, who by careful empirical investigation and exact deductive thinking established reason and scientific method in the world. Then Plato, who sees the reality of the Universe in the Intelligible World, in the goals of thought rather than in the objects of sense, in the World of Ideas, an eternal realm beyond the flux of time and circumstance, constant above an ever shifting world. The world essence is no longer something tangible, the substance of things of sense, but is now the substance of the objects of the reason, the Ideas of Beauty, Truth and Goodness, whose essence is the Good Itself or God. In Aristotle the essence of the world is Progress under God the Prime Mover, Who as Pure Form represents the Platonic Ideas, and as Perfect Actuality is also the acme and essence of substantial creation. Aristotle's conception of God thus combines the leading motives of both Platonism and Pre-Socratic philosophy. God is the real object of knowledge of both reason and sense.

The age succeeding Aristotle also sought to discover the essence of the world, but by very different methods. Reality is now sought as the object of the Will and Affections, as previously it was sought as the object of the Intellect. In the search after a philosophy of life, which characterizes the earlier part of the Hellenistic Period, the Stoics, as had the Jews before them, developed a system of religion in harmony with their ethical doctrines. They appear with their ideas of Providence, and of the affirmation of the will of the individual by acquiescence in the Will of God. God is the ultimate goal of the Will, the final cause of all morality. For the Stoics and the Jews the essence of the world is God.

Neo-Platonism and early Christian philosophy, conscious as was their rivalry, bitter as was the opposition between certain of their followers, are, nevertheless, as systems of mystical philosophy closely related. Each finds at the source and center of the Universe a God, Who is the object of the affections of the soul. He is felt in religious contemplation. He is the true object of the religious sentiments. The soul of man must indeed be prepared and purified before he is able to know Him. But, such purification accomplished, He is visible to the pure in heart. God is the loftiest and truest object of the sentiments of the soul. He is the heart and center of the Universe, the source of being and reality itself.

The whole of Ancient Thought thus agrees in having, as its aim

and purpose, knowledge of the essential nature of the world. All three of its phases are at one in affirming this Reality to be a Being of such attributes and qualities as men are accustomed to term Divine. Knowledge of such a Being is alike the function of the cognitive, the volitional, and the affective aspects of the mind.

CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE

I. Ancient Philosophy 600 B.C.— 430 A.D.
II. Mediaeval Philosophy 430 A.D.—1450 A.D.
III. Modern Philosophy 1450 A.D.—1914? A.D.

I. Ancient Philosophy 600 B.C.—430 A.D.
1. Early Constructive Period 600 B.C.—400 B.C.
2. Critical Period 480 B.C.—400 B.C.
3. Later Constructive Period 400 B.C.—322 B.C.
4. Greco-Roman Philosophy 322 B.C.—430 A.D.

1. Early Constructive Period 600 B.C.—400 B.C.
(a) School of Miletus (ἀρχή)
(1) Thales (water, eclipse 585 B.C.)
(2) Anaximander (ἄπειρον, evolution, gravity)
(3) Anaximenes (air)
(b) Problem of Being and Becoming.
(1) The Eleatic School 570 B.C.—430 B.C. (Being)
a) Xenophanes (Prophet, monotheism)
b) Parmenides (Being, Reason and Perception)
c) Zeno (Relativity, Achilles and tortoise, Stadium)
(2) Heraclitus of Ephasus 536 B.C.—470 B.C. (Becoming) (Universal Change, Fire and Flood, Clash of Forces, Law)
(c) Attempts at Reconciliation
(1) Empedocles (4 elements, 2 forces, Love and Hate)
(2) Anaxagoras (x elements, The Nous)
(3) The Atomists. (The atom and the void, Materialism)
a) Leucippus (Founder of the school)
b) Democratus (Atomic theory of matter, Necessity of Natural Law, Mental images derived from senses).
(4) The Pythagoreans. (Pythagoras founded order, Harmony. Number essence of Universe, Mathematics, Music, Astronomy. Applications of Mathematics to Science, Atoms differ in geometrical form and obey mathematical laws, no blind necessity).

2. The Critical Period. 480 B.C.—400 B.C.
   (a) The Sophists (Teachers, Higher Education, Scepticism)
      (1) Protagoras 480 B.C.—410 B.C.—(Teacher of "Virtue.")
      (2) Gorgias 483 B.C.—375 B.C. (Teacher of Rhetoric.)
      (3) Hippias, Prodicus and many others. (Influence, teachings.)
   (b) Socrates. 469 B.C.—399 B.C. (Reason, Refutation of Sophists, Dialectic, Rational Freedom.)

3. Later Constructive Period. 400 B.C.—322 B.C.
   (a) Plato. 427 B.C. 347 B.C. (Ideas.)
   (b) Aristotle 385 B.C.—322 B.C. (Forms Matter, Evolution, Sciences.)

4. Greco-Roman Philosophy. 322 B.C.—430 A.D.
   (a) Ethical, (Epicureans and Stoics, Schools of Athens.)
   (b) Scientific, (Syracuse Archimedes, Alexandria Euclid.)
   (c) Religious, (Mysticism, Christianity, Neo-Platonism, Alexandria, Rome).

READING LIST

College students beginning the History of Philosophy, and others who desire supplementary reading, should read the following in connection with the chapters indicated:

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY.
G. Santayana, "Egotism in German Philosophy," pp. 11 to 169.
Locy, "Biology and its Makers," pp. 345 to 437.

CHAPTER II. THE EARLY CONSTRUCTIVE PERIOD.
Walter Pater, "Plato and Platonism," chapters I, II and III.

CHAPTER III. THE SOPHISTS AND SOCRATES.
Walter Pater, "Plato and Platonism," Chapters IV and V.
Plato, the "Protagoras," the "Gorgias," and the "Theaetetus."

CHAPTER IV. PLATO.
Walter Pater, "Plato and Platonism," Chapters VI to X inclusive.
Plato, The "Republic," the "Symposium."

CHAPTER V. ARISTOTLE.
Hyde, "Five Great Philosophies of Life," Chapter IV.
Aristotle, "Politics."

CHAPTER VI. GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.
Hyde, "Five Great Philosophies of Life," Chapters I and II.
Seneca, "On Friendship."
Kingsley, "Hypatia."

For a wider course of reading the following are recommended in addition to the above: Plato's "Apology," "Crito," "Phaedo," "Phaedrus," "Parmenides," and "Timaeus, "Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics," and "Metaphysics," Seneca's "Morals." Epictitus' "Discourses," Marcus Aurelius', "Meditations," Maeterlinck's "Wisdom and Destiny."

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The following books are recommended for purposes of general reference:

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